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Chapter 1  
General introduction 
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1.1 Background 
This thesis is motivated by the approach used by the Dutch animal health authorities to 
control the enduring bluetongue serotype 8 disease epidemic in 2008. National governments in 
Europe collaborate supranationally via the European Union (EU) and the World Organisation for 
Animal Health to improve the control of livestock diseases. The EU has put in place legislation for a 
number of livestock diseases, including bluetongue, indicating what control measures each member 
state should apply in case of an outbreak. A large epidemic of bluetongue virus serotype 8 in Europe 
started at the end of 2006. The required measures, such as movement restrictions, use of 
insecticides and indoor housing of livestock (European Council, 2000; European Council, 2007), 
did not sufficiently reduce the disease transmission in 2007. By the end of 2007, nearly 60,000 
holdings with ruminants were affected (Wilson and Mellor, 2009).  
New EU legislation was developed in 2008 in which it was proposed to apply a mass 
emergency vaccination campaign “to achieve the objectives of reducing clinical disease and losses, 
containing the spread of the disease, protecting free territories in the Member States and facilitating 
safe trade in live animals” (European Council, 2008). The Dutch animal health authorities used a 
voluntary vaccination approach and two types of policy instruments to motivate (incentivise) 
participation. A communicative intervention was implemented in which the government 
representatives as well as farmer organizations conveyed written or oral recommendations to the 
farmers to vaccinate their cattle. Subsidization of the vaccination costs was another policy 
instrument put in place (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008). From an epidemiological perspective, 
this approach was successful as only 66 new outbreaks were reported in 2008, compared to 6,500 
in 2007 (Elbers et al., 2009b).  
From an economic perspective, voluntary approaches are more flexible in terms of 
legislation while they can be effective at lower costs, since the ex-ante transaction costs of lobbying 
and legislation and ex-post transaction costs of surveillance and enforcement can be minimized 
(Furubotn and Richter, 1998; Segerson, 2013). The question remains whether a voluntary approach 
can be effective in controlling the transmission of bluetongue and other vector-borne livestock 
diseases. 
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The domain of the economics of animal health assesses the economic impact of livestock 
diseases and quantifies, compares and optimizes ex-ante as well as ex-post decision-making at 
various levels (Dijkhuizen et al., 1995). At the farm level, work in this field aims at making a farmer 
understand what, for example, the financial consequences are when disease control measures are 
adopted by the farmer (e.g. Hogeveen et al., 2011). In this sense, disease control can be seen as 
an on-farm input. Setting the marginal rates of substitution of inputs equal to their relative prices 
would give the economically optimal use of each input, including disease control. The optimal level 
of disease control can be such that a disease is allowed to some extent (McInerney, 1996).  
It should be noted though that bluetongue, and many other livestock diseases, can affect 
not only the animal health status at the own farm but also at e.g. neighbouring farms. A farm’s 
animal health status thus has public good characteristics, implying that externalities are involved. 
The extent to which the animal health status is a public good largely depends on the taxonomy of 
the livestock disease being dealt with. For example, the risk of a contagious disease outbreak within 
a certain region is dependent on the aggregate decision-making of all farmers within this region, 
while the level of private investments depends on the regional disease risk. Each private decision 
to invest or not in disease control (i.e. vaccination) has also an impact on the animal health status 
at neighbouring farms either positively or negatively. Theoretical studies in the domain of economics 
of animal health that account for the endogenous nature of infection risk predict that, due to these 
externalities, farmers likely underinvest in private disease control measures compared to the 
socially optimal level of investment (Beach et al., 2007; Gramig and Horan, 2011; Zilberman et al., 
2012). Public intervention may then be justified when such market failures occur. Other market 
failures related to animal health arise from information asymmetries, resulting in moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems (e.g. Rushton et al., 2007; Hennessy and Wolf, 2015). Traditionally, 
public intervention followed a command-and-control approach of regulation and enforcement. 
Nowadays, the governance of animal health is shifting in the direction of a neoliberal model of cost 
and responsibility sharing, with forms of self-regulation being considered (Oude Lansink, 2011; 
Maye et al., 2014; Gilbert and Rushton, 2016).  
The effectiveness of an intervention based on a voluntary approach (e.g. a vaccination 
scheme) depends on farmers’ willingness to invest in disease control. Economic theory assumes 
the underlying decision-making process is such that farmers pursue the objective of maximising 
income and act in full rationality and self-interest. While still assuming these axioms, it is possible 
to include risk taking behaviour to the decision-making process using the expected utility criterion, 
and account as such for the widely accepted notion that farmers behave in a risk-averse manner 
(Ngategize et al., 1986; Hardaker et al., 2015).  
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Authors in the field of economics of animal health have suggested to go a step further and 
complement economic theory with insights from behavioural sciences (Edwards-Jones, 2006; 
Barnes et al., 2015; Gilbert and Rushton, 2016). Contextual factors that can be considered as key 
determinants of the willingness to invest in disease control are the experiential consequences of 
decisions (Elbers et al., 2010; Gethmann et al., 2015), in the economic literature known as non-use 
or passive values or nonpecuniary benefits (e.g. Lagerkvist et al., 2011; Howley, 2015). Other 
factors are perceptions of disease risk (Flaten et al., 2005; Valeeva et al., 2011), and of trust and 
confidence in the vaccine safety and effectiveness and in the disease control approach chosen by 
animal health authorities (Palmer et al., 2009; Enticott et al., 2014). In reasoned action theory 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), these contextual factors are 
reflected in attitudinal and control beliefs. These social-psychological theories further emphasize 
that in the process of decision-making, farmers are likely influenced by their social environment, i.e. 
they perceive social pressures from different types of norms. 
1.2 Problem statement 
The scientific literature on farmers’ willingness to invest in livestock disease control is 
fragmented and key findings from different research disciplines are not integrated. Economic 
studies on this subject emphasize the importance of understanding interactions between farmers’ 
collective behaviour and disease epidemiology. The focus then is on the design and use of financial, 
incentive-based policy instruments to compensate for externalities. However, these models are 
limited in their ability to account for process and context in decision making and ignore non-
economic motives to invest in disease control. For example, decision making might be partially 
driven by perceived social pressures to vaccinate from peers or other referents when the disease 
comes closer. If the willingness to invest in livestock disease control is also driven by intrinsic and 
social motives, this could imply that not only financial compensation, but a mix of policy instruments 
is needed to reach effectiveness and maximum efficiency. Effectiveness refers to reaching the 
objective of controlling disease spread. Efficiency refers to the ratio between costs and benefits. 
This asks for an integrated research approach that considers (1) the heterogeneity in farmers’ 
responses to policies based on the idea that farmers differ in their motives to invest in livestock 
disease control and at the same time (2) the interplay between farmers’ collective behaviour and 
animal disease epidemiology. 
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1.3 Research objectives 
This thesis will apply economic and social psychological theories and methods on the case 
of bluetongue vaccination to identify and assess economic and non-economic motives to invest in 
livestock disease control. The overarching research objective of this thesis was to assess the key 
determinants of farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue and study the impact of 
different policy designs on the effectiveness of voluntary vaccination approaches to bluetongue 
disease control. 
Specific objectives were to: 
RO1. model and evaluate farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue considering 
economic motives only; 
RO2. identify and assess the relative importance of key social-psychological constructs in 
explaining the willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue; 
RO3. identify and assess the beliefs underlying the key social-psychological constructs that drive 
the farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue; 
RO4. explore the factors explaining heterogeneity in beliefs that drive the farmers’ willingness to 
vaccinate against bluetongue; 
RO5. assess farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue under different policy designs, 
considering economic, intrinsic and social motives; 
RO6. model and evaluate farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue under different 
policy designs, considering economic, intrinsic and social motives and the interplay between 
farmers’ collective behaviour and disease epidemiology.  
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1.4 Methodology  
A three-stage research approach was conducted, as shown in Figure 1. Starting point in 
reasoning how farmers make a decision to invest in livestock disease control is expected utility 
theory (EUT). It is assumed in EUT that people behave as if information is processed to form 
perception and beliefs, and preferences are primitive, consistent, and immutable (Ben-Akiva et al., 
1999; McFadden, 1999). The decision-making process is treated as a black box; it does not 
consider how people form preferences and make choices. The decision is ruled by a set of 
mathematical axioms that assume a rational decision maker. In the context of livestock disease 
control decision making, the EUT considers usually the economic risk and monetary outcomes of 
the decision, intrinsic or social aspects are neglected (Hardaker et al., 2015).  
 
Farmers’ willingness to invest in 
livestock disease control 
considering economic motives only 
(RO1)
Key social-psychological factors 
that explain the willingness to 
invest in livestock disease control 
(RO2, RO3, RO4)
Farmers’ willingness to invest in 
livestock disease control 
under different policy designs 
(RO5)
Farmers’ willingness to invest in 
livestock disease control 
(RO6)
Disease epidemiology input
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
 
Figure 1-1: A three-stage research approach to modelling farmers’ willingness to invest in livestock disease 
control. 
 
The first stage in this thesis consisted of applying two models of decision making on the 
farmers’ decision problem of vaccination against bluetongue: the EUT and the reasoned action 
approach (RAA) from social psychology, which is the latest formulation of the reasoned action theory 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). The motivation for applying both models was to get a richer 
understanding of how farmers make their decision to invest in livestock disease control. In contrast 
to the EUT, in the RAA farmers’ decision-making process is not constrained by economic rationality. 
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The only assumption made is that an individual’s (intended) behaviour follows reasonably from 
beliefs, which are decomposed into attitudinal, normative and control beliefs. These beliefs may be 
inaccurate, biased, or even irrational (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005).  
One way to assessing the process and context of decision making in economic models is 
to include social-psychological constructs of behaviour. The integrated choice and latent variable 
(ICLV) model is an extended discrete choice model, in which next to preferences, these constructs 
are modelled to account for heterogeneity in preferences. It offers a general econometric 
framework to supplement economic theory with concepts or theories from social sciences (Walker 
and Ben-Akiva, 2002; Walker et al., 2007; Ben-Akiva et al., 2012). Some of the process (steps 
involved in decision making) and context (factors affecting the process) are taken into account, and 
so enhance the behavioural representation in economic models. 
The second stage involved the development and testing of a generalized random utility 
model of farmers’ behaviour that allowed for heterogeneity in motives to invest in bluetongue 
disease control. The ICLV model was used as the overall modelling framework and a discrete choice 
experiment was designed to obtain farmers’ preferences for different voluntary bluetongue 
vaccination designs. Findings from the first step were used in two ways. First, to capture different 
perceptions of farmers associated with livestock disease control in some attributes of the 
vaccination scheme. Second, to select the social-psychological constructs and relevant farm 
characteristics that could explain preference heterogeneity for these attributes. As such, economic, 
intrinsic and social motives to invest in livestock disease control were taken into account. 
In the third stage, an agent based model of the interplay between farmers’ collective 
behaviour and bluetongue disease epidemiology was developed. The utility model developed in the 
second stage was employed to represent decision making, and was connected with a social network 
structure. Two simple heuristics update the social-psychological constructs, and subsequently 
utility, using temporal and spatial information available from the simulation model. Farmers observe 
the number and closeness of bluetongue infected farms and construct a measure of risk perception. 
Farmers observe the number of vaccinated network links and construct a measure of perceived 
social pressure to vaccinate. The epidemiology of bluetongue was modelled by a susceptible-latent-
infectious-recovered (SLIR) model, in which the distance dependent transmission from an infected 
farm to a susceptible farm is modelled stochastically by a Poisson process. The effectiveness of 
different policy designs (from the choice experiment) was simulated in terms of disease rate and 
vaccination uptake. 
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Table 1 shows in which way data were collected to address the research objectives 
specified. Decision analysis was used for RO1 to structure the bluetongue vaccination problem into 
decisions, events and payoffs, and to define the relationships among these elements (Clemen and 
Winkler, 1999; Hardaker et al., 2015). Probabilities were estimated by experts, payoffs were based 
on values from the bluetongue literature. 
 
Table 1-1: Overview of the research approaches used in this thesis. 
Research 
objective 
Model of decision making Statistical or simulation 
method 
Model parameterisation 
RO1 Expected utility theory Decision (tree) analysis,        
Monte Carlo simulation 
Expert consultation  
Values from the literature 
RO2 Reasoned action approach Structural equation model First random sample of 1,500 
Dutch dairy farms. Data obtained 
via a survey based on the 
reasoned action approach.  RO3 Structural equation (MIMIC) 
model 
RO4 Cluster analysis,           
Multinomial logit model 
RO5 Random utility / Discrete choice 
theory,    Integrated choice and 
latent variable model approach 
Conditional logit model,        
Mixed logit model 
Second random sample of 
1,500 Dutch dairy farms. Data 
obtained via a choice experiment 
survey. RO6 Agent based model 
simulation 
 
A first survey was developed for RO2, RO3 and RO4 based on the reasoned action 
approach. Farmers’ beliefs were first identified and elicited from semi-qualitative interviews held in 
May/June 2013 with 7 dairy farmers and 1 veterinarian from different parts within the Netherlands. 
The survey was sent in January 2014 to a random sample of 1,500 Dutch dairy farms that was 
drawn from the National Cattle Identification and Registration Database. The survey data was 
analysed using several, mostly multivariate, statistical techniques. 
A survey-based discrete choice experiment was developed for RO5 and RO6. The survey 
was sent in April 2015 to a random sample of 1,500 other Dutch dairy farms that was drawn from 
the National Cattle Identification and Registration Database. The survey data was analysed using 
several econometric models. Farmer profiles and estimations from the econometric model were 
used in the agent based model simulation. 
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1.5 Thesis outline 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The general introduction and general discussion are 
the first and final chapter. Each of the six chapters in between addresses one of the research 
objectives that were defined in section 1.3. Chapter 2 corresponds with RO1, and evaluates 
farmers’ expected utility based on the monetary net benefits of voluntary vaccination against 
bluetongue. 
Chapter 3 corresponds with RO2, and assesses the social-psychological constructs that 
predict the intention to vaccinate against bluetongue and are functional for the design of voluntary 
vaccination strategies. Chapter 4 corresponds with RO3, and assesses which beliefs underlying the 
social-psychological constructs drive the intention to vaccinate against bluetongue and evaluates 
the vaccination strategy implemented by the Dutch animal health authorities in 2008. Chapter 5 
corresponds with RO4, and explores whether there is heterogeneity in farmers’ attitudinal beliefs 
about vaccination against bluetongue, and which factors are associated with the heterogeneity. 
Chapter 6 corresponds with RO5, and assesses farmers’ preferences for bluetongue 
vaccination scheme attributes and explains preference heterogeneity by linking it to social-
psychological constructs and farm and farmer characteristics. Chapter  7 corresponds with RO6, 
and simulates the disease rate and vaccination uptake under different policy designs. 
Chapter 8 provides a synthesis of the results found throughout this thesis. The implications 
for policy making are subsequently discussed, followed by the main scientific contributions of this 
thesis, and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
Chapter 2  
Expected utility of voluntary vaccination in the middle of an 
emergent bluetongue virus serotype 8 epidemic: a decision 
analysis parameterized for Dutch circumstances 
 
Authors: J. Sok, H. Hogeveen, A. R. W. Elbers, A. G. J. Velthuis, A. G. J. M. Oude Lansink 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published in Preventive Veterinary Medicine, Vol. 115 (2014) pp. 75 – 87  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.03.027  
  
18 
Abstract 
In order to put a halt to the bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) epidemic in 2008, the 
European Commission promoted vaccination at a transnational level as a new measure to combat 
BTV-8. Most European member states opted for a mandatory vaccination campaign, whereas the 
Netherlands, amongst others, opted for a voluntary campaign. For the latter to be effective, the 
farmer’s willingness to vaccinate should be high enough to reach satisfactory vaccination coverage 
to stop the spread of the disease. This study looked at a farmer’s expected utility of vaccination, 
which is expected to have a positive impact on the willingness to vaccinate. 
Decision analysis was used to structure the vaccination decision problem into decisions, 
events and payoffs, and to define the relationships among these elements. Two scenarios were 
formulated to distinguish farmers’ mindsets, based on differences in dairy heifer management. For 
each of the scenarios, a decision tree was run for two years to study vaccination behaviour over 
time. The analysis was done based on the expected utility criterion. This allows to account for the 
effect of a farmer’s risk preference on the vaccination decision. Probabilities were estimated by 
experts, payoffs were based on an earlier published study.  
According to the results of the simulation, the farmer decided initially to vaccinate against 
BTV-8 as the net expected utility of vaccination was positive. Re-vaccination was uncertain  due to 
less expected costs of a continued outbreak. A risk averse farmer in this respect is more likely to 
re-vaccinate. When heifers were retained for export on the farm, the net expected utility of 
vaccination was found to be generally larger and thus was re-vaccination more likely to happen. 
For future animal health programmes that rely on a voluntary approach, results show that 
the provision of financial incentives can be adjusted to the farmers’ willingness to vaccinate over 
time. Important in this respect are the decision moment and the characteristics of the disease. 
Farmers’ perceptions of the disease risk and about the efficacy of available control options cannot 
be neglected. 
 
Keywords 
bluetongue, emergent disease, voluntary vaccination, decision-making, risk aversion, risk 
perception  
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2.1 Introduction 
Introduction of a vector-borne disease can have large socio-economic consequences, in 
terms of production, policy and trade (Burrell, 2002). bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) appeared 
in north-western Europe in August 2006, where this serotype was previously unknown to the 
European Union (EU). This specific serotype affected also cattle with clinical disease, whereas 
symptoms of other serotypes usually were seen in sheep (Elbers et al., 2008a). 
In response to this outbreak, the Dutch government started to put reactive measures into 
place based on EU Directive 2000/75/EC. The Directive stipulated the disease should be 
combatted and eradicated using control, monitoring, surveillance and restrictions on movements 
of susceptible animal species (European Council, 2000; European Council, 2007). In detail, 
measures entailed diagnostics, mandatory indoor housing of ruminants, medical treatment of 
animals, treatment of stables and vehicles for animal transport with insecticides, extra testing of 
animals for export and movement restrictions (Velthuis et al., 2010). Nevertheless, many new 
outbreaks were reported after July 2007. This indicated that BTV-8 had survived successfully the 
winter of 2006, despite hopes that the cold seasonal temperatures would have constrained the 
outbreak (Wilson and Mellor, 2009). In order to put a halt to the BTV-8 epidemic, the EU Commission 
promoted a vaccination campaign at transnational level to be started in the spring of 2008. It was 
expected that the virus would be manageable by an effective use of vaccination (Wilson and Mellor, 
2008). Furthermore the Commission decided to provide financial incentives “to prevent the spread 
of the disease as rapidly as possible” (European Council, 2008). Member states like Belgium and 
Germany opted for a mandatory vaccination campaign. Other member states, such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, decided to offer their farmers a voluntary vaccination program 
with provision of financial incentives. In the Netherlands, bad experiences of cattle farmers with a 
past mandatory vaccination campaign against Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis, when a batch of 
vaccines was contaminated, were amongst the reasons to adopt a voluntary program (Elbers et al., 
2010). The main reasons to adopt a voluntary program in the UK were to minimize the regulatory 
burden on the industry and avoid a costly system of enforcement to check compliance (2008).  
The financial consequences in the Netherlands until the year in which the vaccination 
programme took place were estimated to be €32.4 million in 2006, mainly because of indirect 
costs of control and diagnosis. In the subsequent year, the costs were estimated at €170 million 
Euros, primarily as a result of direct costs of the disease (Velthuis et al., 2010). 
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The effectiveness of the vaccination programs within each member state are not known for 
all EU countries. For the Netherlands a vaccination coverage of 70 – 80% was reached in 2008 
(Elbers et al., 2010) and new infections in the subsequent years were not reported.  
Before and during a voluntary vaccination campaign, it was unclear whether the costs and 
responsibility sharing with the farmer community led to a successful uptake, and what the effect of 
providing financial incentives would be. In the UK, some veterinary experts discussed the 
responsibility of the government in the control of diseases such as bluetongue (e.g. Brownlie, 2008; 
Orpin, 2008). The central element of discussion was the trade-off between effectiveness and 
efficiency, between a guaranteed high vaccination coverage for eradication with higher government 
spending on enforcement (mandatory) and on the other hand a vaccination campaign with less 
certainty about the resulting coverage, but more efficient and fast distribution of vaccines and less 
public spending (voluntary). For the latter, the farmer’s willingness to vaccinate had to be high in 
order to reach a coverage that eradicated BTV-8, which is the leading goal (European Council, 
2000). The coverage aimed for to prevent between herd-transmission was 80 per cent (Velthuis et 
al., 2011). 
In the field economics of animal health, only a few studies looked specifically at voluntary 
participation in animal health programmes. The voluntary participation in pre-outbreak animal 
disease insurances was studied with special attention to the risk attitude and/or risk perception of 
farmers (Ogurtsov et al., 2009; Niemi and Heikkilä, 2011). For vaccination – that might be 
considered as insurance before, during or after an epidemic – the collective effectiveness of a 
voluntary campaign was studied for a theoretical endemic disease comparable to Bovine Viral 
Diarrhoea (Rat-Aspert and Fourichon, 2010). In these studies, the characteristics of the disease and 
the decision moment differed. These factors were considered to be important decision variables 
when modelling the vaccination behaviour, just as the risk attitude of farmers.     
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing a decision model that can be 
used as a basic framework to assess a farmer’s expected utility of an intervention to control 
disease, such as vaccination. Furthermore, with this decision model we simulated the farmer’s 
expected utility of (voluntary) vaccination in the middle of an emergent BTV-8 epidemic, to study 
determinants of the willingness to vaccinate, which is expected to increase with the expected utility 
of vaccination. The results of this study can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of policy 
instruments, e.g. provision of financial incentives that encourage a successful uptake of voluntary 
vaccination. 
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2.2 Materials and methods 
This study used decision analysis, utilizing a decision tree, to simulate the farmer’s decision 
to vaccinate against BTV-8 as part of the public voluntary vaccination programme. Decision analysis 
is a prescriptive model of choice based on logical derivations from some axioms ruling how a 
Decision Maker (DM) would act in making risky decisions. Risk is defined here as uncertain 
consequences (Hardaker et al., 2004). The corresponding axioms that allow to derive a DM’s 
expected utility in a consistent way is, for example described by Clemen and Reilly (1999). In this 
study the farmer has been conceptualized as a rational economic DM that maximizes expected 
utility (see Seegers et al., 1994; Hardaker et al., 2004).  
Strong assumptions were made on the structure of the decision problem. In decision 
analysis the decision problem is split into separate events or uncertain states of nature, and related 
consequences or payoffs. The belief of the DM about the likelihood of occurrence of an event is 
reflected with a probability . A payoff indicates what happens in terms of income, given the decision 
taken and the related event(s) that occur (Hardaker et al., 2004). The analysis was done using 
Precision Tree and @Risk (Palisade Inc., NY, USA), both add-in software to MS Excel. 
2.2.1 Structuring the problem 
2.2.1.1 Influence diagram 
We used an influence diagram to firstly structure the decision problem into decisions, events 
and payoffs and then define the relationships among these elements (Hardaker et al., 2004).  
The decision to vaccinate has economic and epidemiologic consequences. In Figure 1, 
epidemiological relationships are indicated with solid arrows. Vaccination reduces the probability of 
being confronted with disease effects of the BTV-8 outbreak. Over time, it lowers the national herd 
susceptibility against BTV-8 because of less virus circulation, which in turn lowers the herd exposure 
on a single farm. In Figure 1, economic relationships are indicated with dashed arrows. Vaccination 
ensures that direct costs of disease effects of BTV-8, such as production losses and fertility 
problems, are minimized. Furthermore, it ensures that export of heifers can be continued 
independently of what the national BTV-8 status is, thereby avoiding a drop of heifer prices. Both 
effects finally impact the income.  
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Figure 2-1: Influence diagram for the decision to vaccinate against BTV-8 in one year. A square represents 
a decision, a circle represents an event and a diamond indicates the consequence of the interaction 
between decisions made and the events.  
 
The set of relationships taken into account by the DM determines to a large extent the 
outcome of the decision problem. The key basic consideration is that vaccination reduces the 
impact of BTV-8, costs of vaccination are weighted against the (direct) costs and likelihood of 
disease. In Figure 1, this consideration is represented by relationships 1, 2 and 3. Another 
consideration relates to dairy heifer management aimed at rearing heifers for export, in Figure 1 
represented by relationships 4 and 5.  
Over time, a high vaccination uptake can be effective in controlling the transmission of BTV-
8 thereby reducing the incidence of outbreaks, and hence is dependent on the aggregated decision 
to vaccinate of the whole sector. However, an initial high vaccination uptake might lead to a decision 
not to vaccinate in the subsequent year when costs of vaccination are weighed against the expected 
costs of a continued outbreak (Rat-Aspert and Fourichon, 2010). This third consideration is 
represented by relationships 6 and 7 in Figure 1.   
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In summary, the scenarios formulated distinguished two different DM’s mind sets. In 
scenario 1, the basic consideration was studied. In scenario 2 the consideration related to heifer 
export was added to the basic consideration. For each of the scenarios a decision tree was solved. 
Both scenarios were run for two years to study the third consideration, which is vaccination 
behaviour over time.  
2.2.1.2 Decision tree 
As structured with the influence diagram (scenarios), a decision tree was made to represent 
the decision problem chronologically and in greater detail. Figure 2 shows a decision tree to 
illustrate the decision problem in each scenario. The full tree is a representation of scenario 2 for 
the two years. Scenario 1 is represented by a part of this tree, excluding the event export restriction 
(EXR). 
For each decision tree, at first the decision to vaccinate or not had to be made. A positive 
decision implied expenditures, the costs of vaccinating the herd. After the decision to vaccinate, 
the DM was subject to some events. For the basic consideration studied in scenario 1, these were 
the events of herd exposure to BTV-8 and of being confronted with disease effects (Figure 2). 
Probabilities and payoffs were assigned to all events. The decision outcome can influence 
probability values. For example, the decision to vaccinate reduced the probability of being 
confronted with direct costs of BTV-8 to approximately zero.  
For year 1, three probabilities were derived for scenario 1. The first probability was herd 
exposure (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1) to BTV-8 at the start of the outbreak. For each event, the probabilities of two 
branches necessarily have to add up to 1. With this rule, the probability of for example no herd 
exposure can be calculated. Then, if the herd was exposed, the probability of being confronted with 
disease effects (𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1), depends on whether the herd has been vaccinated (𝑉𝑉1), or not (𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1). Export 
of heifers was only allowed if it was proven, by use of a diagnostic test, that no BTV-8 was circulating 
or that vaccination took place (European Council, 2007). The event added was a diagnostic test 
result indicating presence of BTV-8 after which an export restriction was put in place (𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1) when 
the result was negative. Vaccination on forehand reduced the probability of disease effects and thus 
indirectly the probability of a negative test result, indicating disease presence. 
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Figure 2-2: Decision tree representation of the vaccination problem for two years. After deciding to 
vaccinate (𝑽𝑽 or 𝑵𝑵𝑽𝑽), the events of herd exposure (𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯), disease effects (𝑫𝑫𝑯𝑯) and export effects (restriction) 
(𝑯𝑯𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬) follow. 
 
The likelihood of a continued outbreak (year 2) was captured by the probability of herd 
exposure 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2. A large vaccination uptake by the farmer community in year 1 lowered 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2compared 
to 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1. The likelihood thus depended on the aggregated decision to vaccinate of the farmer 
community, while the private decision to revaccinate depended on that changing likelihood (Beach 
et al., 2007). This endogenous process was difficult to capture in a probability but should contain 
the DM’s belief on the vaccination decisions of the farmer community, combined with the 
epidemiological consequences of that uptake.  
Considering (re-)vaccination in year 2, the probability of being confronted with disease 
effects (𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2) depended on what happened in year 1 of the outbreak and the initial vaccination 
decision made by the DM. A herd previously infected by the disease may develop lifelong immunity 
in which case no disease effects are observed (Elbers et al., 2010). If the herd was vaccinated in 
year 1 and disease effects did not appear (𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1) intermediately, the probability of 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2 was reduced 
due to continuing but decreasing efficacy of the initial vaccine. Besides disease effects, also export 
effects (𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2) depended on the outcomes of previous events and the initial vaccination decision in 
year 1. 
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2.2.2 Risk preferences 
 Incorporating the attitude towards risk is useful since it was an important consideration in 
the decision-making process to vaccinate for BTV-8 (Elbers et al., 2010). Although farmers are 
commonly assumed to be risk averse (Hardaker et al., 2004), it was not clear how risk is considered 
and taken into account in the decision to vaccinate. For example, the time-point when the decision 
problem occurs is important to the DM; the risk attitude may be considerably different in the middle 
of an outbreak situation compared to a disease-free situation. A single utility function cannot 
represent these two situations and therefore can only be specified for a short period of time under 
a given set of circumstances (Ngategize et al., 1986).  
In this study, a negative exponential utility function (1) was considered to reflect a DM’s risk 
preference: 
𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤) = 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝑤𝑤 𝑅𝑅⁄ ,𝑤𝑤 > 0,𝐸𝐸 > 0                          (1) 
where 𝑤𝑤 is income and 𝐸𝐸 is a parameter that captures the risk tolerance and describes the 
curvature of the utility function. Utility is maximized through income. The risk tolerance indicates 
how much risk (in terms of income) the DM is willing to take. In studies in economics of animal 
health, usually the risk aversion coefficient is used to study risk attitudes (e.g. Rat-Aspert and 
Fourichon, 2010; Niemi and Heikkilä, 2011), whereas the risk tolerance concept more often is used 
within financial economic literature (Clemen and Reilly, 1999). However, both concepts are closely 
related as the risk aversion coefficient is the reciprocal of risk tolerance (Pratt (1964) in: Clemen 
and Reilly, 1999). By fluctuating 𝐸𝐸, the attitude towards risk can be varied. A low 𝐸𝐸 indicates high 
risk aversion; the curve corresponding to the utility function becomes more concave. When 𝐸𝐸 
becomes infinite, the curve is flat, representing risk neutrality. The utility function in (1) has constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) properties: income does not affect the degree of risk aversion.  
Impact of risk aversion on the vaccination decision was studied by comparing the certainty 
equivalents (𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻). The 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 is defined as: the amount of money (in terms of income) that is equivalent 
to a given situation that involves uncertainty (Clemen and Reilly, 1999). It can be obtained by taking 
the inverse of (1): 
𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻) = −𝐸𝐸[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(−𝑈𝑈(𝑤𝑤) + 1)],𝑤𝑤 > 0,𝐸𝐸 > 0.                       (2) 
If the DM is risk neutral, the 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 is equal to the expected monetary value (𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉). If the DM is risk 
averse, the 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 > 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉.  
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The effect of risk aversion on the decision outcomes was studied with different predefined 
risk tolerance levels set. Savings were taken as a proxy for the risk tolerance level. The risk 
tolerance levels (𝐸𝐸) were set to €30,000 for a hardly risk averse DM and €3,000 for a highly risk 
averse DM. The first number corresponded with the average savings of an average dairy farm 
between 2004 – 2006 (LEI/CBS, 2008) and the latter value is 10 per cent of this. An infinite risk 
tolerance level represented a risk neutral DM. 
2.2.3 Model parameterization 
The voluntary vaccination program in The Netherlands took first place in May 2008 (Elbers 
et al., 2010). At that time, many farms in a large part of the Netherlands had been infected with 
BTV-8 in the former two years. However, farms located in the Northern provinces were barely 
affected (Velthuis et al., 2011), and thus still susceptible to the disease. The starting point of the 
model was an average dairy farm located in an area with susceptible herds for BTV-8. Statistics 
indicated that the average dairy farm had a herd size ℎ𝑠𝑠 of 76 cows (LEI/CBS, 2008). Other cattle 
production systems else than dairy farms were not considered in this study; in the Netherlands, 
most cattle farms are dairy farms and represent also the highest economic value in the cattle 
production sector. Based on Elbers et al. (2008b), it was assumed that only dairy cows would be 
clinically affected and not young stock and calves.  
First, the decision itself could only be taken at some costs: the total costs of vaccinating 
the herd 𝑉𝑉, assuming that the entire herd, including young stock and calves, was vaccinated.  It 
was calculated as: 
𝑉𝑉 = 2 × (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + ℎ𝑟𝑟 × 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + (ℎ𝑠𝑠 + ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) × (𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)),                                                      (3) 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 10 + 0.5 × (ℎ𝑠𝑠 + (ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)),                              (4) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 the call-out fee, ℎ𝑟𝑟 the hourly rate of the veterinarian, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 the duration of the herd vaccination, 
the numbers 10 and 0.5 stand for the preparation time and the time of one vaccine administration 
respectively, ℎ𝑠𝑠 the herd size, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 the replacement rate, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 the calving age, 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 the cost of a vaccine 
dosage, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 the cost of dispense material of one dosage and 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 is the cost of registering each 
dosage. The resulting input parameters are summarized in Table 2. The herd vaccination had to be 
done twice (Schwartz-Cornil et al., 2008), so total costs of vaccinating the herd were multiplied by 
two. Total costs of vaccination at a farm with export activities 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 were slightly higher due to a 
higher proportion of young stock and calves being kept (see Appendix I). 
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Table 2-1: Description of the input parameters used for calculating the economic consequences of 
vaccination against BTV-8 for the average Dutch dairy farm in 2008. 
Variable Description Unit Input parameter Source 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 Call-out fee veterinarian euro/visit 20.58 Velthuis et al., 2011 
ℎ𝑟𝑟 Hourly rate veterinarian euro/hour 116.17 Velthuis et al., 2011 
ℎ𝑠𝑠 Average herd size # dairy cows 76 LEI/CBS, 2008 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 Replacement  rate % 28 Mohd Nor et al., 2013a 
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 Drop-out rate % 8 Mohd Nor et al., 2013a 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 Calving age years 2.25 Mohd Nor et al., 2013b 
𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 Vaccine costs euro/dosage 0.40 Velthuis et al., 2011 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 Dispense material costs  euro/dosage 0.02 Velthuis et al., 2011 
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 Registration costs euro/dosage 0.05 Velthuis et al., 2011 
 
2.2.3.1 Payoffs 
Payoff calculations were based on a deterministic economic model (Velthuis et al., 2010). 
The model was adjusted for the assessment of the total loss from the BTV-8 epidemic for an 
individual (average) dairy farm and is described by:  
𝐿𝐿 = (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿) + 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,                                                          (4) 
where 𝐿𝐿 are the total losses at a dairy farm, 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 the diagnostic costs, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 the treatment costs and 
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 the production losses. The latter are associated with mortality, reduced milk production, weight 
losses and fertility and gestation problems and were calculated in the same way as Velthuis et al. 
(2010). These cost categories together made up the total direct costs of the disease.  
Export restrictions 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 are indirect costs. It is the yearly number of heifers that regularly is 
exported, multiplied by the price change as a result of the export restriction. This was calculated 
as: 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (ℎ𝑠𝑠 − ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) × 365
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
× 0.5 × (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) × 𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣ℎ − 𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣ℎ,       (5) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the calving interval, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 the drop-out rate, 𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣ℎ the export value of a heifer, 𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣ℎ the 
slaughter value of a heifer. The value 0.5 is included because only half of the newborn calves are 
female (assumption). A full description of the costs calculations is given in Appendix I. 
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2.2.3.2 Probabilities 
Hardaker and Lien (2010) indicate that if relevant frequency data are lacking, expert advice 
can be a good other source. For lack of frequency data of the disease occurrence, expert 
judgements were used to estimate probabilities that relate to the epidemic of 2008 and the 
consequences for the year after. This was done by two senior Dutch veterinary epidemiologists 
from the Central Veterinary Institute, who gained experience with the BTV-8 epidemic. The procedure 
of elicitation was as follows: both experts were asked to make their probability judgements 
individually. Each probability then was jointly discussed and added to the model after the experts 
agreed upon distribution type and range.  
Probability values and their statistical distributions are presented in Table 3. The table 
should be read as follows: the probability of herd exposure in year 1 (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1) is defined as a Pert 
distribution with minimum value 0.9, most likely value 0.95 and maximum value 1. This corresponds 
with the upper branch in the event ‘Herd Exposure’ in Figure 2. By definition, the Pert distribution of 
no herd exposure then is (0, 0.05, 0.1), because probabilities in one node necessarily have to add 
up to 1.  This corresponds with the lower branch in the event ‘Herd Exposure’ in Figure 2.  
Three types of distributions were used. Pert and triangular distributions are often used to 
describe distributions from expert opinion, where a Pert distribution is more natural than a triangular 
distribution (Vose, 2000). Therefore, natural phenomena, such as herd exposure, were described 
with a Pert distribution and the more static properties of a test result with a triangular distribution. 
A uniform distribution was used to describe 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2. No knowledge was available on this probability 
and therefore it was defined as a uniform probability distribution around the expected mean. 
2.2.4 Model run, output definition and validation 
Using Monte Carlo simulation, all decision tree models were run, taking into account the 
probability distributions set by experts as inputs and expected economic consequences derived 
from the model. Both decision options – either do vaccinate or do not vaccinate – were defined as 
outputs. Furthermore, one additional output was defined as the difference between both decision 
options, which can be considered as the net expected utility of vaccination, measured in terms of 
income losses. Thus, for each iteration, the expected utility (represented as income losses) of both 
decision options and their difference were calculated simultaneously. From the resulting 
distributions, their minimum, mean, median and maximum were reported. A positive net expected 
utility of vaccination indicates that the income loss of vaccination is lower than the income loss of 
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no vaccination, and vice versa. Model iterations continued until the expected standard deviation of 
the defined decision outputs converged (with a 3 per cent tolerance and 95 per cent confidence 
level). This was done to guarantee stable and reliable output statistics. 
The outputs – income losses on which the decision is taken – derived could not be externally 
validated as empirical data on income losses from BTV-8 infection is lacking. Instead, internal 
validation was used to assess the validity of the model. First, inputs were compared with outputs to 
check for unexpected relationships that could indicate errors in formulae and parameterization of 
the payoffs and probabilities. Moreover, as a sensitivity analysis, the economic consequences of 
BTV-8 as estimated by Santman-Berends (2011) were used to check the robustness of the 
predictions of the decision model. 
 
Table 2-2: Description of the probability values and their statistical distributions used in the decision tree. 
Probability Value Distribution Description 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1                               c              0.9, 0.95, 1.0 Pert Herd exposure in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1| 𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.001, 0.005 Pert Disease in yr.1 given vacc. in yr. 1. 
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1| 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0.9, 0.95, 1.0 Pert Disease in yr. 1 given no vacc. in yr. 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2                               c              0.3, 0.9 Uniform Herd exposure in yr. 2.  
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑉𝑉2,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.001, 0.005 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given vacc. in yr. 2, and given 
vacc. and no disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉2,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑉𝑉1 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given no vacc. in yr. 2, and given 
vacc. and no disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑉𝑉2,𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.0001, 0.0005 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given vacc. in yr. 2, and given 
vacc. and disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉2,𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.0001, 0.0005 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given no vacc. in yr. 2, and given 
vacc. and disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑉𝑉2,𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.0001, 0.0005 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given vacc. in yr. 2, and given no 
vacc. and disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉2,𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.01, 0.05 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given no vacc. in yr. 2, and given 
no vacc. and disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑉𝑉2,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.001, 0.005 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given vacc. in yr. 2, and given no 
vacc. and no disease in yr. 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2| 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉2,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0.9, 0.95, 1.0 Pert Disease in yr. 2 given no vacc. in yr. 2, and given 
no vacc. and no disease in yr. 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1| 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 0.95, 0.99, 1.0 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 1 given disease in yr. 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1| 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1,𝑉𝑉1 0, 0.01, 0.05 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 1 given vacc. and no disease 
in yr. 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1| 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1,𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 1 given no vacc. and no 
disease in yr. 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2| 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2 0.95, 0.99, 1.0 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 2 given disease in yr. 2. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2| 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2,𝑉𝑉2 0, 0.01, 0.05 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 2 given vacc. and no disease 
in yr. 2. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2| 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2,𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉2,𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 2 given no vacc. and no 
disease in yr. 2, and given no vacc. in yr. 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2| 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻2,𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉2,𝑉𝑉1 0.2, 0.25, 0.3 Triang Neg. test result in yr. 2 given no vacc. and no 
disease in yr. 2, and given vacc. in yr. 1. 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Economic consequences  
Table 4 presents the expected economic consequences of the BTV-8 outbreak for the 
average Dutch dairy farm. The costs of vaccinating the herd were estimated as €436. For a dairy 
farm that exported heifers, the costs of vaccinating the complete stock were slightly higher at €502 
because such a farm retains more animals. For an infected farm the direct costs were estimated 
at €5,339 including costs of diagnosis, treatment and production losses. The latter was for almost 
three-quarters the result of gestation problems (see Velthuis et al., 2010). When a part of the heifers 
was retained for export due to heifer management aimed at rearing own dairy cows, BTV-8 infection 
could result in another loss of €6,832 mainly because of lower prices for heifers in case they 
cannot be exported. 
 
Table 2-3: Overview of the costs of vaccination and of the expected economic consequences of BTV-8 for 
the average Dutch dairy farm in Euros. 
Vaccination costs  Direct costs Indirect costs 
Herd vaccination  Diagnosis Treatment  Production losses  Export restriction  
436 (502) 79 840 4420 6832 
 
2.3.2 Expected utility of vaccination 
Based on the convergence criteria set, 8,550 iterations were needed to guarantee stable 
and reliable outcomes.  
The decision outcomes for scenario 1 are presented in Table 5 for all five decision 
moments. In year 1, at the start of the outbreak, there was only one decision moment. In year 2, 
four decision moments had to be simulated, based on the decision chosen and related events earlier 
in year 1.  
In year 1 of the outbreak, vaccination was the best decision with a net expected utility of 
vaccination calculated, ranging from €3,950 to €4,777 with a median of € 4,373. Since 𝑉𝑉1 at the 
start reduces the probability of disease, the most likely decision moment entered in year 2 was with 
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 before. In that case, the best decision was to re-vaccinate. However, the net expected utility 
of re-vaccination this time ranged from €-253 to €914, with a median of €178.  
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Table 2-4: Overview of the decision outcomes for scenario 2, represented as income losses in Euros. The 
underlined vaccination decisions indicate the policy suggestion which is the optimal route when the full tree 
is run. 
Decision 
moment 
Intermediate 
events passed Vaccinate? 
Income losses 
Min Mode Median Max 
Year 1 NA  YES 436 447 443 459 
   NO 4,391 4,838 4,816 5,217 
   Net exp. utility 3,950 4,378 4,373 4,777 
Year 2 V1 NDE1 YES 436 439 440 456 
   NO 187 463 616 1353 
   Net exp. utility -253 28 178 914 
 V1 DE1 YES 436 437 437 438 
   NO 0 1 0 2 
   Net exp. utility -438 -436 -436 -435 
 NV1 DE1 YES 436 437 437 438 
   NO 0 48 41 194 
   Net exp. utility -437 -411 -395 -242 
 NV1 NDE1 YES 436 438 440 457 
   NO 1,470 1,837 3,039 4,755 
   Net exp. utility 1,028 1,398 2,597 4,315 
 
In approximately 21 per cent of the simulated decision outcomes, the net expected utility 
of vaccination was negative (see also the black line in Figure 4). It indicated that the DM has become 
nearly indifferent between both decision options. A less likely decision moment to be entered in year 
2 was when 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 turned out to be present while 𝑉𝑉1 was carried out. In that case, the optimum was 
not to vaccinate as immunity reduces the probability of re-infection to nearly zero and therefore the 
costs of vaccination of the herd can be saved. Based on the net expected utility of vaccination, the 
same holds for the situation with 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 with 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1. The slightly higher income loss compared to the 
situation analysed previously is due to the fact that vaccination was not carried out in year 1 and 
hence the herd susceptibility was higher. The fourth decision moment in year 2 is with 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 and 
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 previously. Compared to year 1, probability of disease decreased resulting in lower net 
expected utility of vaccination. Nevertheless, vaccination of the herd was the best decision to make. 
In scenario 2, when it was assumed that  part of the heifers are retained for export, the DM 
did have an extra interest in vaccination since it guarantees that these heifers would be free of BTV-
8 at time of exportation. Pointed out in Table 6, the additional interest was reflected in a larger net 
expected utility of vaccination in all situations compared to results for scenario 1, except for 
situations with 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1.  
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Table 2-5: Overview of the decision outcomes for scenario 2, represented as income losses in Euros. The 
underlined vaccination decisions indicate the policy suggestion which is the optimal route when the full tree 
is run. 
Decision 
moment Events passed Vaccinate? 
Income losses 
Min Mode Median Max 
Year 1 NA  YES 507 592 639 856 
   NO 10,098 11,086 11,022 11,864 
   Net exp. utility 9,431 10,252 10,372 11,274 
Year 2 V1 NDE1 YES 506 555 584 813 
   NO 465 1,039 1,455 3208 
   Net exp. utility -93 613 868 2511 
 V1 DE1 YES 503 549 575 800 
   NO 1 48 72 298 
   Net exp. utility -506 -502 -502 -499 
 NV1 DE1 YES 504 548 575 804 
   NO 6 124 172 652 
   Net exp. utility -504 -437 -411 -75 
 NV1 NDE1 YES 507 552 584 814 
   NO 3,386 5,797 6,958 10,765 
   Net exp. utility 2,822 9,412 6,363 10,200 
 
As a result, in the most likely entered decision moment in year 2 the net expected utility of 
vaccination ranged from €-93 to €2,511, with a median of €868. In 0.4% of the simulated decision 
outcomes, net expected utility of vaccination was negative. The likelihood that the DM repeated 
vaccination of the herd was thus much higher. 
2.3.3 Risk aversion impact 
Results so far represented a risk neutral DM, since all outputs were based on the 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 
criterion. However, for many of the decision outcomes, risk aversion would not change the net 
expected utility of vaccination in such a way that the decision switched.  
In scenario 1, there was one case where risk was important: the (most likely) decision 
moment in year 2, with 𝑉𝑉1 and 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 previously. For this case, it was already shown that the 
distributions of both decision options overlap, and also that the variation around the mean of the 
distribution associated with no vaccination was very large whereas it was the opposite for 
vaccination (Table 4). Small variation here indicates that only a small risk is present. 
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Figure 3 illustrates what happens for this situation when different risk tolerance levels are 
set. The distribution of the vaccination decision shifts gradually from the left to the right if less risk 
is tolerated, whereas the distribution of the no vaccination decision shifts considerably to the right. 
As a consequence, the net expected utility of vaccination – previously defined as the difference 
between both decision options – becomes proportionally more negative when the degree of risk 
aversion increases. 
 
 
Table 7 shows the calculated certainty equivalents (𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻) of the decision outcomes and the 
net expected utility of vaccination for different risk tolerance levels represented as income losses. 
As argued before, the risk associated with the decision not to vaccinate was valued much higher.  
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Figure 2-3: Graphical illustration of the effect of risk aversion on the decision outcomes for the situation in 
scenario 1 in year 2 with vaccination (𝑽𝑽𝟏𝟏) and no disease effects (𝑵𝑵𝑫𝑫𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏) in year 1, with on the horizontal 
axis the expected utility from the decision taken, and on the vertical axis the probability density. For the 
vaccination decision, if less risk is tolerated, the expected utility doesn’t increase so much; for the no 
vaccination decision, if less risk is tolerated, the expected utility increases considerably. 
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Table 2-6: Overview of the decision outcomes for different risk tolerance levels for the situation in scenario 
1 in year 2, with vaccination (𝑽𝑽𝟏𝟏) and no disease effects (𝑵𝑵𝑫𝑫𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏) in year 1, represented as income losses in 
Euros. The risk tolerance levels are: risk neutrality (𝑬𝑬 = inf), hardly risk averse (𝑬𝑬 = 30,000) and highly risk 
averse (𝑬𝑬 = 3,000). 
Risk tolerance Vaccinate? 
Income losses 
Min Mode Median Max 
𝐸𝐸 = inf 
YES 436 439 440 456 
NO 187 463 616 1,353 
Net exp. utility -253 28 178 914 
𝐸𝐸 = 30000 
YES 436 440 441 458 
NO 204 502 667 1,445 
Net exp. utility -236 67 225 1,007 
𝐸𝐸 = 3000 
YES 436 445 448 490 
NO 478 1,067 1,351 2,431 
Net exp. utility 31 1,027 899 1,988 
 
The implications for the net expected utility of vaccination are depicted in Figure 5. In this 
graph, the net expected utility of vaccination is depicted as a cumulative probability function for 
different levels of risk aversion. Based on the median, which in the graph equals the 0.5 cumulative 
probability value, the decision outcome was always to re-vaccinate in year 2.  
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Figure 2-4: Graph of the net expected utility of vaccination for different risk tolerance levels R for the 
situation in scenario 1 in year 2 with vaccination and no disease effects in year 1, with on the horizontal 
axis the net expected utility, and on the vertica 
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However, when risk is considered, the risk attitude is important for the final outcome. In 
cases where risks would be ignored (𝐸𝐸 = inf) the cumulative probability function indicated that in 
approximately 21 per cent of the simulated decision outcomes, it was better not to vaccinate based 
on a negative net expected utility of vaccination. This percentage reduced to approximately 16 per 
cent for a hardly risk averse DM. The cumulative probability function corresponding with the highly 
risk averse DM was entirely positive. 
In scenario 2, risk aversion did not change most of the outcomes so that another decision 
was taken. Only for the decision moment in year 2 with 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉1 and 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 previously, the outcome 
changed. In this case, with risk neutrality, the net expected utility of vaccination was negative with 
a median of €-411. (Table 6). With high risk aversion, the net expected utility of vaccination was 
generally positive. The cost of vaccination was compared with the small probability of disease and 
therewith the small probability of an export restriction. For a highly risk averse DM, this risk is highly 
valued and thus was vaccination preferred. However, it was not likely that the DM enters this 
decision moment in year 2, because in year 1 the most likely decision is to vaccinate. 
2.3.4 Validation  
As a sensitivity analysis, economic consequences derived from the deterministic model 
used in this study were replaced by those estimated by Santman-Berends (2011). According to this 
study, for a completely susceptible herd with 75 cows at the moment of introduction, the economic 
consequences were estimated to be €1,962, including costs of diagnostics, treatment and 
production losses. Economic consequence related to an export ban was not studied and thus 
remained as it was as in the original calculation. 
Results  can be categorized threefold. First, for decision outcomes after 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 occurred, the 
net expected utility did not change; the costs of vaccination of the herd can be saved after the herd 
is immunized. Second, for all except one decision outcomes after 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻1 occurred, the net expected 
utility did considerably change in its magnitude but not in its direction (based on the median). Thus, 
the initial decision (to vaccinate) did not switch.  
Third, the exception is the decision outcome in scenario 1 that was highlighted in section 
3.3. The net expected utility ranged from €-368 to € 63 with a median of €-210 for a risk neutral 
DM. Risk aversion did not lead to a positive net expected utility (based on the median).   
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2.4 Discussion 
The prime objective of this study was to assess the farmer’s willingness to vaccinate against 
BTV-8 based on the net expected utility of vaccination. According to the results, the average Dutch 
dairy farmer is expected to be willing to vaccinate against BTV-8, except for situations where 
disease effects intermediately showed up. Heifer management is important; when heifers are reared 
for export, the overall net expected utility of vaccination is higher. The farmer’s willingness to 
vaccinate in year 2 was surrounded with uncertainty.  
Eradication of BTV-8 is most likely to happen when a large part of the national herd becomes 
immune through either vaccination or lifelong protection due to natural infection in a short period of 
time. Therefore, from a sectorial viewpoint, it is important that farmers collectively vaccinate to 
increase the likelihood of eradication. The main policy instrument used in 2008 was subsidization 
of the costs of vaccination. In 2009, subsidization stopped (Velthuis et al., 2011). Vaccination  
coverage in that year dropped to between 50 – 60% (Elbers et al., 2010). Dairy farmers who did 
not want to vaccinate and those in doubt about vaccination indicated that a subsidized campaign 
(similar to that of the previous year) along with disclosure of information about (1) the efficacy and 
safety of the vaccine and (2) the whys and wherefores of repeated vaccination could motivate them 
(Elbers et al., 2010). Reducing the costs of vaccination with subsidization can stimulate farmers, 
who perceive the chance of infection to be low, to revaccinate. The effects of disclosure of 
information as a policy instrument is not clear and is hardly studied within the field of economics of 
animal health. It might be that farmers interpret the information disclosed, e.g. with respect to the 
efficacy of the vaccine, and make decisions that are not optimal from a social point of view (Bennett, 
2012).  
Results of this paper suggest that when financial incentives are used as a policy instrument, 
a change of the subsidy schemes can be beneficial. Decision making in the control of animal disease 
epidemics is a dynamic and flexible process (Ge et al., 2007). The results show that the farmer is 
highly willing to vaccinate in year 1 whereas it becomes less likely that vaccination is repeated, 
assuming that the farmer act as a rational economic DM that maximizes expected utility. Validation 
of the decision outcomes, using results of Santman-Berends (2011), emphasized this. The reduced 
net expected utility from vaccination in year 2 must be seen in the light of the classical externality 
problem: despite the fact that BTV-8 is not contagious, the activity level of one farmer to mitigate 
the virus affects the situation of another farmer either positively or negatively. There are no 
incentives for one farmer to take costly actions that are only in favour of another farmer. At the 
same time disease eradication is only met when vaccination is collectively executed. 
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For this situation, risk aversion can have an effect given that the extra certainty about 
income is valued more by a risk averse farmer, but that might not be enough as the validation 
suggested. Besides, not all farmers can be expected to be risk averse. Therefore, if financial 
incentives are used, they could be better allocated to year 2 to increase the farmers’ net expected 
utility of vaccination, to motivate farmers to re-vaccinate. Another possibility is to ask farmers to 
vaccinate their herd for two years, with the prospect of providing financial incentives over time.  
The decision problem analysed is based on the BTV-8 epidemic circumstances of 2008, 
using an average Dutch dairy farm located in an area with susceptible herds. The results are not 
representative for other production systems, as the payoffs were calculated specifically for a dairy 
farm. Furthermore, as payoffs were determined deterministically, the average costs were always 
equal; and thus the effect of e.g. varying the herd (farm) size was not studied.  
Data used for parameterizing the model were mainly based on historical data of the disease 
costs in 2006 and 2007 (Velthuis et al., 2010). Costs related to diagnosis and treatment were 
presumed to be still valid for the time period studied. For calculating the production losses, prices 
were updated for the time period studied and some of the epidemiological input were revised by 
the experts involved in this study when it was revealed that they had been overestimated (see 
Appendix I). The economic consequences of an export restriction for an individual farm were kept 
fixed over time; potential supply and demand effects in the markets for heifers and beef were 
outside the scope of this study.  
The efficacy of the vaccine has a large influence on the probability of disease effects in the 
year vaccination takes place, but also for the year after. Vaccine manufacturers claimed at the start 
of the vaccination campaign that the BTV-8 vaccine would protect the animal for at least one year 
(Elbers et al., 2010). At that time this was the guiding thought among practitioners implying that 
they recommended re-vaccination to farmers. Hence in the model it was assumed that the efficacy 
of the initial vaccine somewhat continued, reflected in a lower probability of disease effects in year 
2. Ex-post, however, it turned out that the vaccine protected cattle for at least three years (Oura et 
al., 2012). Would that have been known also by the farmer community, they would have decided 
not to re-vaccinate.  
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The decision problem presented in this study simulated a decision-making process in the 
middle of an epidemic situation. Farmers did not have experience in controlling BTV-8 because it 
was an emerging disease at that time. It is not entirely clear how aforementioned time and disease 
characteristics affect decision-making under uncertainty. Utility elicitation can only be done for a 
short period of time under a given set of circumstances and thus it matters at which point in time 
the decision problem is presented (Ngategize et al., 1986). For example, two studies about the 
voluntary participation of farmers in pre-epidemic animal disease insurances found diverse results. 
An empirical study by Ogurtsov et al. (2009) that looked into Dutch dairy farmers buying different 
categories of catastrophe insurance, reported that the impact of assumed risk aversion on buying 
insurance was not found for those related to insuring animal disease epidemics. The authors argued 
that it was hard for farmers to estimate the probability of occurrence of an outbreak and therefore 
they may underestimate potential risks. Niemi and Heikkilä (2011) who studied the impact of risk 
aversion and hypothetical disease outbreak characteristics on group participation in animal disease 
insurance concluded that farmers avoid (the present value of) premiums as they lack the incentives 
to participate before an outbreak occurs. Another study done by Rat-Aspert and Fourichon (2010) 
looked into the collective effectiveness of voluntary vaccination against a hypothetical endemic 
infectious disease. Their results suggest that voluntary vaccination cannot eradicate the modelled 
disease, and that risk aversion, as well as incentives, only results in a lower prevalence over time. 
Both, results of aforementioned studies and the results of this study suggest that the 
moment of the decision, e.g., pre-epidemic versus the middle of an epidemic, and the 
characteristics of the disease problem are very important for the farmer’s voluntary decision to 
cooperate in animal health programmes, assuming economic rational behaviour. In a study of 
Valeeva et al. (2011), it was found that Dutch pig fattening farmers perceive endemic diseases as 
operational risks whereas epidemic diseases are classified as catastrophic risks. Severity of 
disease was valued slightly but significantly more important for the latter than for the former. 
Important interactions between disease risk, the farmer’s perception of that risk, his perceptions of 
available control options, and his actual practices might exist (Perry et al., 2001). Farmers may 
perceive the risk of an outbreak of an epidemic disease that has been absent for a long time be 
lower than the objective risk. The perceived risk may be higher than the objective risk if such an 
outbreak was recently reported in the farmers’ vicinity (Ekboir, 1999). It might be that for emerging 
diseases, perception of disease risk of farmers, perhaps as well as for policy makers and 
veterinarians, is even higher.  
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Besides the perception of disease risks, farmers do also have perceptions about the 
efficacy of control options. An empirical study of Cross et al. (2009) indicated divergent efficacy 
beliefs on vaccination as a mitigation strategy for controlling BTV-8 amongst Scottish and Wales's 
farmers, but also amongst veterinarians. In this study, it was assumed that the DM perceives the 
probabilities as they have been estimated by experts ex-post (Hardaker and Lien, 2010). The 
underlying assumption here was that the DM had perfect information. An interesting avenue for 
future research is to empirically assess a farmer’s perceived costs, benefits and risks and 
incorporate those results to the model to see if their own judgement change the output. Besides, 
this decision model can function as a basic framework to study farmer’s decision-making related to 
other animal diseases.  
Finally, it is agreed with Edwards-Jones (2006) that modelling farmers’ willingness to 
vaccinate against BTV-8 involves more than standard economic theory; insights from other 
disciplines such as sociology and psychology are welcomed and need to be taken into account in 
future research.  
2.5 Conclusions 
Based on the net expected utility of vaccination, the average Dutch dairy farmer is expected 
to be willing to vaccinate against BTV-8 in the first year, it declines thereafter as a result of less 
expected costs of a continued outbreak. A risk averse farmer in this respect is more likely to 
continue vaccination. 
Farmers who export heifers have a higher willingness to vaccinate. 
A policy implication of this study is that for an effective allocation, financial incentives can 
be adjusted to the willingness to vaccinate over time. 
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Appendix  
Below a detailed explanation of the cost calculations is given for (1) the total costs of 
vaccination and (2) the total loss from the BTV-8 epidemic for an individual (average) dairy farm. 
First the algebraic formulae are given. The full parameterization is summarized in Appendix Table.  
(1) 
𝑉𝑉 = 2 × (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + ℎ𝑟𝑟 × 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + (ℎ𝑠𝑠 + ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) × (𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐))                                                      
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 10 + 0.5 × (ℎ𝑠𝑠 + (ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)),                  
𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 2 × (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + ℎ𝑟𝑟 × 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + (ℎ𝑠𝑠 + ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 + �ℎ𝑠𝑠 − (ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)� × 365𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × 0.5 × (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) ×(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐))                                                        
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 10 + 0.5 × (ℎ𝑠𝑠 + ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + (ℎ𝑠𝑠 − (ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)) × (365/𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) × 0,5 × (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) 
(2) 
𝐿𝐿 = (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿) + 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸                                                                                            
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 0.5ℎ𝑟𝑟                      
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 = ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅
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× 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 × �[𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 × 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 + [𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 × 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + [𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 × 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 + 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 + 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 + 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 =  𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸100 × 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 ×  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × (𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣 + 𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) 
𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 =  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 ×  𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸100 × 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 ×  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 =   𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸100 × 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 ×  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 × 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 × 0.5𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 × 𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 
𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 =  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝_𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 × (𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × (𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣 + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 − 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣) 
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 =  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 × (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2 + ∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 × (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 + ∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐6) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 =  ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 × (𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐) 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (ℎ𝑠𝑠 − ℎ𝑠𝑠 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) × 365
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
× 0.5 × (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) × 𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣ℎ − 𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣ℎ                      
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Appendix table A2.1: Description of the input parameters used for calculating the economic consequences 
of vaccination against and losses from BTV-8 for the average Dutch dairy farm in 2008. 
Variable Description Unit Input 
parameter 
Source 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 Call-out fee veterinarian euro/visit 20.58 Velthuis et al., 2011 
ℎ𝑟𝑟 Hourly rate veterinarian euro/hour 116.17 Velthuis et al., 2011 
ℎ𝑠𝑠 Average herd size # dairy cows 76 LEI/CBS, 2008 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 Replacement  rate % 28 (Mohd Nor et al., 2013) 
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 Drop-out rate % 8 (Mohd Nor et al., 2013) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 Calving age years 2.25 (Mohd Nor et al., 2014) 
𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 Vaccine costs euro/dosage 0.40 Velthuis et al., 2011 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 Dispense material costs  euro/dosage 0.02 Velthuis et al., 2011 
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 Registration costs euro/dosage 0.05 Velthuis et al., 2011 
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 100⁄  Morbidity rate animals/100 
animal months 
5.6 Elbers et al., 2009 
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 Risk period months 6 Elbers et al., 2009 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 Proportion diseased animals treated with pain killers % 50 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 Price pain killer euro/animal 15 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 Proportion diseased animals treated with antibiotics % 50 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 Price antibiotics euro/animal 50 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 Proportion diseased animals treated in general % 50 
 
Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 Price materials euro/animal 0.75 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 100⁄  Mortality rate animals/100 
animal months 
0.2 Elbers et al., 2009 
𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣 Production value euro/animal 480 Average, based on Houben 
et al., 1994, updated by van 
der Walle, 2004  
𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣 Slaughter value euro/animal 684.75 LEI/CBS, 2008 
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 Rendering costs euro/animal 26.02 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 Proportion diseased animals earlier culled % 0 Authors’ expertise 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 Average milk production liters/animal 26.7 (CRV, 2008) 
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 Reduction in milk production % 20 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 Days diseased days 18 Elbers et al., 2008b 
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 Value of the milk (variable costs) euro/liter 0.06 (KWIN, 2006) 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 Proportion diseased animals that exhibit weight loss % 7 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 Extra feed costs related to weight loss euro/animal 5.60 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 Drop in feed intake related to weight loss euro/animal 2.00 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 Proportion diseased animals that have no gestation % 5 Revised by experts 
𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 Lost value of a calf euro/animal 163.06 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 Costs of feed and housing euro/animal 3.57 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣 Increased slaughter value euro/animal 45.80 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 Proportion diseased animals that have postponed gestation % 16.6 Authors’ expertise 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2 Costs of an extra artificial insemination euro/animal 13.85 KWIN, 2006 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1 Loss due to extended calving interval of 1 cycle euro/animal 9 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 Proportion diseased animals that have an abortion % 6.2 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1 Costs of the first artificial insemination euro/animal 23.75 KWIN, 2006 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐6 Loss due to extended calving interval of 6 cycles euro/animal 101.90 Velthuis et al., 2010 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 Proportion diseased animals that have a stillbirth % 0.4 Velthuis et al., 
2010/Rendac.nl 
𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣ℎ Export value heifer euro/animal 957.50 LEI 
𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣ℎ Slaughter value heifer euro/animal 647.40 LEI 
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Abstract 
Understanding the context and drivers of farmers’ decision-making is critical to designing 
successful voluntary disease control interventions. This study uses a questionnaire based on the 
reasoned action approach framework to assess the determinants of farmers’ intention to participate 
in a hypothetical reactive vaccination scheme against bluetongue. Results suggest that farmers’ 
attitude and social pressures best explained intention. A mix of policy instruments can be used in a 
complementary way to motivate voluntary vaccination based on the finding that participation is 
influenced by both internal and external motivation. Next to informational and incentive-based 
instruments, social pressures, which stem from different type of perceived norms, can spur 
farmers' vaccination behaviour and serve as catalysts in voluntary vaccination schemes. 
 
Keywords 
farmers, decision-making, attitude, social pressures, disease control, bluetongue, voluntary 
vaccination, policy instruments 
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3.1 Introduction 
Bluetongue (BT) is a World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)-listed animal disease. An 
outbreak of an OIE listed disease has major implications for livestock production, policy and trade 
in the country or region affected (Burrell, 2002). All these impacts were experienced during the 
bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) epidemic from 2006 – 2009 in the Netherlands. The virus 
caused clinical disease in ruminants, thereby affecting dairy as well as other farm types in cattle, 
sheep and goat sectors (see Elbers et al. (2008a) for an overview). Financial consequences of the 
epidemic in 2006 and 2007 in the Netherlands have been estimated around 200 million Euros, of 
which about 140 million Euros relating to the dairy cow sector (Velthuis et al., 2010).  
A reactive vaccination programme at transnational level was adopted in 2008 since the 
direct control measures and the ban of animal movements failed to stop the spread. The Dutch 
government offered farmers a vaccination scheme on the basis of voluntary participation with 
subsidy as a financial, incentive-based policy instrument. It fits in with a neoliberal governance style 
of cost and responsibility sharing (e.g. Maye et al., 2014) and is based on economic theory 
postulating that self-regulation may result in successful interventions at lower public cost (e.g. Oude 
Lansink, 2011). The ex-ante transaction costs of lobbying and legislation and ex-post transaction 
costs of surveillance and enforcement are minimized (Furubotn and Richter, 1998). 
Since the implementation of the vaccination scheme, only a few Dutch farms got infected in 
2008 and 2009. However, it is difficult to judge ex-post whether the voluntary approach was a 
success or a failure while many farms were already immunized via natural infection (Wilson and 
Mellor, 2009), which in combination with a low uptake could already be sufficient to control the 
spread. Actual uptake by dairy farmers have been estimated at 71% in 2008 (with subsidy) (Elbers 
et al., 2010).  
After the BTV-8 epidemic, Elbers et al. (2010), in an exploratory survey among Dutch 
farmers, showed that (1) prevention of production losses and (2) subsidization of vaccination were 
perceived as the main motives to vaccinate against BT. Other important motives mentioned were: 
(3) welfare concerns, (4) contribution to the eradication campaign and (5) recommendation by the 
practitioner. 
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To understand and predict individual vaccination decisions, rational choice models, i.e. 
expected utility theory (EUT) models are often applied (Hardaker and Lien, 2010; Rat-Aspert and 
Fourichon, 2010; Sok et al., 2014). In these models, the motives 1 and 2 are considered. It is often 
argued that governments should increase the expected utility (profits) by utilizing financial, incentive-
based policy instruments to make voluntary disease control interventions effective. 
Considering the motives 3 – 5 however, it might be that additional self-regulatory or 
motivational mechanisms exist that drive the decision to vaccinate, which cannot directly be inferred 
from rational choice models. Some of these mechanisms are embedded in different types of norms. 
Social psychological decision models emphasize the effect of social pressures on decision-making, 
such as the reasoned action approach (RAA) (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). The RAA predicts that a 
given behaviour is determined by the strength of a person’s intention to perform that behaviour. The 
intention is a function of three social-psychological constructs: attitude, perceived norms and 
perceived behavioural control. Nowadays different dimensions are captured within these constructs, 
also prompted through the use of multivariate statistical techniques (Thompson, 2004). Within 
attitude, an instrumental and experiential dimension are distinguished. Factors considered in a 
typical EUT model are similar to this instrumental dimension. Within perceived norm, an injunctive 
and descriptive dimension are distinguished. Within perceived behavioural control, a capacity and 
an autonomy dimension are distinguished (see Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) for an overview). In this 
study, only the construct of perceived norms is disentangled into an injunctive and descriptive 
dimension to investigate in more detail the social pressures operating on farmers. 
Next to information and incentive-based instruments is the effectiveness of disease control 
interventions also dependent on reflecting, re-enforcing and shaping attitudes and norms within a 
community (Collier et al., 2010). Therefore an understanding of which of these constructs drive 
farmers’ compliance with a policy intervention is critical for an efficient and effective design. The 
aim of this research is to assess which of the socio-psychological constructs and underlying 
dimensions drive farmers’ intention to participate in a hypothetical reactive vaccination scheme 
against BT.  
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3.2 Material and methods 
3.2.1 Framework and statistical method 
The RAA model identifies the social-psychological constructs that may influence intention to 
carry out particular behaviours, so that statistical modelling can be used to estimate the nature and 
significance of these relationships. 
The model can mathematically be represented as follows: 
𝐴𝐴 ∼ 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑐𝑐(𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁,𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶),                            (1)  
where 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 = 𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 ,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷),                                 (2) 
𝐴𝐴 given behaviour 
𝐴𝐴 intention to perform the behaviour 
𝐴𝐴 attitude – the farmer’s positive or negative evaluation of performing that behaviour 
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 perceived norms – the social pressures one feels to perform that behaviour 
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 injunctive norm – the perceptions of what referents think he or she should do  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 descriptive norm – the perceived behaviour of others (farmers) 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 perceived behavioural control – the perceived own capability to perform that behaviour. 
 In this study, structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to estimate the entire RAA as 
a set of simultaneous equations. It models correlational and causal relationships among constructs 
and corrects for measurement errors of the observed variables that represent these constructs in 
the estimation procedure. A construct is a latent variable that can be defined in conceptual terms 
but cannot directly be measured or be measured without error. Therefore, a construct is 
represented by multiple variables that, in combination, give a reasonably accurate measure of the 
construct using factor analytic approaches (Hair et al., 2010).  
The commonly applied two-step modelling approach in SEM, developed by Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988), was used. First step was to estimate a measurement model in which the variables 
were assigned to their constructs, using confirmatory factor analysis. Thus, based on the RAA 
model, it was a priori specified which variables make up which of the five constructs. Based on 
tests assessing the score reliability, score validity and overall model fit (e.g. see Fornell and Larcker, 
1981), the measurement model was evaluated on its specification and consistency with the data. 
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The second step was to estimate a structural model in which the causal relationships were tested 
to investigate the impact of the exogenous constructs attitude, injunctive norm, descriptive norm 
and perceived behavioural control on the endogenous construct intention. As constructs are often 
highly correlated, different model specifications were run to assess the presence of 
multicollinearity.  
3.2.2 Questionnaire and sample 
In Table 1 a description of the variables measured is given, with these elements being based 
on the standard questionnaire format provided by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). In defining the action 
that respondents were to undertake (or rather, express their intention to undertake) Ajzen’s TACT 
principle has been used, with actions defined in terms of target, action, context and time. For 
example, ‘If bluetongue (target) were to occur in the environment (context) this year (time), and a 
voluntary vaccination programme was to be announced (context), I am going to vaccinate my herd 
preventively (action). All questions were preceded with the phrase: “If bluetongue were to occur in 
the environment this year”, and for the questions related to the constructs perceived behavioural 
control and intention the words “and a voluntary vaccination programme was to be announced” 
were added to emphasize the voluntary nature of the vaccination scheme. 
A 5-points semantic differential scale with five different bipolar adjective pairs (e.g. 
unsatisfying and satisfying) was used to measure attitude. The other variables were measured with 
5-point bipolar Likert-type scales with endpoints ‘disagree’ to ‘agree’. 
A random sample of 1,500 Dutch dairy farms was drawn from the National Cattle 
Identification and Registration Database. The sample was restricted to farms with a herd size of at 
least 40 dairy cows, which is about 80 to 85 per cent of the whole dairy farm population (LEI, 
2016). These are more likely to be professional dairy farmers rather than hobby farmers. The latter 
type of farmers were excluded because it was felt that their decision-making process for vaccination 
decisions, in the face of a threat of a BT infection, could be made in a very different decision context 
(e.g. Gethmann et al., 2015). 
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Table 3-1: Description of the variables for representing the constructs in the SEM. 
Construct and variable  Description of the statement 
Attitude 𝑐𝑐1 Preventive vaccination of my herd is … … unsatisfying – satisfyinga 
𝑐𝑐2  … disadvantageous – advantageousb* 
𝑐𝑐3  … necessary – unnecessaryb 
𝑐𝑐4  … unimportant – importantb 
𝑐𝑐5  … acceptable – unacceptablea*  
   
Injunctive norm 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐1 People who have something to do with my farm expect me to vaccinate my herd 
preventively. 
𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐2 People in the industry whose opinions I value would approve of me vaccinating my herd 
preventively. 
𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐3 People who are important to me think that I should vaccinate my herd preventively. 
   
Descriptive 
norm 
𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1 Farmers like me are going to vaccinate their herd preventively. 
   
Perceived (beh.) 
control 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐1 I do have the possibility to vaccine my herd preventively.c 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐2 I could vaccinate my herd preventively, if I wanted to.c 
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐3 It is up to me whether I vaccinate my herd preventively.d 
   
Intention 𝑐𝑐1 I am going to vaccinate my herd preventively. 
𝑐𝑐2 I do want to vaccinate my herd preventively. 
𝑐𝑐3 I am willing to vaccinate my herd preventively. 
a Experiential dimension 
b Instrumental dimension 
c Capacity dimension  
d Autonomy dimension. 
* These variables were reversely recoded for the statistical analysis. 
 
The questionnaire1 was pre-tested on two dairy farmers. The final, revised, questionnaire 
was sent out in January 2014, along with a pre-paid return envelope and an accompanying letter in 
which the relevance of the research was set out. Farmers were offered two possibilities to fill in the 
questionnaire: using the paper copy, or on-line. The letter ended with a guarantee of anonymity of 
responses and the offer of a financial incentive to take part: i.e. a 10 per cent chance of winning a 
gift coupon of € 25. After 4 weeks, a reminder was sent to all farmers in the sample. The final 
response, the 415th, was returned March, resulting in a response rate of 28 per cent. About one 
sixth of the returned questionnaires were filled out on-line. Observations with missing values were 
excluded from the statistical analysis, resulting in an effective sample size of 357. 
  
                                              
1 The questionnaire is available upon request. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Regarding respondents’ attitude, mean rank scores of the observed variables (𝑐𝑐1 – 𝑐𝑐5) 
indicated a fairly positive evaluation of the outcomes of the behaviour (3.57 – 3.86) (Table 2). 
Correlations among variables for attitude were high (all within-construct correlations are marked 
bold). Correlations between variables for attitude and intention were also high. 
Regarding respondents’ perceived norms, mean rank scores of the variables were around 
average (2.99 – 3.43). Correlations among variables for injunctive norm were high. The variable 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐2 
based on the question “people in the industry whose opinion I value” had the highest mean rank but 
at the same time was only weakly correlated with the intention variables. The other two variables 
for injunctive norm correlated highly with those of intention, attitude and descriptive norm.   
 
Table 3-2: Sample correlation matrix with means , standard deviations of the variables and Cronbach’s 
alpha values of the constructs. 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. ∝𝑪𝑪 
1. 𝑐𝑐1 1               .90 
2. 𝑐𝑐2 .72 1               
3. 𝑐𝑐3 .67 .59 1              
4. 𝑐𝑐4 .76 .69 .81 1             
5. 𝑐𝑐5 .59 .49 .58 .59 1            
6. 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐1 .43 .43 .46 .48 .36 1          .80 
7. 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐2 .23 .27 .27 .30 .39 .58 1          
8. 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐3 .41 .40 .45 .48 .39 .65 .49 1         
9. 𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1 .30 .26 .21 .28 .25 .44 .26 .33 1       - 
10. 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐1 .24 .27 .21 .29 .35 .20 .29 .19 .04 1      .73 
11. 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐2 .27 .30 .23 .29 .32 .16 .23 .20 .09 .75 1      
12. 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐3 -.08 .00 .00 .00 .04 .00 .01 .00 -.05 .35 .31 1     
13. 𝑐𝑐1 .66 .56 .58 .68 .51 .50 .26 .51 .35 .29 .28 .02 1   .94 
14. 𝑐𝑐2 .64 .54 .58 .65 .51 .51 .28 .50 .35 .30 .30 .03 .92 1   
15. 𝑐𝑐3 .60 .54 .57 .61 .58 .45 .32 .48 .31 .31 .31 .02 .81 .81 1  
Mean 3.64 3.57 3.57 3.75 3.86 2.99 3.43 3.03 3.27 3.95 4.08 4.18 3.22 3.11 3.43  
Std. Error 1.13 1.02 1.12 1.08 1.06 1.24 1.16 1.18 1.00 0.99 .95 1.04 1.26 1.24 1.22  
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Regarding respondents perceived behavioural control, mean rank scores of the variables 
were just below or above 4 (3.95 – 4.18). The scores indicated that, on average, farmers were 
capable of performing vaccination against BT. The variable 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐3, representing the autonomy 
dimension within perceived behavioural control, had the highest rank (4.18) but had modest 
correlations with the other variables within perceived behavioural control and at the same time was 
not correlated with all other variables, including those of intention. 
Regarding respondents’ intention, mean rank scores were slightly above average (3.11 – 
3.43). The variable 𝑐𝑐3 had the highest score (3.43), most likely because the phrase used – I’m willing 
to – was the least powerful expression to measure intention. Correlations among variables for 
intention were very high. 
Correlations among observed variables for each construct were internally consistent given 
the ∝𝐶𝐶 values (Table 2). The ∝𝐶𝐶 for the constructs attitude and intention were “excellent”, for 
injunctive norm “very good” and for perceived behavioural control “adequate” (Kline, 2011). For 
descriptive norm there was only one observed variable, hence the score reliability cannot be 
calculated for this construct. 
3.3.2 SEM estimations 
The evaluation of the measurement model resulted in a respecification. The main issue here 
was that the variable 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐3 (representing the autonomy dimension) was removed from the model 
because of low score validity, and thus only the capacity dimension remained with perceived 
behavioural control. 
Figure 1 shows the estimated causal relationships, the extent to which the exogenous 
constructs attitude, injunctive norm, descriptive norm and perceived behavioural control impact 
upon the endogenous construct intention. All exogenous constructs inserted were allowed to 
correlate. The highest causal relationship was that of attitude on intention, while holding all other 
constructs constant. These results at first sight suggest that, for the vaccination behaviour, attitude 
is the main determinant of intention.  
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Figure 3-1: Structural model estimation, where an ellipse represents a construct, a circle an error term, a 
straight arrow a dependence relationship and a curved arrow a correlational relationship. The number of 
asterisks denote the significance level where ***, ** and * are at 0.001 (highly), 0.01 (moderately) and 
0.10 (somewhat) respectively. 
 
Given the discrepancy between beta’s on and intercorrelations between constructs, results 
also suggested shared variance (multicollinearity) being present among exogenous constructs. 
Table 3 shows different model specifications that were run to show where the multicollinearity was 
present. The main source of collinearity was found between the constructs attitude and injunctive 
norm when explaining intention. In model specifications A and B, the beta’s of both constructs were 
separately estimated, while in model specification C they were jointly estimated. In the latter 
specification, the beta of injunctive norm got a much lower regression weight due to the high 
correlation with attitude. Therefore, in addition to attitude, injunctive norm was an important 
determinant of intention. 
 
Table 3-3: Different structural model specifications to show the presence of multicollinearity among 
constructs. 
Model 
spec. 
Exogenous constructs 
inserted 
Beta estimates of:  R2 
1. Attitude 2. Injunctive 
norm 
3. Descriptive 
norm 
4. Perceived 
beh. control 
A 1. 0.77    0.59 
B 2.  0.61   0.37 
C 1. and 2. 0.62 0.23   0.62 
D 3.   0.38  0.14 
E 2. and 3.  0.56 0.10  0.37 
F 4.    0.37 0.13 
G 1., 2., 3. and 4. 0.61 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.65 
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A smaller source of collinearity was found between both normative constructs when 
explaining intention. In model specifications B and D, the beta’s of both normative constructs were 
separately estimated, while in model specification E they were jointly estimated. In the latter 
specification, the beta of descriptive norm got a much lower regression weight due to the high 
correlation with injunctive norm. Therefore, in addition to injunctive norm also descriptive norm had 
some impact upon intention. Or put differently, within the perceived norm construct, injunctive norm 
was more important than descriptive norm. 
3.4 Discussion  
Results of this study suggest that attitudinal considerations outweigh normative and control 
considerations as causal factors influencing intention to vaccinate against BT. Thus, farmers who 
exhibited a positive intention to vaccinate evaluated that behaviour positively, and vice versa. 
Although attitude turned out to be the main determinant of intention, results indicated that social 
pressures influenced intention formation as well. 
Three main types of policy instruments are commonly distinguished: financial, incentive-
based (carrots), regulative (sticks), and informational (promises or sermons) instruments 
(Rothschild, 1999; Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2011). Traditionally, the focus has been on financial and 
regulative instruments (Collier et al., 2010). The first and third type of policy instrument can be used 
to motivate voluntary participation where carrots are ‘external motivators’ and promises ‘internal 
motivators’. Both these instruments were used in the past BT vaccination strategy in 2008 (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, 2008). 
Since attitude is the main determinant of intention and farmers, on average, expressed a 
fairly positive evaluation of the outcomes of the behaviour, an obvious type of policy instrument to 
stimulate the vaccination uptake are informational instruments that can increase the internal 
motivation by reasoned opinions. One should consider that information is more likely accepted if 
there is a credible communicator, a high level of ‘similarity’ between the audience and communicator 
and both the message and communicator must be perceived as trustworthy (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1996). 
Subsidization as a financial, incentive-based instrument, is an external motivator to 
encourage participation by making herd vaccination cheaper. Its effect on farmers’ vaccination 
behaviour can be heterogeneous as different crowding effects can occur. Subsidization can 
strengthen (crowding-in) but also weaken (crowding-out) the internal motivation (Frey, 1993; Deci et 
al., 1999) and norms that induce behaviour externally (Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Kuhfuss et 
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al., 2015). It is important to take into account that different groups of farmers base their 
participation decisions on different considerations, and therefore a mix of instruments is required 
to maximize the uptake (Barnes et al., 2015). 
The model of individual decision-making utilized in this paper originates from social 
psychology and is not a rational choice model. The RAA gives more weight to social aspects of 
decision-making. Results show that, for the BT vaccination decision problem, farmers’ decision-
making is affected by social pressures. Thus, farmers in this respect do not act as autonomous 
actors who can be encouraged to participate only by providing information or incentives, but they 
are influenced by what referents think (injunctive norm) and what the expected behaviour of other 
farmers will be (descriptive norm). 
Given that these social interactions among farmers and other referents about vaccination 
decisions exist, motivational mechanisms, such as peer group pressure, can be actively used as a 
fourth type of policy instrument to motivate participation (Leeuwis, 2007; Collier et al., 2010). Social 
pressures might take the role of a ‘catalyst’ among the mix of policy instruments used in BT 
vaccination strategies based on voluntary participation, and leverage the (cost-)effectiveness and 
efficiency of such interventions. 
Intervention design can be further supported by empirically analyzing the indirect measures, 
i.e. looking at which underlying beliefs explain each construct (Sok et al., 2015). Studying indirect 
measures is very relevant as they can help understanding what exactly drives the behaviour 
(Montaño and Kasprzyk, 2008). Attitudinal and normative beliefs are of most interest since this 
analysis showed that the behaviour is driven by attitudinal considerations and injunctive and to a 
lesser extent descriptive norms. Moreover, the heterogeneity in farmers’ beliefs can be mapped 
out with behavioural concepts, such as perceived risk and personality traits, and with differences in 
farming structures (Sok et al., 2016a).    
In conclusion, it has been shown that farmers’ attitude and social pressures best explained 
intention to vaccinate against BT. Informational policy instruments are used for motivating farmers’ 
whose attitude is favourable; they can be motivated internally by reasoned opinions. Incentive-based 
policy instruments are used for motivating farmers externally by financial compensation. The effect 
of these subsidies on vaccination behaviour is likely heterogeneous and for each farmer not 
necessarily positive. Next to informational and incentive-based instruments, social pressures, which 
stem from different type of perceived norms, can spur farmers' vaccination behaviour and serve as 
catalysts in voluntary vaccination schemes.
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Abstract 
This research utilizes the reasoned action approach framework to study which beliefs drive 
the intention of farmers to participate in a voluntary vaccination scheme against bluetongue. 
Knowing the driving beliefs can help in selecting an appropriate mix of policy instruments to enhance 
the participation rate and thereby improve the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of voluntary 
vaccination strategies. Results are used to evaluate the policy instruments used by the Dutch 
government in their 2008 vaccination strategy (communicative intervention and vaccine 
subsidization). The paper posits that social interaction mechanisms, such as peer group pressure, 
might advance the design of voluntary vaccination strategies.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Voluntary schemes are increasingly used in the governance of a secure and safe supply of 
food. For many issues, such as the veterinary and (phyto)sanitary safety, the governance is shifting 
in the direction of a more neoliberal model of cost and responsibility sharing (e.g. Enticott et al., 
2014; Maye et al., 2014). Economic theory postulates that self-regulation may result in successful 
interventions at lower public cost (Oude Lansink, 2011). The ex-ante transaction costs of lobbying 
and legislation and ex-post transaction costs of surveillance and enforcement are minimized 
(Furubotn and Richter, 1998) 
Regarding veterinary safety, governments worldwide agree on controlling animal diseases 
listed by the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE) (OIE, 2017). In 2006, the Netherlands was 
struck by an introduction of bluetongue (BT), one of such OIE-listed diseases. Given her international 
responsibilities, the Dutch Ministry installed a package of  disease prevention and control measures 
appropriate for BT (European Council, 2000; European Council, 2007). A mass transnational 
vaccination scheme with a vaccine made available from Spring 2008 onwards, was needed to 
control the disease (Velthuis et al., 2010; Sok et al., 2014). 
 Most European member states opted for a mandatory vaccination scheme, whereas 
the Netherlands, amongst a few others, opted for a voluntary approach. Two types of policy 
instruments were deployed to stimulate voluntary participation by farmers. A communicative 
intervention was implemented in which the Ministry as well as farmer organizations conveyed written 
or oral recommendations to motivate farmers intrinsically to vaccinate their cattle. Subsidization of 
the vaccination costs as an extrinsic motivator was another policy instrument put in place (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, 2008). 
The vaccination scheme, together with the standard prevention and control measures at EU 
level, was successful as the total number of reported outbreaks in the EU dropped from 45,000 in 
2008 to 1,118 in 2009, to 176 in 2010, and finally to 39 in 2011 (IFAH, 2012). In the Netherlands, 
only 66 outbreaks were reported in 2008 compared to more than 6,500 in 2007 (Elbers et al., 
2009b). Accordingly, the voluntary approach was sufficiently effective in controlling the spread from 
an epidemiological viewpoint. However, it must be noted that the average seroprevalence of 
antibodies against the BT virus among dairy cattle was already 68 per cent before the vaccination 
scheme started (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008) while it was estimated that approximately 80 
per cent of livestock with protecting antibodies – required either by infection or immunization – was 
probably needed to prevent between-herd transmission (de Koeijer et al., 2011). 
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The epidemiological effectiveness of the voluntary approach depends on the level of 
participation of farmers in the vaccination scheme. The higher the level of participation, the more 
likely it becomes that the necessary level of immunological protection  is reached that is required 
to disrupt the epidemic spread. As a consequence, also the cost effectiveness (control of the spread 
of the disease at the lowest costs possible) and the overall efficiency (costs of the vaccination 
scheme in relation to the benefits) will depend on the participation of farmers. For the past Dutch 
BT vaccination scheme, the mean level of participation among cattle farmers in 2008 was estimated 
at 71 per cent and at 57 per cent in 2009 (Elbers et al., 2010).   
An exploratory survey among farmers showed that motivation to participate in a voluntary 
vaccination scheme against BT was driven by economic objectives but also by social-psychological 
objectives like animal welfare considerations and the perceived need to make a contribution to the 
eradication campaign (Elbers et al., 2010); these objectives relate to beliefs of farmers. Knowing 
which beliefs of farmers drive their decision to participate in a voluntary vaccination scheme is 
important as it can help understanding what kind of  policy instruments most likely enhance the level 
of participation and thereby improve the (cost-)effectiveness and efficiency of voluntary vaccination 
strategies.  
The main contribution of this paper is exploring farmers’ beliefs on this subject, as to date 
they are not well-understood. This study utilizes the reasoned action approach (RAA, Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 2010). RAA decomposes beliefs into attitudinal, normative and control beliefs. Results are 
used to evaluate the Netherlands’ past BT vaccination strategy and to provide insights that can be 
used to designing future voluntary vaccination strategies. 
4.2 Framework 
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework based on the reasoned action approach that 
is used in this paper for analyzing farmers’ beliefs. The RAA predicts that a given behaviour (𝐴𝐴) is 
determined by the intention (𝐴𝐴) to perform the behaviour. 𝐴𝐴, in turn, is directly explained by four main 
psychological constructs: attitude (𝐴𝐴), the farmers’ positive or negative evaluation of performing 
that behaviour; perceived norms (𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁), the social pressures famers perceive to perform that 
behaviour; and perceived behavioural control (𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶), the perceived own capability to perform that 
behaviour. Within 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁, a distinction is made between injunctive norms (𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼), the perceptions of what 
referents think one should do; and descriptive norms (𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷), the perceived behaviour of others 
(farmers). All direct measures explaining 𝐴𝐴, in turn, are explained by underlying beliefs, which are 
the indirect measures explaining 𝐴𝐴.  
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Figure 4-1: Framework based on the reasoned action approach (RAA). The number of plusses indicate the 
relative importance of each construct on intention. 
 
The abovementioned constructs can be measured either directly or indirectly. Sok et al. 
(2016b) estimated them with direct measures only. This was done for two reasons (Montaño and 
Kasprzyk, 2008): (1) direct measures are usually more strongly associated with intentions than 
indirect measures, and (2) the associations between direct measures and intentions indicate the 
relative importance of the constructs in predicting a given behaviour.  
Results revealed that the farmers’ intention to participate in a reactive vaccination scheme 
against BT is mainly attitude-driven, however, normative considerations (social pressures) also 
influenced intention formation, with injunctive norms being more important than descriptive norms 
(Sok et al., 2016b). Given this result, the relative importance of the constructs on 𝐴𝐴 is indicated in 
Figure 1 by the number of plusses, with more plusses indicating a greater importance. This implies 
that attitudinal and injunctive normative beliefs outweigh the descriptive normative and control 
beliefs (indirect measures). 
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The next section elaborates on how beliefs are identified and elicited, and subsequently 
analyzed to find the drivers behind the intention to participate in a voluntary hypothetical reactive 
vaccination scheme against BT. 
4.3 Material and methods 
4.3.1 Identification, elicitation and models for analyzing beliefs 
The first step in applying the RAA is the identification and elicitation of farmers’ beliefs. For 
this step, semi-qualitative interviews were held in May/June 2013 with 7 dairy farmers and 1 
veterinarian from different parts within the Netherlands. To obtain a set of underlying beliefs for 
each construct, 𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶, each respondent was asked a number of questions. In order 
to obtain the attitudinal beliefs underlying 𝐴𝐴, interviewees were asked to list the (dis)advantages of 
performing the behaviour under study. In case of injunctive normative beliefs underlying 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴, 
interviewees were asked to list the individuals or groups who would (dis)approve of their performing 
the behaviour under study. To obtain descriptive normative beliefs underlying 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷, interviewees were 
asked to list the individuals or groups for which it was expected that they will perform the behaviour 
under study. In case of control beliefs underlying 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶, interviewees were asked to list factors or 
circumstances that would make it more easy (difficult) and/or persuade (dissuade) him or her to 
perform the behaviour under study. All responses from the 7 dairy farmers (and 1 veterinarian) were 
listed and subsequently analyzed on the main recurring beliefs.  
Since there are four main psychological constructs – 𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 – that can 
determine 𝐴𝐴, four different models were central (see Figure 1) for analyzing the main recurring 
beliefs identified. They can be represented by the following equations:  
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑐𝑐�𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖�,                           (1) 
where 𝐴𝐴 is the farmer’s positive or negative evaluation of performing that behaviour, 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 the strength 
of the attitudinal belief about attribute 𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐 = 1, 2, … , 5) in statement 𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2) and 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐  the evaluation 
of attribute 𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐 = 1, 2, … , 5) in statement 𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2); 
NI = f(inkmk),                                         (2) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 is farmers’ perception of what referents think they he or she should do, 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 the injunctive 
normative belief about referent 𝑘𝑘 (𝑘𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 12) and 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 the motivation to comply with referent 𝑘𝑘 
(𝑘𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 12); 
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𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 = 𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤),             (3) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 is the perceived behaviour of other farmers, 𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 the descriptive normative belief about 
referent 𝑙𝑙 (𝑙𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 4) and 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 the identification with referent 𝑙𝑙 (𝑙𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 4); 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛),            (4) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the perceived personal capability to perform that behaviour, 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 the belief of the 
presence of control factor 𝑑𝑑 (𝑑𝑑 = 1, 2, … , 5) in statement 𝑙𝑙 (𝑙𝑙 = 1, 2) and 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 the power of control 
factor 𝑑𝑑 (𝑑𝑑 = 1, 2, … , 5) in statement 𝑙𝑙 (𝑙𝑙 = 1, 2). 
In each equation, a multiplicative composite, such as 𝑝𝑝11𝑒𝑒11 or 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙2𝑑𝑑2, is the product of a 
belief with an outcome evaluation, with a possible score ranging from -10 to 10. Originally, this idea 
of measurement stems from the expectancy-value model, initially applied to attitude measurement 
(Feather, 1959; Fishbein, 1963).  
4.3.2 Questionnaire and sample 
Table 1 presents the attitudinal belief statements that were incorporated in the 
questionnaire. Each belief statement was preceded with the phrase: “Were bluetongue to occur in 
my environment this year and I was to vaccinate”, and measured on a 5-point unipolar2 Likert type 
scale with endpoints from ‘Not likely’ to ‘Very likely’. Each outcome evaluation (evaluation of attribute) 
statement was preceded with the phrase: “Will the following motives be important if you consider 
preventive vaccination of your herd if bluetongue were to occur in your environment this year?”, and 
measured on a 5-point bipolar Likert type scale with endpoints from ‘Important’ to ‘Unimportant’. 
For each injunctive referent considered in the questionnaire (Table 2), the normative belief 
statement was formulated as: “What is the opinion of <referent 𝑘𝑘> about preventive vaccination of 
your herd if bluetongue were to occur in your environment this year?”, and was measured on a 5-
point bipolar Likert type scale with endpoints from ‘Strongly against’ to ‘Highly in favour’. 
 
 
                                              
2 Whether the measurement scale should be unipolar or bipolar was determined by looking at the nature of the concept measured (e.g. 
Francis et al., 2004). For example, the attitudinal belief about an attribute can be characterized as a probability, which is a unidirectional 
concept, and thus a unipolar measurement scale is more appropriate, while for an attribute evaluation a bipolar measurement scale is 
most realistic. 
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Each outcome evaluation (motivation to comply to referent 𝑘𝑘) statement was formulated as: 
“Is the opinion of <referent 𝑘𝑘> important to you when considering preventive vaccination of your 
herd if bluetongue were to occur in your environment this year?”, and was measured on a 5-point 
unipolar Likert type scale with endpoints from ‘Unimportant’ to ‘Very important’. 
For each descriptive referent considered in the questionnaire (Table 3), the normative belief 
statement was formulated as: ‘Is <referent 𝑙𝑙> going to preventively vaccinate his or her herd if 
bluetongue were to occur this year in the environment?’, and was measured on a 5-point bipolar 
Likert type scale with endpoints from ‘Definitely not’ to ‘Definitely’. Each outcome evaluation 
(identification with referent 𝑙𝑙) statement was formulated as: “Is what <referent 𝑙𝑙> is going to do if 
bluetongue were to occur in the environment this year important for your consideration to vaccine 
your herd preventively?”, and was measured on a 5-point unipolar Likert type scale with endpoints 
from ‘Unimportant’ to ‘Very important’. In both the injunctive and descriptive normative section a 
‘Not applicable’ (NA) option was included.  
Table 4 presents the description of the control belief statements that were incorporated in 
the questionnaire. Each belief statement was preceded with the phrase: “If a voluntary vaccination 
scheme was to be announced when bluetongue were to occur in my environment this year”, and 
measured on a 5-point unipolar Likert type scale with endpoints from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Very likely’. Each 
outcome evaluation (power of control factor) statement was preceded with the phrase: “Will the 
following issues make it easier (persuade) or more difficult (dissuade) for you to vaccinate your herd 
preventively if bluetongue were to occur in your environment this year?”, and measured on a 5-point 
bipolar Likert type scale with endpoints from ‘More difficult / dissuade’ to ‘Easier / persuade’. 
A random sample of 1,500 Dutch dairy farms was drawn from the National Cattle 
Identification and Registration Database. Only farms with a herd size of at least 40 dairy cows were 
selected, as these are more likely to be professional dairy farmers rather than hobby farmers. 
Hobby farmers were excluded because their vaccination decisions, in the face of a threat of a 
bluetongue infection, involves different arguments that are more likely driven by idealistic motives 
(Elbers et al., 2010). 
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The questionnaire was pre-tested with two dairy farmers to check for flaws or problems with 
interpretation of questions. The final, revised questionnaire, along with a pre-paid return envelope 
and an accompanying letter, was sent out in the second week of January 2014. Farmers were 
offered two possibilities to fill in the questionnaire, i.e. using the paper copy, or an on-line survey. 
Each respondent had a 10 per cent chance of winning a gift coupon of € 25. After 4 weeks, a 
reminder was sent to all farmers in the sample. The final response, the 415th, was returned around 
mid-March, resulting in a response rate of almost 28 per cent 
4.3.3 Statistical model 
 In a related empirical study using the RAA, structural equation modelling (SEM) is 
applied (Sok et al., 2016b). 𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼, 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 are represented by a set of correlated effect 
indicators and analyzed as latent variables, to investigate the presence of causal relations as 
specified in the RAA. In this study, beliefs (multiplicative composites) will be the causal indicators 
that have an impact on the associated determinants of intention. To be able to include causal 
indicators, some form of formative instead of reflective measurement is needed3. A suitable 
approach that allows for both forms of measurement is the multiple indicators and multiple causes 
(MIMIC) model (Jöreskog and Goldberger, 1975), which is the SEM equivalent for multiple 
regression. 
Using MIMIC models, an index of multiplicative composites is analyzed as a set of causal 
indicators explaining a latent variable (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). The MIMIC model can 
be formally described as follows: 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 + 𝜖𝜖                (5) 
𝛥𝛥 = 𝛤𝛤𝑒𝑒 + 𝜁𝜁              (6) 
where in equation 5 𝑦𝑦 is a vector of effect indicators of latent variable 𝛥𝛥 (e.g. 𝐴𝐴 or 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴), Δ a matrix 
of factor loadings and 𝜖𝜖 a vector of measurement error4.  
In equation 6, 𝑒𝑒 (e.g. 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒1 or 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1) is a vector of causal indicators on 𝛥𝛥, Γ a matrix of 
regression coefficients 𝛾𝛾’s of e.g. 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒1 or 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1 on its associated 𝛥𝛥, and 𝜁𝜁 a vector of error terms. 
It is furthermore assumed that the 𝜀𝜀’s are uncorrelated with the 𝜁𝜁’s. 
                                              
3 For a background discussion on the distinction between effect and causal indicators, between formative and reflective measurement 
models and selection criteria, e.g. see Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001); Jarvis et al. (2003); Kline (2011). 
4 Justification how this part is established and how the latent variables 𝛥𝛥 are represented, can be found in Sok et al. (2016). 
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4.3.4 Data screening and preparation 
An initial screening of the data on missing values was made: 25 observations (6 per cent) 
were dropped because they had missing data on all indicators of all direct measures for 𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼, 
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶. Next, in each model for the indirect measures, observations were dropped when they 
had missing data on all belief indicators and/or all outcome evaluations. This led to dropping 10 
observations in the 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 section, 23 in the 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 section, 21 in the  𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 section, and 5 in the 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 section.  
For each attribute 𝑐𝑐, multiplicative composites were averaged if (1) both had a significant 
correlation with 𝐴𝐴 and (2) showed a high internal consistency reliability as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha (𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶).  
The number of NA ticks in the injunctive and descriptive normative section for a particular 
referent is understood as an indication of the importance of that referent in the sample for the 
behaviour under study. The NA option was not included in the continuous underlying distribution, as 
is often done by recoding NA ticks to the middle tick of the Likert type scale. Instead, the number 
of NA ticks were treated as a categorical and not continuous type of missing data and in this way 
functioned as a selection criterion to determine which referents to include in subsequent analyses. 
Only those referents were included in the analysis who had less than 25 per cent NA ticks.  
Since formative measurement is based on multiple regression, multicollinearity can be an 
issue (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Kline (2011) indicates that a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of >10 is indicating that variables may be redundant. The highest VIF was found in the linear 
regression of  ‘Effectiveness’ on all other control factors, which was 3.14. It is concluded that there 
is mild collinearity among the control factors but not up to a level that is considered problematic. 
For the remaining determinants of intention there was only negligible to weak collinearity.  
4.3.5 Model assessment 
Assuming that the (composite) scales reflect continuous underlying distributions, maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation is used, which is the default SEM estimation method. Overall model fit of 
the MIMIC models is assessed first with the default 𝜒𝜒2 test statistic. The null hypothesis tested here 
is that the sample covariance matrices equal the hypothesized covariance matrices. This test only 
shows whether the model is consistent with the data. Three commonly used approximate fit indexes 
were used to test whether the model was also correctly specified: the Steiger-Lind root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) which is a parsimony-corrected index, the Bentler Comparative Fit 
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Index (CFI) which is an incremental fit index, and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR) which is an absolute fit index, a statistic related to the covariance residuals (Hair et al., 
2010; Kline, 2011). Overall model fit was further examined by inspecting (1) the matrix of 
standardized covariance residuals, which shows any difficulties the model has with fitting 
covariances, and (2) the modification indexes, which give suggestions for model improvement by 
freeing any single relationship that is not currently estimated. 
The MIMIC model with referents 𝑙𝑙 causing 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 failed some identification rules, specifically 
the 𝑝𝑝 rule and the 2+ emitted path rule (Bollen and Davis, 2009). Therefore, a global reflectively-
measured latent variable was included to overcome the identification problems and allowing overall 
model fit assessment (Diamantopoulos et al., 2008). The intention construct, represented by three 
indicators, was added to this model. 
Once the overall model fit was assured, the impact of causal indicators on the associated 
determinants of intention was studied by looking at the direction and magnitude of the regression 
coefficients (𝛾𝛾-parameters). Following the approach of Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) in 
estimating the MIMIC model, non-significant indicators that exceeded the 10% critical significance 
level were removed one at a time in an iterative process, starting with the indicators that had the 
lowest t-value. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Measured beliefs  
The causal indicators for each determinant of intention – 𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴, 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 –  are 
presented in Tables 1 – 4 respectively. An indicator is a multiplicative composite consisting of a 
belief statement with its associated outcome evaluation statement. Descriptive statistics of each 
indicator (ind.) are given in the tables, namely the number of observations (𝑙𝑙), correlation (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) 
with the associated determinant of intention and the mean (M) and standard error of the mean (SEM). 
In the model for 𝐴𝐴 (Table 1), attributes are represented by the average of two associated 
indicators. Some attributes were only represented by one indicator, because of low internal 
consistency (measured with ∝𝐶𝐶) and weakly correlated statements (see section ‘Data screening and 
preparation’). This happened often in case the statements were negatively formulated. A similar 
approach was used for control factors in the model for 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (Table 4).  
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In the models for 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 and 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 (Table 2 and 3 respectively),  two columns were added with 
the number of observations excluding NA scores (𝑙𝑙 excl. NA) and the ratio between the columns 𝑙𝑙 
and 𝑙𝑙 excl. NA, expressed in a percentage (% excl. NA). This column was generated to decide which 
referents to include (see section ‘Data screening and preparation’). 
All correlations between the attributes, referents and control factors and their belonging 
constructs had the a priori expected sign, e.g. the attribute ‘Time and effort’ is negatively correlated 
with 𝐴𝐴 and the control factor ‘Effectiveness’ is positively correlated with 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶. 
 
Table 4-1: Description and some descriptive statistics of the attitudinal beliefs identified. 
Attributes 
 
Ind. 
 
Attitudinal belief statement 
Were bluetongue to occur in my environment this year and I was to 
vaccinate will ... 
𝑙𝑙 corr b  𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶 d M (SEM) 
1.Production 
distortions 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒11  it have to cope with negative side effects and/or stress.a 377 -0.17 0.33 1.15 (4.41) 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒12 vaccination negatively influence the physical condition and 
performance of my herd.a 
377 0.08c 2.12 (4.19) 
2. Coll. dis. 
eradication 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒21 it contribute to the eradication of bluetongue in the Netherlands (at 
that moment).  
378 0.39 0.76 2.20 (3.96) 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒22 further spreading of bluetongue be inhibited (at that moment). 378 0.50 3.25 (3.93) 
3. Time and 
effort 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒31 the amount of work involved with vaccination be little. 379 -0.23 0.77 -2.06 (4.56) 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒32 the preparation and performance of the vaccination take a lot of 
time.a 
379 -0.21 -1.96 (4.26) 
4. Risk 
insurance 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒41 the risk of getting economic damage from bluetongue at my farm 
be reduced. 
378 0.59 0.32 4.69 (3.97) 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒42 the costs of vaccination be in the right proportion to the economic 
risk from bluetongue 
378 0.01c 1.87 (3.83) 
5. Job 
satisfaction 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒51 be insured that I can continue working with a healthy herd. 379 0.55 0.66 4.52 (3.24) 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒52 possible harrowing disease cases in my herd be prevented. 379 0.42 3.54 (3.73) 
a Those statements were negatively formulated and thus reversed. 
b Each multiplicative composite was pair-wisely correlated with the average of the indicators representing the latent variable 𝐴𝐴. 
c No significant correlation with 𝐴𝐴.  
d With Cronbach’s alpha (∝𝐶𝐶) the internal consistency reliability was measured for each pair of multiplicative composites 
representing an attribute 
 
4.4.1.1 Behavioural outcomes for attitude 
Attitudinal beliefs identified from the semi-qualitative interview sessions were grouped into 
five attributes. These were a mix of instrumental (economic) and experiential (affective) attributes. 
The attribute which obtained the highest mean rank score was ‘Risk insurance’, to be insured against 
economic damage of BT. Other attributes with mainly instrumental economic orientations in order 
of mean rank score were ‘Collective disease eradication’,  the individual contribution to support 
controlling the spread of BT; and ‘Time and effort’, the time and effort needed to prepare and 
perform the vaccination.  
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The orientation between instrumental and experiential was less clear-cut for ‘Production 
distortions’. On the one hand, this attribute could be economically-oriented in terms of a loss of 
technical performance and thereby efficiency losses. On the other hand it could be experientially-
oriented, as something farmers do not want to be confronted with having cows in bad health after 
vaccination against BT. The latter related to the experientially-oriented attribute ‘Job satisfaction’, 
which was mean ranked second highest. Most of the farmers interviewed indicated they did not 
want to be emotionally confronted with cows seriously suffering from the consequences of BT.  
4.4.1.2 Normative referents for perceived norms 
For the perceived norm construct, a distinction was made between injunctive norms (𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) 
and descriptive norms (𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷). A total of 13 salient referents were identified from the interview 
sessions. Three referents were both classified as injunctive as well as descriptive norms. For 
example, a farmer (the respondent) has a perception of what fellow dairy farmers think he or she 
should do but at the same time takes into account the perceived behaviour of these fellow dairy 
farmers.  
Regarding respondents’ injunctive referents, six out of the twelve selected referents had 
less than 25 per cent NA ticks (underlined in Table 2). The ‘Veterinarian’ was the most important 
referent with 5 per cent NA ticks and the highest mean rank score. In order of mean rank score, 
the other referents selected were ‘Milk buyer’, ‘Fellow dairy farmers’, ‘Feed advisor’, ’Leaders / 
representatives’ and ‘Family and/or friends’.  
Regarding respondents’ descriptive referents, three out of the four selected referents had 
less than 25 per cent NA ticks (underlined in Table 3). ‘Colleague dairy farmers’, was the most 
important referent with about 9 per cent NA ticks. The other referents selected were ‘Leaders / 
representatives’ and ‘Dairy farmers in the media’. All three selected referents had fairly low 
comparable mean rank scores. 
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Table 4-2: Description and some descriptive statistics of the injunctive normative referents identified 
Referent Ind. 𝑙𝑙  𝑙𝑙 excl.  NA % NA a corr b M (SEM) 
1. Veterinarian 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1  363 345   5.0 0.38 5.87 (3.45) 
2. Study club members 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑2 361 187 48.2 0.28 1.19 (2.64) 
3. Exporter breeding cattle 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑3 364 186 48.9 0.16 3.08 (4.34) 
4. Animal welfare organization / society 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑4 364 255 29.9 0.36 2.51 (3.07) 
5. Contact bank / accountant 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑5 365 244 33.2 0.41 1.52 (3.05) 
6. Colleague dairy farmers 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑6 361 317 12.2 0.33 2.37 (3.15) 
7. Milk buyer 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑7 364 322 11.5 0.30 4.14 (3.99) 
8. Government representative 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑8   363 239 34.2 0.21 1.39 (3.02) 
9. Feed advisor 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑9 364 305 16.2 0.34 2.69 (3.15) 
10. Family and/or friends 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑10 365 282 22.7 0.39 1.53 (3.04) 
11. Leaders / representatives 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑11 363 274 24.5 0.37 2.57 (3.03) 
12. Fellow believers 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑12 367 170 53.7 0.28 0.56 (2.52) 
a Referents were included in the statistical analysis when less than 25% was a NA score 
b Each multiplicative composite was correlated with the average of the indicators representing the latent variable 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼. 
 
Table 4-3: Description and some descriptive statistics of the descriptive normative referents identified 
Referent Ind. 𝑙𝑙  𝑙𝑙 excl.  NA % NA a corr b M (SEM) 
1. Leaders / representatives 𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐1  368 297 19.3 0.27 2.00 (2.68) 
2. Study club members 𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐2 368 214 41.8 0.33 1.09 (2.28) 
3. Colleague dairy farmers 𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐3 369 335   9.2 0.35 1.56 (2.75) 
4. Dairy farmers in the media 𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐4 368 323 12.2 0.31 1.71 (2.52) 
a Referents were included in the statistical analysis when less than 25% was a NA score 
b Each multiplicative composite was correlated with the average of the indicators representing the latent variable 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼. 
 
4.4.1.3 Control factors for perceived behavioural control 
The control beliefs identified from the semi-qualitative interview sessions were grouped into 
five control factors encompassing four external and one internal. The external control factor which 
obtained the highest mean rank score was ‘Communication’, i.e. the provision of reliable information 
that can be trusted. Other external control factors in order of mean rank score were ‘Effectiveness’, 
mainly the effectiveness of the vaccine (strategy); ‘Compensation’, not only to lower costs of 
vaccination but also as a signal of seriousness; and ‘External organization’, particularly the red tape. 
The internal control factor was ‘Internal organization’, the easiness with which vaccination could be 
performed at the farm, e.g. to lock up the cows by the feeding fence.  
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Table 4-4: Description and some descriptive statistics of the control beliefs identified. 
Control 
factors 
 
Ind. 
 
Control belief statement 
If a voluntary vaccination program was to be announced when 
bluetongue were to occur in my environment this year will ... 
𝑙𝑙 corr b  𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶 d M (SEM) 
1. Comm. 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒11  I receive sufficient inform. about the purposes and necessity of 
preventive vaccination. 
383 0.32 0.82 3.60 (3.87) 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒12 they give me a solid justification why preventive vaccination is 
required. 
382 0.37 4.03 (3.58) 
2. Internal 
organization 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒21 vaccination be easy to perform on my farm.  382 0.27 0.02 3.81 (3.91) 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒22 a vaccination round be difficult to organize at my farm.a 383 -0.09c 1.14 (4.70) 
3. Compens. 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒31 I have sufficient resources available to pay such an unforeseen 
expense.   
382 0.24 0.78 3.05 (3.94) 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒32 I not be able to cover the costs of preventive vaccination.a 383 0.26 2.80 (4.28) 
4. Effective. 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒41 it be clear to me how the available vaccine functions. 383 0.24 0.73 3.10 (3.08) 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒42 the available vaccine do what it needs to do, and nothing else. 380 0.38 3.72 (3.22) 
5. External 
organization 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒51 (government) organizations employ an efficient policy.  383 0.28 0.04 2.28 (3.10) 
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒52 the registering to join in the programme be laborious.a 383 -0.06c 1.70 (4.16) 
a Those statements were negatively formulated and thus reversed. 
b Each multiplicative composite was pair-wisely correlated with the average of the indicators representing the latent variable 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶. 
c No significant correlation with 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶.  
d With Cronbach’s alpha (∝𝐶𝐶) the internal consistency reliability was measured for each pair of multiplicative composites 
representing an attribute 
 
4.4.2 Mimic models  
Figure 2 illustrates the MIMIC model using the results for the attributes 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 causing 𝐴𝐴. Table 
5 presents the overall model fit indexes and the relative importance of the causal effects on the 
associated determinant of intention.  
Based on the guidelines for establishing (un)acceptable fit provided by Hair et al. (2010), 
the model with attributes 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 causing 𝐴𝐴 had an excellent fit. The attributes together explained 54 
per cent of the variance in 𝐴𝐴.  The model with referents 𝑘𝑘 causing 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 had a good fit; here the 
referents explained 36 per cent of the variance in 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴. Also, the model with referents 𝑙𝑙 causing 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 
had a good fit as the referents selected explained 27 per cent of the variance in 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷. The overall 
model fit indices evaluated a model in which a global reflectively-measured latent variable was 
included for identification purposes (see section ‘Model assessment’).  
The model with control factors 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 causing 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 showed a good fit, even though the RMSEA 
was only 0.111. However, the RMSEA falsely indicates a poor fit since the 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 was only 1 (Kenny et 
al., 2014).  Poor fit can be diagnosed by specifying additional models that include deleted 
parameters. With the non-significant control factors included to increase the 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐, the model fit was 
as follows: 𝜒𝜒2 = 7.13 with 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 = 4, 𝑒𝑒 < .129; RMSEA = .046; SRMR = .007; CFI = 0.991. In both 
model specifications, the control factors explained 18 per cent of the variance in 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶. 
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Figure 4-2: An illustration of the MIMIC model with attributes 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊 causing 𝑨𝑨. 
 
Results reported no influential standardized covariance residuals. A few weak influential 
modification indices were reported suggesting omitted paths between a cause and one particular 
reflective indicator. For example, in the model with referents 𝑘𝑘 causing 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴, there were two 
suggested omitted paths from the referents ‘Veterinarian’ and ’Leaders / representatives’ to a 
particular reflective indicator of 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 that was formulated as: […] people in the industry whose 
opinions I value […]. Therefore, the suggested omitted paths can be theoretically explained as both 
referents are people from the industry. However, there is no further justification for the inclusion of 
these paths. The causal effect is estimated via paths from both referents to the latent construct 
𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴.  
Focussing on the relative importance of the causal effects on the associated determinant 
of intention, all parameters that were statistically significant had the expected sign (see Table 5). 
Regarding the model with attributes 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 causing 𝐴𝐴, ‘Risk insurance’ obtained the highest 𝛾𝛾-
parameter, followed by ‘Job satisfaction’ and ‘Collective disease eradication’. Although significant 
at the 5 per cent critical level, the negative coefficients of ‘Production distortions’ and ‘Time and 
effort’ were low. Thus, the most influential attitudinal belief underlying the evaluation to perform 
preventive vaccination against BT was to be insured against the economic damage of the disease. 
Yet another influential underlying attitudinal belief was the ‘psychological insurance’ against the 
chance of facing harrowing disease cases and to be emotionally confronted with cows seriously 
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suffering from the consequences of BT. The third in the order of influential beliefs was that with 
preventive vaccination a contribution is made to the eradication of the disease.  
Regarding the model with referents 𝑘𝑘 causing 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼, ‘Family and/or friends’ obtained the 
highest 𝛾𝛾-parameter, immediately followed by ‘Veterinarian’. The third in order of influential injunctive 
referents was ‘Colleague dairy farmers’. Thus, the most influential referents underlying the 
respondents’ perceived injunctive norms are relatives and the veterinarian. It should be noted here 
that although almost equal in relative importance, the ‘Veterinarian’ was the most important and 
highest mean ranked referent compared to the other injunctive referents5. Regarding the model 
with referents 𝑙𝑙 causing 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷, ‘Colleague dairy farmers’ obtained the highest 𝛾𝛾-parameter, followed 
by ‘Leaders / representatives’ and ‘Dairy farmers in the media’. Thus, the most influential referent 
underlying the respondents’ perceived descriptive norms are ‘Fellow dairy farmers’.  
 
Table 4-5: Estimates of the various MIMIC models. 
Cause Causal effect of 𝛾𝛾 on… 𝑒𝑒 
 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 𝛥𝛥𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶  
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒1 -.105    .012 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2 .218    .000 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒3 -.093    .027 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒4 .341    .000 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒5 .277    .000 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚1  .209   .001 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚6  .174   .005 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚7  .113   .075 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚10  .222   .000 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚11  .158   .014 
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐1   .176  .010 
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐3   .308  .000 
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐4   .179  .012 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒1    .239 .004 
𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒4    .210 .010 
𝑁𝑁 362 244 287 373  
𝜒𝜒2 
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 
𝑒𝑒 < 20.52 16 .198 17.37 10 .067 23.57 11 .015 5.60 1 .018  
RMSEA .028 .055 .063 .111  
SRMR .016 .025 .049 .008  
CFI .996 .982 .987 .988  
                                              
5 Different model specifications were run to check the robustness of the coefficients. A model specification with 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1 and 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑10 in the 
index gave the following coefficients: 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚1 = .320 and 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚10 = .304 with 𝑙𝑙 = 274. A model specification with only 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑1 gave the 
following coefficient: 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚1 = .412 with 𝑙𝑙 = 343. A model specification with only 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑10 gave the following coefficient: 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚10 = .434 
with 𝑙𝑙 = 280. From the different model specifications it can be concluded that the two referents stay equally important.  
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Regarding the model with control factors 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 causing 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶, ‘Communication’ obtained the 
highest 𝛾𝛾-parameter, immediately followed by ‘Effectiveness’, both external control factors. Thus, 
the most influential control belief underlying the respondents’ perceived own capability to perform 
the behaviour had to do with the communication of the responsible institutions to the farmers related 
to the justification and the necessity of preventive vaccination. Yet another influential underlying 
control belief related to the effectiveness of the vaccine (strategy). 
4.5 Discussion 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; 2010), beliefs are subjective probabilities, and they 
can be established in three different ways: via (1) descriptive belief formation, which results from 
direct observation; (2) informational belief formation, which results from accepting information from 
some outside source; or (3) inferential belief formation, which results from a process of inference 
from some other belief.  
Attitudinal beliefs about attributes can be classified into instrumental (economic) and 
experiential (affective) aspects of attitude (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). Thus, for the influential 
attitudinal beliefs found in this study, ‘Risk insurance’ and ‘Collective disease eradication’ are 
instrumental and ‘Job satisfaction’ is experiential in nature. Especially for the instrumental attributes, 
a more favourable attitude can be stimulated through information belief formation, a careful use of 
the communication intervention as a policy instrument to demonstrate the exposure to the potential 
risks of no vaccination at the farm but also country-wide. The significance of communication is 
confirmed as it was one of the influential external control factors (‘Communication’). As this 
information needs to be ‘accepted from an outside source’, the selected risk communication 
channels through which information is sent matter. As Garforth et al. (2004: p. 28) observed: “local 
and personal contacts generally have more influence on farmers’ intentions than more distant and 
impersonal sources”. 
Trust and credibility determine the success in changing attitudinal beliefs in risk 
communication. Information is more likely accepted if there is a credible communicator, a high level 
of ‘similarity’ between the audience and communicator and both the message and communicator 
must be perceived as trustworthy (Petty and Cacioppo, 1996). Trust and credibility are also crucial 
in the case of BT vaccination, particularly if farmers might have lost confidence in a publicly 
organized vaccination programme due to a contaminated vaccine offered in the past (Barkema et 
al., 2001; Elbers et al., 2010).  
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The latter might provide an explanation of why the external control factor ‘Effectiveness’ is influential. 
Hence, all of the above justifies why in 2008 not only the Ministry itself but also farmer organizations 
recommended vaccination and farmer meetings were used to communicate.  
Another policy instrument used in 2008 was subsidization of the costs of vaccination. From 
economic theory, it can be argued that when the probability of infection is high and expected 
economic consequences are large, vaccination provides a similar protection as insurance against 
the risk of infection. Farmers who perceive a high probability of infection without vaccination and 
expect large economic consequences of infection without vaccination will have a strong incentive 
to vaccinate. This was most likely the case in 2006 and 2007 for farmers in the southern and 
central part of the Netherlands, who experienced the negative effects of infection on their livestock 
(Schaik et al., 2008). In these circumstances, subsidization of vaccination might only have had a 
small effect on the motivation of a farmer to participate in a vaccination campaign (Sok et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, farmers in the northern part of the Netherlands might have perceived the risk of 
infection to be rather low in 2008, although in this area the largest proportion of susceptible animals 
was present. The 2008 vaccination plan indicated that “special attention needs to be given to areas 
for which it is known that the bluetongue seroprevalence is relatively low” (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 2008: p. 6). Hence, subsidization was used to provide an economic incentive to farmers in 
low prevalence areas to vaccinate. Moreover, providing subsidies (as opposed to fines) might also 
have served as an indicator of the seriousness with which the government was taking her 
responsibility, and therefore could well have been a complement to the communicative intervention 
that aims at motivating farmers intrinsically.   
A key assumption in RAA is that beliefs do not have to be rational, nor have to be instinctive 
or stable over time. They are formed in daily encounters in the real world (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). 
The only assumption made in the RAA is that one’s behaviour follows reasonably from beliefs. 
Therefore, it is very likely that the direct or indirect experiences with the consequences of the BT 
epidemic of 2006 – 2009 are captured within attitudinal beliefs through descriptive and/or 
inferential belief formation. In other words, farmers might have been basing their responses on their 
direct and indirect experiences with BT when filling in the questionnaire. Diverging BT experiences 
from the past could have led to a different set of influential attitudinal beliefs for different groups. 
Farmers in the southern part might have been more concerned with ‘Production distortions’ than 
farmers in the northern part of the Netherlands, because the BT prevalence was the highest in the 
southern part, where the outbreak started, and decreased towards the north (Elbers et al., 2008c; 
Schaik et al., 2008). Furthermore, Elbers et al. (2010) reported that the probability of BT vaccine 
uptake in 2009 increased if farmers had experienced BT in the preceding years. This is in line with 
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the assertion of RAA that beliefs are not necessarily rational. From a rational point of view, 
vaccination is less profitable if the herd has become immune through natural infection. Thus, some 
farmers might base, for a major part, their vaccination decisions on direct and indirect experiences 
with animal diseases no matter whether that decision is rational or not. Personal characteristics, 
such as the individuals’ goals, values or conscientiousness can address these decisions (Willock et 
al., 1999; Austin et al., 2001). It can provide explanations why attitudinal beliefs are not always 
instrumental but can also be experientially-oriented, like the case of ‘Job satisfaction’ is showing 
(Gasson, 1973). Such contextual and personal factors can be used to address heterogeneity in 
beliefs among farmers. 
The most influential normative beliefs found in this study were ‘Family and friends’ and 
‘Veterinarian’, followed by ‘Colleague dairy farmers’. The way these beliefs are formed is not 
exclusive, in fact, all three different ways of belief formation may be true. The multiplicative 
composite of ‘Family and friends’ (see Appendix) consisted of a low belief score (0.44) and a 
moderate outcome evaluation score (2.80). Thus, the influence of relatives is not so much 
determined by a strong opinion relatives hold in favour of the behaviour under study, rather the 
normative influence itself is more important. This likely relates to the fact that Dutch dairy farms 
usually are family businesses; factors such as the case of multiple decision makers, the stage in 
the family cycle and the dependence of family income from farm operations are taken into account 
in the decision-making process (Gasson et al., 1988; Burton, 2006).  
The multiplicative composite of ‘Veterinarian’ (see Appendix) consisted of a highly positive 
belief score (1.41) and a high outcome evaluation score (4.01). Thus, most farmers perceive the 
veterinarian’s opinion to be in favour of vaccination while this normative belief is also important. This 
finding is in line with previous research showing that the veterinarian is being perceived as a highly 
trusted and influential referent in herd health management (e.g. Ellis-Iversen et al., 2010; Kristensen 
and Jakobsen, 2011; Lam et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2013; Fisher, 2013). This suggests that for 
future BT alike vaccination strategies, the social interactions between veterinarians and farmers 
might be an appropriate communication channel to use.  
‘Fellow dairy farmers’ was the third in order of important injunctive normative beliefs, while 
being the most important descriptive normative belief. In both cases, the belief score was barely 
positive (0.60 and 0.42 respectively) and the outcome evaluation score moderate (3.30 and 2.96 
respectively) (see Appendix). The low scores might indicate that farmers had difficulties with forming 
a belief about (estimating a probability) and evaluating the outcome of normative influences from 
fellow dairy farmers for a hypothetical reactive vaccination scheme. Nevertheless, the fact that 
fellow dairy farmers are an influential referent in both type of norms suggests that social interactions 
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among farmers about vaccination decisions exist. In case these social interactions are confidence-
based, the belief can be formed through either descriptive (direct observation) or informational 
belief formation (accepting information). If there is more distance, the belief can be formed through 
inferential belief formation. Farmers may base their inferences on prior descriptive beliefs, such as 
beliefs concerning a colleague dairy farmer’s personality or his or her farming style.  
The preceding illustrates the complexity of understanding collective voluntary vaccination. 
Eradication programmes have characteristics of collectively produced goods (Oude Lansink, 2011), 
i.e. the success of eradication programmes depends on the success of collective action, while for 
an economic rational decision maker, the positive externality of a reduced likelihood of infection for 
colleague farmers is not an incentive to vaccinate (Rat-Aspert and Fourichon, 2010; Sok et al., 
2014). This view, where each individual farmer is expected to behave autonomously and self-
interested, might be an ‘undersocialized’ view (Granovetter, 1985); collective voluntary behaviour is 
also likely driven by social interactions within a community or network of farmers. In the latter, 
behavioural ‘rules’ that influence the collective outcome are e.g. norms of reciprocity, reputation, 
group identity, solidarity and trust, which are all elements of (informal) social capital (e.g. Mathijs, 
2003; Burton et al., 2008; Sutherland and Burton, 2011).  
Peer group pressure is also indicated to be a policy instrument that can externally motivate 
voluntary behaviour (Van Woerkum, 1990). As this research has shown that social interaction among 
farmers exist, future research is needed to study more deeply the underlying mechanisms of social 
interactions that influence farmers’ decision-making with regard to private and public interests of 
controlling future BT alike disease epidemics. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In the 2008 vaccination strategy against bluetongue, the policy instruments used largely 
fitted in with the influential beliefs of dairy farmers that drove the intention to participate in a 
voluntary vaccination scheme. 
The analysis of the beliefs shows that for a communication intervention, the communication 
channels used need to be credible and trusted by farmers. As farmers seem to already have intrinsic 
motivations to vaccinate, subsidization can complement a communication intervention to stress the 
seriousness with which the government takes her responsibility. 
Given that social interactions among farmers about vaccination decisions exist, social 
interaction mechanisms, such as peer group pressure, might take the role of a ‘catalyst’ among the 
mix of policy instruments used in voluntary vaccination strategies. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix table A4.1: Rank scores and some descriptive statistics of the attitudinal beliefs (𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) and outcome 
evaluations (𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊). 
 Not likely > > Very likely   
Ind. 1 2 3 4 5 Obs. Mean (SEM) 
𝑝𝑝11 26 83 111 95 63 378 3.22 (1.17) 
𝑝𝑝12 20 60 125 108 66 379 3.37 (1.10) 
𝑝𝑝21 40 67 82 139 51 379 3.25 (1.20) 
𝑝𝑝22 25 25 80 174 75 379 3.66 (1.07) 
𝑝𝑝31 17 55 100 137 70 379 3.50 (1.09) 
𝑝𝑝32 33 60 111 122 53 379 3.27 (1.15) 
𝑝𝑝41 14 26 63 169 107 379 3.87 (1.02) 
𝑝𝑝42 40 64 152 93 30 379 3.02 (1.07) 
𝑝𝑝51 41 50 109 138 41 379 3.23 (1.15) 
𝑝𝑝52 31 37 110 145 57 380 3.42 (1.11) 
 Of no importance < > Of importance   
Ind. -2 -1 0 1 2 Obs. Mean (SEM) 
𝑒𝑒11 34 53 70 139 83 379 .49 (1.23) 
𝑒𝑒12 18 38 76 154 92 378 .70 (1.09) 
𝑒𝑒21 29 43 85 157 65 379 .49 (1.13) 
𝑒𝑒22 18 28 79 167 87 379 .73 (1.04) 
𝑒𝑒31 89 101 96 65 29 380 -.41 (1.23) 
𝑒𝑒32 88 95 106 66 25 380 -.41 (1.20) 
𝑒𝑒41 12 11 50 164 142 379 1.09 (.95) 
𝑒𝑒42 24 34 87 132 102 379 .67 (1.15) 
𝑒𝑒51 7 3 49 140 181 380 1.28 (.85) 
𝑒𝑒52 11 15 85 153 115 379 .91 (.97) 
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Appendix table A4.2: Rank scores and some descriptive statistics of the attitudinal beliefs (𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒌𝒌) and 
outcome evaluations (𝒎𝒎𝒌𝒌) 
 
Ind. 
Much against < > Much in favour  % Obs.  
NA 
 
Mean (SEM) -2 -1 0 1 2 Obs. 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙1 1 0 41 117 188 364 4.7 1.41   (.72) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙2 3 13 106 56 16 363 46.6 .36   (.79) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙3 14 11 52 34 82 364 47.0 .82 (1.25) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙4 10 10 75 83 89 363 25.6 .87 (1.04) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙5 11 5 115 70 47 364 31.9 .55   (.97) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙6 4 12 138 129 43 362 9.9 .60   (.81) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙7 2 7 95 96 128 365 10.1 1.04   (.91) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙8 11 12 113 52 60 362 31.5 .56 (1.05) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙9 3 6 117 131 56 365 14.2 .74   (.81) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙10 9 13 153 77 42 367 19.9 .44   (.90) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙11 8 12 79 104 83 364 21.4 .85   (.98) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙12 16 14 94 38 14 367 52.0 .11   (.98) 
 Not important > > Very important % Obs. 
NA 
 
Mean (SEM) Ind. 1 2 3 4 5 Obs. 
𝑑𝑑1 15 14 52 153 128 366 1.1 4.01 (1.01) 
𝑑𝑑2 50 41 75 36 9 362 41.7 2.59 (1.15) 
𝑑𝑑3 65 23 70 37 39 366 36.1 2.84 (1.42) 
𝑑𝑑4 97 63 86 38 19 366 17.2 2.40 (1.23) 
𝑑𝑑5 104 55 88 37 17 366 17.8 2.36 (1.23) 
𝑑𝑑6 40 33 104 116 49 365 6.3 3.30 (1.18) 
𝑑𝑑7 33 23 72 98 118 366 6.0 3.71 (1.27) 
𝑑𝑑8 97 53 88 39 21 365 18.4 2.44 (1.26) 
𝑑𝑑9 51 33 109 111 33 365 7.7 3.12 (1.19) 
𝑑𝑑10 73 40 120 64 29 365 10.7 2.80 (1.24) 
𝑑𝑑11 79 53 96 58 22 364 15.4 2.65 (1.25) 
𝑑𝑑12 109 25 65 11 8 367 40.6 2.01 (1.16) 
 
Appendix table A4.3: Rank scores and some descriptive statistics of the attitudinal beliefs (𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒍) and 
outcome evaluations (𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒍) 
 
Ind. 
Definitely will not < > Definitely will  % Obs.  
NA 
 
Mean (SEM) -2 -1 0 1 2 Obs. 
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙1 5 5 120 102 69 368 18.2 .75 (.88) 
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙2 6 9 132 60 15 368 39.7 .31 (.77) 
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙3 5 20 165 124 23 369 8.7 .42 (.77) 
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙4 2 13 143 131 36 368 11.7 .57 (.76) 
 Not important > > Very important % Obs. 
NA 
 
Mean (SEM) Ind. 1 2 3 4 5 Obs. 
𝑐𝑐1 114 66 81 59 13 369 9.8 2.37 (1.23) 
𝑐𝑐2 80 35 72 45 6 368 35.3 2.42 (1.20) 
𝑐𝑐3 74 40 93 111 32 369 5.1 2.96 (1.28) 
𝑐𝑐4 99 66 110 55 13 369 9.8 2.47 (1.17) 
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Appendix table A4.4: Rank scores and some descriptive statistics of the attitudinal beliefs 𝒄𝒄𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊 and outcome 
evaluations 𝒑𝒑𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊. 
 Not likely > > Very likely   
Ind. 1 2 3 4 5 Obs. Mean (SEM) 
𝑐𝑐11 9 25 68 192 90 384 3.86 (.93) 
𝑐𝑐12 15 35 109 167 58 384 3.57 (.98) 
𝑐𝑐21 7 17 60 183 117 384 4.01 (.90) 
𝑐𝑐22 8 19 65 134 159 385 4.08 (.98) 
𝑐𝑐31 20 27 99 129 108 383 3.73 (1.10) 
𝑐𝑐32 17 16 99 101 150 383 3.92 (1.10) 
𝑐𝑐41 40 71 117 108 49 385 3.14 (1.17) 
𝑐𝑐42 25 52 152 114 38 381 3.23 (1.02) 
𝑐𝑐51 56 84 128 86 29 383 2.86 (1.15) 
𝑐𝑐52 17 26 112 117 113 385 3.74 (1.09) 
 Harder / dissuading < > Easier / persuading   
Ind. -2 -1 0 1 2 Obs. Mean (SEM) 
𝑒𝑒11 12 8 94 170 100 384 .88 (.93) 
𝑒𝑒12 12 6 66 168 131 383 1.04 (.93) 
𝑒𝑒21 9 12 90 175 97 383 .89 (.90) 
𝑒𝑒22 28 41 160 103 51 383 .28 (1.06) 
𝑒𝑒31 15 17 112 155 85 384 .72 (.98) 
𝑒𝑒32 17 17 115 152 84 385 .70 (1.00) 
𝑒𝑒41 11 9 76 193 94 383 .91 (.90) 
𝑒𝑒42 8 6 71 157 142 384 1.09 (.89) 
𝑒𝑒51 20 16 106 161 82 385 .70 (1.02) 
𝑒𝑒52 18 36 148 117 64 383 .45 (1.03) 
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Abstract 
When designing effective voluntary vaccination strategies against animal disease epidemics, 
policy makers need to take into account that different groups of farmers base their participation 
decisions on different considerations. Using the past bluetongue virus serotype 8 epidemic of 2006 
– 2009 in Europe as an example, this paper uses the reasoned action approach to identify a set of 
attitudinal beliefs being the major drivers behind the intended decision to participate in voluntary 
vaccination. The results show that there is heterogeneity among farmers in these beliefs. In 
particular, perceived risk, which was captured by a risk attitude and a risk perception of the farmer, 
and personality traits are associated with variability in beliefs about vaccination against bluetongue. 
The patterns found between perceived risk, personality traits and other farm and farmer 
characteristics were discussed in relation to the governance of animal health. 
 
Keywords 
reasoned action approach, beliefs, perceived risk, personality traits, bluetongue, vaccination 
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5.1 Introduction 
Animal health authorities in Europe are increasingly offering reactive voluntary vaccination 
schemes to farmers in order to prevent the consequences of serious animal health epidemics. 
Farmers differ in their personal and farm characteristics and are likely having different 
considerations for participating in such a scheme. Next to economic considerations, these can be 
intrinsic or social in nature. 
One of such serious animal disease epidemics, caused by bluetongue (BT) virus serotype 
8, was first reported in Europe in 2006 and ultimately controlled during 2009 after a mass reactive 
vaccination scheme, primarily directed towards controlling the spread of  the virus, at European 
transnational level was adopted in 2008 (Elbers et al., 2010). A unique factor here was that a few 
European countries (including England, the Netherlands and Wales) left the decision to vaccinate to 
the farmers themselves. Most member states (including Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Czech Republic) adopted a mandatory vaccination scheme to meet expected epidemiological goals, 
i.e. stop the spread of disease and in the end eradicate the disease. France adopted a mixture of 
voluntary and compulsory schemes (Wilson and Mellor, 2009). 
The animal health authorities in the Netherlands thus adopted a voluntary vaccination 
scheme, thereby possibly losing control on the uptake and becoming dependent on the collective 
participation response of farmers. The choice for voluntary vaccination schemes took places 
against a background where governance of animal health is shifting towards a more neoliberal 
model of cost and responsibility sharing (Enticott et al., 2014; Maye et al., 2014), but also because 
of non-positive sentiments of cattle farmers with obligatory vaccination campaigns due to a negative 
experience with a vaccination campaign against Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis, when a batch of 
vaccines was contaminated (Elbers et al., 2010). At the same time, it is agreed world-wide that 
national governments bear the final responsibility of guaranteeing veterinary, sanitary and 
phytosanitary safety, including the control of animal diseases such as BT (OIE, 2017). 
In the light of the foregoing, voluntary approaches might not meet the required 
epidemiological goals. On the other hand, if a voluntary approach can meet the epidemiological 
goals, this has all the intrinsic ingredients for the approach to be more cost-effective and efficient 
overall (e.g. Segerson, 2013). Farmers’ behaviour needs to be understood well before vaccination 
schemes that trust on voluntary approaches are designed and implemented.  
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Social behaviour is, according to the reasoned action approach (RAA, Fishbein and Ajzen, 
2010), guided by three kinds of considerations: attitudinal, normative and control beliefs. The more 
favourable the attitude towards the behaviour, the more normative pressure is perceived to perform 
the behaviour, the more perceived control over the behaviour, the more likely it is that the behaviour 
is performed. Attitudinal beliefs link the behaviour to outcomes and/or potential consequences (e.g. 
vaccination insures the risk of infection or gives adverse effects) of the behaviour. Normative beliefs 
refer to the expectations and perceived behaviour of others. Control beliefs reflect factors that may 
facilitate or hinder performing of the behaviour. Each farmer forms his or her beliefs in daily 
encounters in the real world, and in different ways through direct observation (e.g. perceived past 
experience), external information (e.g. via veterinarians) or through inference processes (e.g. based 
on another belief that grazing cows increase the probability of infection) (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). 
When revealing the most influential beliefs using latent variable regression techniques, 
homogeneity in beliefs among the farmers in the sample was assumed (see Sok et al., 2015). In 
reality, different groups of farmers base their participation decisions on different considerations. 
When designing effective vaccination schemes, it is therefore more realistic to assume that farmers 
are heterogeneous in their beliefs. 
Differences in farm-management might partly explain the heterogeneity in beliefs to 
participate in a reactive vaccination scheme. For example, whether cows are kept inside or graze 
outside can influence the likelihood of BT virus infection (e.g. Baylis et al., 2010; Santman-Berends 
et al., 2010). If the heifer management is such that a part of the calves are retained for being 
exported in addition to the replacement of dairy cows can be a strong economic consideration to 
vaccinate (Sok et al., 2014). A second group of background variables that can explain heterogeneity 
in beliefs are so-called behavioural variables. An important concept here is perceived risk in relation 
to animal disease epidemics, captured by a risk attitude (risk preference) and risk perception of the 
farmer (Meuwissen et al., 2001; Flaten et al., 2005; Ogurtsov et al., 2009; Valeeva et al., 2011) 
and personality traits (e.g. Austin et al., 2001). 
This paper explores the factors determining heterogeneity in attitudinal beliefs for the 
participation in voluntary vaccination against BT. It applies a cluster analysis to group farmers based 
on different sets of scores on attitudinal beliefs. The farmer clusters are profiled using background 
variables through a multinomial logistic regression model. The profile clusters may contain 
important information for designing effective vaccination strategies against animal diseases such 
as BT, where the success of control depends on collective action. The relevancy for policy-making 
can be shown with the notification that BT (virus serotype 8) re-appeared in France and a vaccination 
campaign is  needed to control the spread (Sailleau et al., 2017). 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the RAA framework is briefly 
described and results of preceding related studies that have used the RAA to study BT vaccination 
behaviour are summarized. Next, in the materials and method section, the two-stage clustering 
method and the multinomial regression model procedures that are used in this paper are described 
and the results obtained are presented. The paper ends with a discussion of the results and 
concluding remarks. 
5.2 Framework and previous research 
Figure 1 presents the RAA framework graphically. The RAA is the most recent representation 
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour and the Integrative Model (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). It is a 
decision model from social psychology, and predicts that a given future behaviour is explained by 
the intention to perform the behaviour. The intention, in turn, is directly explained by four main social-
psychological constructs: attitude, perceived norms and perceived behavioural control. Within 
perceived norms, a distinction is made between injunctive and descriptive norms. In turn, these 
constructs are explained by underlying beliefs, which are the indirect measures explaining intention. 
Figure 1 also shows how this study relates to preceding studies. For each study the aim 
and scope is clarified. In study 1 Sok et al. (2016b) concluded, among other things, that the farmers’ 
intention to participate in a voluntary hypothetical reactive vaccination scheme when BT were to 
occur is mainly attitude-driven. Therefore, normative and control beliefs were kept outside the scope 
of the current study (marked grey in Figure 1).  
Since farmers’ intentions to participate in a voluntary hypothetical reactive vaccination 
scheme against BT are mainly attitude-driven, attitudinal beliefs particularly guide the behaviour. 
These attitudinal beliefs have been identified and elicited during interviews and subsequently 
analyzed to see which of them explained attitude best (Sok et al., 2015). The most influential 
attitudinal beliefs (indicated in Figure 1 with the number of plusses or minuses) related to positive 
outcomes of the behaviour, i.e. being insured against the risk of economic damage as a result of a 
BT infection (Economic risk insurance) and being insured against the risk of being emotionally 
confronted with harrowing disease cases, cows seriously suffering from BT (Job satisfaction or 
‘psychological insurance’).  
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Another positive outcome but less influential is that with vaccination a contribution is made 
to the eradication of the disease (Collective disease eradication). There were also two negative 
outcomes but less influential in explaining attitude. One related to the perception that vaccination 
could lead to potential adverse effects and/or stress in the herd (Production distortions) and the 
other related to the time and effort it takes to get the herd vaccinated (Time and effort). 
 
 
  
Figure 5-1: The reasoned action approach, adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). 
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5.3 Materials and methods 
5.3.1 Questionnaire and sample 
A major part of the 12-page questionnaire was used to obtain direct and indirect measures 
of the social-psychological constructs as specified in the RAA framework (see Figure 1). Details 
regarding the measurement and statistical analyses are found in Sok et al. (2015; 2016b). Part of 
the questionnaire6 was reserved for measuring the background variables for the current study, i.e. 
variables that can explain the adoption profile of groups of farmers.  
Background variables were classified into farm-management and behavioural variables (see 
Figure 1). In the group of farm-management variables, average milk production per cow (305 days) 
was measured with three categories: ‘less than 8500 kg’., ‘between 8500 – 9500 kg.’ and ‘more 
than 9500 kg.’. Furthermore, three management characteristics were measured, relating to 
grazing, replacement and export. The grazing regime was measured with three categories: ‘never 
grazing’, ‘part of the day’ and ‘day and night’. Replacement management was measured with five 
categories ranging from ‘entirely own raised’ to ‘entirely purchased’. Sale of breeding stock was 
measured with three categories: ‘never’, ‘occasionally’ and ‘regularly’. A composite variable was 
constructed from the variables relating to import (replacement management) and export of heifers. 
The first category consisted of farms that rear their own heifers, and never export them. The second 
category consisted of farms that occasionally import and/or export heifers. The third and last 
category consisted of farms that regularly import and/or export heifers. 
In the group of behavioural variables, a sub-classification was made into perceived past 
experience, perceived risk and personality traits. In the subgroup of perceived past experience 
variables, the respondent was asked whether he or she thought that bluetongue occurred at the 
farm in the past and that the herd had been vaccinated against bluetongue, the latter representing 
(perceived) past behaviour. Both were measured on a 4-point Likert type scale with categories: 
‘Certainly not’, ‘Probably not’, ‘Probably yes’ and ‘Certainly yes’. In the subgroup of perceived risk 
variables, a risk perception and a relative risk attitude were measured. The conceptual framework 
for measuring risk is taken from the Health Belief Model, where risk perception is defined as a 
composite of perceived susceptibility times perceived impact (Janz and Becker, 1984; Valeeva et 
al., 2011). Risk perception was measured with two 5-point Likert-type scales, one with adjectives 
‘Never’ to ‘Often’ and one with adjectives ‘No impact’ to ‘High impact’. The relative risk attitude (with 
                                              
6 The questionnaire is available upon request. 
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respect to animal diseases in general) was measured on a 5-point Likert type scale with adjectives 
‘Less risk’ to ‘More risk’ (see Meuwissen et al., 2001). In the subgroup of personality traits variables, 
the Big Five personality dimensions were measured, namely agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
emotional stability, extraversion and openness. A brief measure is the Ten-Item Personality Inventory 
(TIPI), developed by Gosling et al. (2003), which was applied using a calibrated Dutch questionnaire 
(Hofmans et al., 2008). 
Based on an expected response rate of 20 – 25% and a minimum sample size of 300, the 
survey was randomly sent to 1,500 Dutch dairy farmers. This sample was drawn from the National 
Cattle Identification and Registration Database and restricted to farms with a herd size of at least 
40 dairy cows. The latter was done to ensure that hobby holders were not included, as they likely 
have a different set of arguments in favour or against vaccination. Some socio-demographic 
variables and other farm characteristics were additionally measured to check for the sample 
representativeness.  
 The questionnaire, along with a pre-paid return envelope and an accompanying letter, was 
sent out in the second week of January 2014. Farmers were offered two possibilities to fill in the 
questionnaire, i.e. using the paper copy, or an on-line survey. Each respondent had a 10% chance 
of winning a gift coupon of € 25. After 4 weeks, a reminder was sent to all farmers in the sample. 
The final response, the 415th, was returned around mid-March, resulting in a response rate of 
almost 28%. 
5.3.2 Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is an exploratory multivariate statistical technique, and was used here to 
decompose the single cluster of farmers into multiple clusters such that, within clusters, farmers 
would be as much as possible homogeneous, and between clusters as much as possible 
heterogeneous in their attitudinal beliefs. 
The attitudinal beliefs were tested for multicollinearity. The highest variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was found in the linear regression with the belief Job satisfaction as the dependent variable 
and all other attitudinal beliefs as independent variables, which was 1.81. Kline (2011) indicates that 
a VIF of >10 is indicating that variables may be redundant. 
Specifically, a two-stage cluster analysis procedure was used (e.g. Punj and Stewart, 1983; 
Ketchen and Shook, 1996). In the first stage, a proximity matrix was made based on Manhattan 
distance measure between each pair of farmers (clusters); the distance is defined as the sum of 
the absolute differences of each of the five attitudinal beliefs. The Ward’s minimum variance method 
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takes the proximity matrix and groups each time the pair of clusters with the smallest distance, till 
only one cluster is left. The number of clusters was based on the minimum of the total within-cluster 
variance (sum of squares).  
The final number of clusters was determined using precision and usefulness as criteria. 
More clusters will better represent the heterogeneity in attitudinal beliefs, but too many clusters will 
complicate further analysis with the regression model used for predicting a farmer cluster 
membership. Precision was assessed by looking at the dendogram and stopping rules provided by 
Stata 13. Usefulness was assessed by looking at the cluster sizes and interpretability of the results.  
In the second stage, the clusters were refined using the K-means method; the resulting 
cluster means were taken from the Ward’s method and all cases were reassigned in an iterative 
way to the cluster mean that is the closest.  
Validity of the clusters was assessed by taking the direct attitude and intention measures 
(see Framework section). According to the theory and previous results, farmers in a cluster with 
high (low) scores on favourable outcomes should also have high (low) scores on attitude and 
intention measures. Furthermore, one-way ANOVAs tests were run on the within-cluster means of 
the five attitudinal beliefs. 
5.3.3 Statistical analysis  
The first step in the statistical analysis was to recode some of the variables. The group of 
farm-management variables was measured as categorical variables, and were recoded into 
dummies. The behavioural variables were measured using Likert-type scales and were left 
unchanged, except the perceived past experience variables. The scales ‘Certainly […]’ and ‘Probably 
[…]’  of this variable were transformed into a dummy variable (see Table 2).  
Several tests were run to see which variables in the regression model likely explain why 
farmers ended up in a particular cluster. For dummy variables, contingency tables with a chi-square 
(𝜒𝜒2) measure of association were run to test, based on the cluster analysis results, whether within-
cluster means are significantly different from each other. For continuous variables, one-way ANOVAs 
were run.  
 
 
92 
The obtained cluster variable is the dependent variable in the multinomial logistic regression 
model and the selected background variables are the independent variables. The model is defined 
as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 = 𝑗𝑗) = 𝛽𝛽′𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, … ,𝐸𝐸)                     (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 is the probability that farmer 𝑐𝑐 belongs to cluster 𝑗𝑗. The row vector 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 is made up of 
independent variables of the farm-management and behavioural variables, the column vector 𝛽𝛽′𝑖𝑖 
are the unknown regressions coefficients that need to be estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation, and 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐 is the error term. 
Given that the dependent is a categorical variable with 𝐸𝐸 levels, the error term is logistic. 
The probability that farmer 𝑐𝑐 belongs e.g. to cluster 1 is: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 = 1) = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽′1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽′2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)+⋯+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽′𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖).                  (2) 
Model fit is assessed with the log-likelihood ratio test and the pseudo-R2 of McFadden. Effect 
sizes of the regression coefficients are analyzed with the marginal effects, specifically the average 
marginal effect (AME) using Stata’s margins command (Mood, 2010). For dummy variables, the 
AME gives the predicted change in probability of the cluster variable given the discrete change, 
averaged across the observations with other variables held constant (conditional). For continuous 
variables, it is the predicted change in probability of the cluster variable given a one unit change.   
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Sample representativeness 
The average age of the respondent was 49 years. Nearly two third of respondents had an 
intermediate vocational education background and one fifth had some form of higher professional 
education qualification.  
Table 2 shows the overall mean (third column) of the background variables. Milk production 
(305 days lactation) varied widely, about 40 per cent of the farmers fell in the category ‘< 8500 kg’ 
and 40 per cent in the category ‘8500 – 9500’. Almost 80 per cent of the respondents indicated 
they let their animals graze, of whom three quarters grazes for only a part of the day. About half of 
all respondents indicated they sometimes export breeding cattle and almost 20 per cent does this 
regularly. Furthermore, the average herd size in the sample was 94 dairy cows and 69 young stock. 
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The average score on herd size and grazing regime in the sample were in line with the 
statistics provided by the Agricultural Economic Institute (LEI, 2016). Their reported mean herd size 
is 93 in 2013 and 95 cows in 2014. The grazing regime for three time slices (average of May, July 
and September) is 35% “Cows in the shed”, 51% “Restricted grazing” and 14% “Unrestricted 
grazing”. Statistics from the  Cattle Improvement Co-operative (CRV, 2014) estimated the average 
milk production in the Netherlands (305 days lactation) at 8523 kg. For age, education and export 
of breeding cattle no comparisons with official data could be made. However, based on the 
measures for which comparison is possible, the  sample appeared to be a good representation of 
the Dutch dairy farmers population (i.e. those with at least 40 dairy cows). 
5.4.2 Description of the clusters 
The upper part (Belief) of Table 1 shows the result of the second step of the two-stage 
cluster analysis. The overall mean is shown as well as the within-cluster centred means are provided. 
The (normal) mean of a belief of a particular group is obtained by adding the centred mean to the 
overall mean, for example for group 1 for Production distortions, the normal mean is 1.21 + -0.07. 
In the last two columns, the results of one-way ANOVAs show that the means of the attitudinal beliefs 
were statistically different between the four clusters for each of the five clustering variables; All 
beliefs were highly significant at the 0.1% critical level. 
The lower part of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics in terms of the overall mean and 
within-cluster centred means of four direct attitude and two intention measures. The means were 
significantly different between the four clusters at the 0.1 per cent critical level.  
The cluster analysis suggested four clusters with distinct sets of attitudinal beliefs. The 
belief Economic risk insurance got the highest F value, indicating that this was the most 
discriminating variable among the clusters identified.   
Farmers in cluster 1 represented about one fourth of the sample and are likely less willing 
to vaccinate given the fairly below average scores on attitude and intention. They had far below 
average scores on the positive outcomes of the behaviour: Economic risk insurance, Job 
satisfaction, and Collective disease eradication. Hereafter they are referred to as ‘non-intenders’. 
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Table 5-1: Overall mean and within-group centred means of the attitudinal beliefs, attitude and intention 
measures 
 Range 
 
 
Overall 
 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 F-testa 
 
  
Non-
intenders Undecided Intenders1  Intenders2 
  N=367 N = 90 N = 140 N = 53 N = 84  
Belief        
Production distortions -10 – 10 1.21 -0.07 1.31 -7.21 2.44 117.67 
Coll. disease eradication -10 – 10 2.72 -3.60 0.44 1.63 2.10   71.38 
Time and effort -10 – 10 -2.01 0.65 1.53 -2.72 -1.54   23.99 
Economic risk insurance -10 – 10 4.69 -4.03 -1.00 2.65 4.32 192.01 
Job satisfaction -10 – 10 4.02 -3.06 -0.30 1.41 2.89 127.30 
Attitude towards vaccination       
(un)satisfying 1 – 5 3.63 -0.98 -0.04 0.64 0.72   58.27 
(dis)advantageous 1 – 5 3.56 -0.86 -0.02 0.56 0.60   51.79 
(un)necessary 1 – 5 3.58 -0.82 -0.07 0.75 0.53   41.04 
(un)important 1 – 5 3.76 -0.94 -0.03 0.68 0.63   59.48 
Intention to vaccinate        
I intend to 1 – 5 3.21 -0.98 -0.05 0.77 0.64   44.37 
I am willing to 1 – 5 3.43 -0.87 -0.01 0.70 0.50   33.53 
a The differences between the clusters of the within-group centred means of all variables were highly significant at the 
0.1% level. 
 
Cluster 2 was the largest cluster, representing almost 40 per cent of the farmers in the 
sample. This cluster can be seen as the average cluster since their attitude and intention are about 
equal to the overall mean. Also the attitudinal beliefs did not deviate much from the overall mean. 
Farmers in this cluster did not clearly indicate whether they want to have their herd vaccinated. 
Hereafter they are referred to as ‘undecided’. 
Farmers in cluster 3 represented about one seventh of the sample, and were characterized 
by well above average scores on the three positive outcomes of the behaviour and in particular by 
a far below average score on Production distortions. These farmers are expected to be willing to 
vaccinate since the intention scores were about 4 on a scale of 1 to 5. Hereafter they are referred 
to as ‘intenders1’. 
Just as in cluster 3, farmers in cluster 4 had high attitude and intention scores. They scored 
well above average on the three positive outcomes, in particular Economic risk insurance with a 
mean of 9.01 on a scale of -10 to 10. What distinguishes farmers in cluster 4 from those in cluster 
3 was the above average score on Production distortions. Hereafter they are referred to as 
‘intenders2’. 
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5.4.3 Description of the background variables 
Table 2 gives an overview of the background variables considered. The significance levels 
from the chi-square and one-way ANOVA tests (see section 2.4) are indicated with the asterisks 
behind each variable. 
In the group of farm-management variables, (part of) the variables relating to milk production 
and heifer management were significantly associated with the cluster variable, at least at the 10 
per cent level. Milk production per cow varied among the clusters, with lower production levels 
especially present in the non-intenders group and higher production levels in the intenders2 group. 
Farmers in the intenders1 group more often imported or exported heifers.  
In the group of behavioural variables, again, most of the variables were significantly 
associated with the cluster variable, at least at the 10 per cent critical level, except some of the 
personality traits. Only the trait emotional stability was clearly not significantly associated with the 
cluster, the others were (extraversion and openness) almost significant at the 10 per cent critical 
level. 
Regarding the perceived past experiences, farmers were more explicit about whether they 
vaccinated against BT in the past than whether BT occurred at their farm. Most farmers reported 
either ‘probably not’ or ‘probably yes’ for the BT infection experience, while for the BT vaccination 
experience, most farmers reported either ‘certainly not’ or ‘certainly yes’. Almost 60 per cent of the 
farmers in the non-intenders group perceived that BT did not occur at their farm while in both 
intenders groups this was exactly the opposite. Almost 70 per cent of the farmers in the non-
intenders group perceived that they did not vaccinate against BT while in the both intenders groups 
this was exactly the opposite. 
Regarding the perceived risk, a first observation is that, with increasing risk perception, 
farmers were more risk averse. Farmers in the non-intenders group had the lowest risk perception 
and at the same time were, on average, willing to take more risk than their colleague farmers. 
Farmers in both intenders groups, on the other hand, were willing to take less risk and had higher 
risk perception scores, especially those in the intenders2 group. 
Regarding the personality traits, farmers in the non-intenders group scored, on average, the 
lowest on agreeableness and conscientiousness and the highest on openness, while this was exactly 
the opposite for farmers in both intenders groups. Farmers in the undecided group scored, on 
average, the lowest on emotional stability and extraversion.   
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Table 5-2: Overview of the background variables in terms of their description, range, overall and group-
mean. 
Background variable Range Overall  
Non-
intenders Undecided Intenders1  Intenders2 
Farm-management characteristics 
Milk production < 8500 kg.*** 0 to 1 0.44 0.60 0.49 0.34 0.25 
Milk production 8500-9500 kg.* 0 to 1 0.40 0.32 0.38 0.47 0.49 
Milk production > 9500 kg.** 0 to 1 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.25 
Grazing none 0 to 1 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.17 
Grazing part of the day 0 to 1 0.60 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.70 
Grazing day and night 0 to 1 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.13 
Own raised heifers and no export 0 to 1 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.13 0.20 
Occasionally import/export heifers 0 to 1 0.50 0.47 0.59 0.53 0.57 
Regularly import/export heifers** 0 to 1 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.34 0.23 
Behavioural characteristics  
Perceived past experience  
Bluetongue infected in past** 0 to 1 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.59 0.63 
Bluetongue vaccinated in past*** 0 to 1 0.54 0.32 0.53 0.70 0.70 
Perceived risk 
Risk perception*** 1 to 25 8.16 6.29 7.93 8.40 10.37 
Relative risk attitude*** 1 to 5 2.66 3.21 2.70 2.29 2.23 
Personality traits 
Agreeableness** 1 to 7 5.59 5.37 5.56 5.78 5.75 
Emotional stability 1 to 7 5.54 5.55 5.45 5.75 5.54 
Extraversion 1 to 7 4.97 5.06 4.78 4.99 5.17 
Conscientiousness*** 1 to 7 5.36 5.09 5.24 5.60 5.71 
Openness 1 to 7 4.97 5.10 5.06 4.85 4.76 
*, ** and *** indicate significance level at 0.10 (highly), 0.05 (moderately) and 0.01 (somewhat) respectively. 
 
5.4.4 Regression results 
Table 3 presents the average marginal effects that were computed from the multinomial 
logistic model. The dummy variables relating to grazing were excluded from the analysis since they 
had low associations with the cluster variable. The personality trait of emotional stability was 
removed for the same reason. One of the milk production and heifer management variables were 
also excluded to prevent perfect collinearity. 
The results on the model fit were as follows. The log-likelihood ratio test was highly 
significant, indicating that the specified model performed better than a model with just a constant. 
The McFadden’s pseudo-R2 value of 0.155. According to the empirical relationship found between 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 and the R2 of a linear regression model, the number is equivalent to a R2 
between 0.30 and 0.40 (Domencich and McFadden, 1975, p. 124).  
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Table 5-3: Estimated average marginal effects of the background factors from the multinomial logistic 
regression model. 
 
Background variable 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 = 1) 
Non-intenders 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 = 2) 
Undecided 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 = 3) 
Intenders1 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 = 4) 
Intenders2 
Milk production 8500-9500 kg. -.070 -.088  .035  .123 *** 
Milk production > 9500 kg -.169 ***  .022 -.000  .147 ** 
Occasionally import/export heifers -.054  .002  .045  .007 
Regularly import/export heifers  .106 -.144 *  .106 * -.069 
Bluetongue infected in the past -.031  .006  .021  .003 
Bluetongue vaccinated in the past -.093 ** -.027  .090 **  .030 
Risk perception -.015 ***  .001 -.004  .018 *** 
Relative risk attitude  .067 *** -.009 -.020 -.038 * 
Agreeableness -.041 **  .001  .020  .021 
Extraversion  .028 -.068 ***  .002  .038 * 
Conscientiousness -.032 -.048 *  .035 *  .046 ** 
Openness  .025  .053 ** -.027 * -.051 *** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance level at 0.10 (highly), 0.05 (moderately) and 0.01 (somewhat) respectively. 
N = 346, Log-likelihood value: -387.83, Log-likelihood ratio: 142.22 (p < 0.001), McFadden’s pseudo-R2: 0.155. 
 
Within each cluster, the number of asterisks indicates the significance level (highly, 
moderately or somewhat) of the background variables that were highly associated. In the following 
paragraphs, they are discussed in relation to the dependent cluster variable, which represent a 
farmer cluster with each a different set of scores on the five attitudinal beliefs. 
The interpretation of an AME in case of a dummy variable, e.g. the variable ‘Milk production 
> 9500 kg.’ is as follows. If the milk production level is >9500 kg., it increases the probability of a 
farm to be in the intenders2 group by 14.7 per cent. The interpretation of an AME in case of a 
continuous variable, e.g. the variable ‘Risk perception’ is slightly different. A one unit increase on 
the scale of 25 of ‘Risk perception’ decreases the probability of a farm to be in the non-intenders 
group by 1.5 per cent while it increases the probability to be in the intenders2 group by 1.8 per 
cent. 
Regarding the farm-management variables, farms with higher milk production levels were 
more likely in the intenders2 group as these variables had positive signs and were moderately to 
highly significant. Farms with lower production levels were more likely in the non-intenders group 
given the negative signs. Farmers that import (for replacement) and/or export heifers were more 
likely to be in the intenders1 group, as the heifer management variables included had positive signs 
and the second was somewhat significant. This likely is the opposite for those in the undecided 
group, with the second variable negative and somewhat significant. 
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 Among the behavioural variables, the perceived BT infection experience did not 
discriminate among clusters. Farmers who perceived that they vaccinated in the past against BT 
were, ceteris paribus, less likely part of the non-intenders group, while more likely to be situated in 
the intenders1 group. The perceived risk measures were particularly associated with the clusters 1 
and 4. Farmers who had a low perception of the risk and were willing to take more risk than other 
farmers were more likely allocated to the non-intenders group while the opposite was true for those 
in the intenders2 group. 
Also different personality traits profiled different clusters. Less agreeable farmers were 
more likely in the non-intenders group. The same line of reasoning applied to the other personality 
traits as well. Less extraverted farmers were more likely in the undecided group while more 
extraverted farmers were more likely in the intenders2 group. Less conscientious farmers were 
more likely in the undecided group while more conscientious were more likely in both intenders 
groups. Finally, more ‘open’ farmers were more likely part of the undecided group while less ‘open’ 
farmers were more likely to be situated in both intenders groups. 
5.5 Discussion  
This study investigated in particular the heterogeneity in attitudinal beliefs among farmers 
regarding vaccination against BT by firstly clustering them, and then predicting cluster membership 
using different background variables. Two groups of background variables have been considered, 
i.e. farm-management and behavioural variables. The remainder of this section discusses the results 
of the cluster and regression analysis, paying in particular attention to the roles of perceived risk 
and personality traits.  
Farmers in the non-intenders group showed an unfavourable attitude towards participation 
in a reactive vaccination scheme if BT were to occur. This goes hand in hand with lower milk 
production levels, lower perceived risk in terms of lower risk perception and higher relative risk 
attitude. They did not vaccinate during the last BT (virus serotype 8) 2006 – 2009 epidemic. 
Moreover, they scored significantly lower on the agreeableness trait. According to Nuthall (2009), 
‘a person classified as being ‘agreeable’ is good-natured, soft-hearted and somewhat selfless. 
Generally these people might be called benign and seldom get angry or overly excited about issues. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a ‘non-agreeable’ person will be rather irritable, and certainly 
ruthless as well as being somewhat selfish. All these background variables together provide a 
consistent profile of a cluster of farmers that is likely not going to vaccinate if bluetongue were to 
occur. 
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Farmers in the undecided group showed a neutral attitude towards participation in a reactive 
vaccination scheme if BT were to occur. Both the farmers in the non-intenders as well as in the 
undecided group might be so-called hard-to-reach farmers. Using two continua, farmers’ (dis)trust 
in external information sources and their orientation toward the outside world, Jansen et al. (2010) 
further classified hard-to-reach farmers into proactivists, do-it-yourselfers, wait-and-see-ers, and 
reclusive traditionalists. Among those different groups of farmers there will exist different 
considerations not (yet) to participate that can be next to economic relating to intrinsic and social 
considerations. 
Farmers in both intenders groups had a favourable attitude towards participation in a 
vaccination scheme if BT were to occur. These groups differed particularly in terms of their concern 
about production distortions. The results suggest that the latter goes hand in hand with more 
intensive farming, in terms of milk production. This explains why farmers in the intenders2 group 
perceived the risk of a BT infection to be high in terms of susceptibility and impact, and were willing 
to take less risks. A valid explanation why farmers in the intenders1 group were not concerned 
about production distortions is their (positive) perceived past experience with vaccination during the 
BT (virus serotype 8) epidemic from 2006 – 2009. Farmers in the intenders1 group also imported 
and/or exported heifers more often.  
Perceived risk measures in this study were highly associated with the non-intenders group 
and the intenders2 group. They relate with the intensity of dairy farming, in terms of milk production. 
This suggests that farmers in particular are concerned about the risk related to the production 
domain (Meuwissen et al., 2001; Hardaker et al., 2015), and explains why farmers in the non-
intenders group scored the lowest and farmers in the intenders2 group scored the highest on the 
belief Risk insurance. These differences in perceived risk also indicate that farmers might not be 
commonly risk averse, as is often assumed (Ogurtsov et al., 2009; Hardaker et al., 2015). However, 
farmers’ preferences for risk are also domain-specific (Weber et al., 2002; Hansson and Lagerkvist, 
2012). 
Different (combinations of) personality traits in this study were highly associated with all 
clusters. One overall pattern observed is that conscientiousness discriminates farmers into higher 
intenders and lower intenders. According to Nuthall (2009), ‘someone who has a high rating on this 
trait will be careful, reliable and takes responsibility seriously. Such people can generally be relied 
upon, and when a task is agreed you can be sure it will get done. In contrast, someone who exhibits 
the other end of this trait’s scale will be somewhat careless, undependable and even negligent’. It 
remains somewhat unclear how conscientiousness relates to the decision problem under study, as 
it can both be a sense of duty (other-centred motive) and/or achievement striving (self-centred 
100 
motive) (Moon, 2001; Moon et al., 2012). Another observed pattern holds for the openness trait, 
with less ‘open’ farmers in the intenders groups and more ‘open’ farmers in the non-intenders and 
undecided group. According to Nuthall (2009), an open person will be daring, liberal and somewhat 
original in their thinking. In contrast, a person who scores poorly on the openness scale will be 
conservative, unadventurous and conventional. Austin et al. (2001) found that Scottish production-
oriented farmers score highly on extraversion, openness and conscientiousness. This implies that 
farmers in the intenders groups, who reported high intentions to vaccinate, run their farm in a more 
conservative way, which contradicts with the results of Austin et al. (2001). Moreover, the farm-
management variables measured indicate these farmers to be more production-oriented given the 
higher milk production levels. However, the lower openness scores may also indicate that these 
farmers are not open to the different decision options in case of animal disease epidemics and seek 
certainty of protection of their animals, and therefore are favourable towards vaccination. In this 
sense the openness trait might be decision domain-specific, i.e. with respect to animal disease 
epidemics these farmers are less ‘open’, while for other domains they might be more ‘open’. 
This research shows that in particular perceived risk and personality traits measures can 
address the heterogeneity in attitudinal beliefs about participation in a reactive vaccination scheme 
when BT were to occur. Both, perceived risk and personality traits measures, do not seem to be 
mutually exclusive, they likely somehow interact with each other (Nicholson et al., 2005; Soane and 
Chmiel, 2005). Dimensions of general trust and confidence, especially in the governance of animal 
health, also likely play a role here (Siegrist et al., 2005; Enticott et al., 2014).  
Furthermore, as farmers are faced with different types and sources of risk, likely the domain-
specificity also plays a role. The type of disease is an important factor in how farmers perceive risk. 
Endemic diseases might be seen as an operational risk while epidemic diseases as a catastrophic 
risk (Valeeva et al., 2011). BT in north-western Europe in 2006 was defined as an emergent disease 
in this zone (Saegerman et al., 2008). Future research could further unravel farmers’ decision-
making in the context of animal health and investigate whether farmers treat this as a risk domain 
on its own, and also how prevention and control decisions relate with personality traits such as 
openness and conscientiousness.  
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When developing effective voluntary vaccination strategies against animal disease 
epidemics like the past BT epidemic from 2006 – 2009, policy makers need to account for 
heterogeneity among farmers in internal motivations to participate. Some farmers might be more 
concerned about the adverse effects of vaccination while others by any means want to have their 
herd vaccinated to be protected against the economic risk (e.g. Elbers et al., 2010; Gethmann et 
al., 2015; Sok et al., 2015). The results of this study suggest that about 40 per cent of the farmers, 
both the intenders groups, are internally motivated, and about 25 per cent of the farmers, the non-
intenders group, are not internally motivated to participate in a voluntary vaccination scheme. For 
the remaining farmers, the undecided group, it is less clear what they will ultimately decide. 
The cross-sectional properties of the data makes estimations of participation rates in future 
voluntary vaccination schemes precarious. Given the current presence of bluetongue in France, the 
current perceived risk of the respondents might be higher compared to the moment the perceived 
risk was measured in the questionnaire. All other behavioural and farm-management variables 
measured in this questionnaire can assumed to be stable over time, at least in the short run. The 
clusters of farmers who are internally motivated might very well represent the group that coincides 
with the lower limit of participation (40% of the total population of farmers), as at the time of the 
data collection there was no real threat of BT. Gethmann et al. (2015) reported that 40.7% of 
German cattle farmers’ expressed the intention to vaccinate in 2011 (questionnaire undertaken in 
2010). Elbers et al. (2010) reported that 52% if Dutch dairy farmers indicated to be willing to 
vaccinate their herd against other BT serotypes in the future if vaccines were made available 
(questionnaire undertaken in 2009). The effectiveness of voluntary vaccination schemes depend on 
the extent to which those farmers who are not internally motivated or are undecided can be 
convinced. Different types of policy instruments exist that can induce voluntary behaviour via internal 
or external motivation.  
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Abstract 
Re-emergence of the bluetongue disease in Europe poses a continuous threat to European 
livestock production. Large-scale vaccination is the most effective intervention to control virus 
spread. Compared to command-and-control approaches, voluntary vaccination approaches can be 
effective at lower costs, provided that farmers are willing to participate. We use a discrete choice 
experiment to estimate the preferences for vaccination scheme attributes, accounting for 
preference heterogeneity via an integrated choice and latent variable approach. In designing 
livestock disease control schemes, it is often argued that governments should use financial, 
incentive-based policy instruments to compensate farmers for externalities, assuming they act in 
rational self-interest. Our results suggest that in addition to economic motives, farmers can have 
intrinsic or social motives to invest in livestock disease control. Implications for the effectiveness 
of providing subsidy or information to motivate voluntary participation are discussed. 
 
Keywords 
Livestock disease control, policy instruments, voluntary vaccination, bluetongue, integrated choice 
and latent variable model, preference heterogeneity, attitude, perceived norms 
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6.1 Introduction 
Bluetongue is a vector-borne livestock disease caused by the bluetongue virus, and has 
been identified on all continents except Antarctica. Biting midges (Culicoides spp.) transmit the virus 
from infected to susceptible ruminants (Maclachlan, 2011). An outbreak of an vector-borne disease 
can have large socio-economic consequences, in terms of livestock production, policy and trade in 
the countries or regions affected (Burrell, 2002). A large epidemic of bluetongue virus serotype 8 
occurred in Europe during 2006 to 2009. Several years later, multiple outbreaks were reported in 
France in the autumn of 2015 (Sailleau et al., 2017). Re-emergence of bluetongue in Europe poses 
a continuous threat for livestock production. Large-scale vaccination is the most effective 
intervention to control the spread (e.g. Wilson and Mellor, 2009). 
Livestock disease control policies have traditionally followed a command-and-control 
approach of regulation and enforcement, but voluntary approaches are now also being considered. 
During the bluetongue virus serotype 8 epidemic in 2006 to 2009, some European Union member 
states adopted voluntary vaccination schemes (Wilson and Mellor, 2009). Outbreaks in France 
continued to be reported in 2016 and animal health authorities in the UK have been considering 
whether vaccination strategies should be implemented, and in what form (Bessell et al., 2016; 
Roberts et al., 2016). Voluntary approaches are more flexible in terms of legislation and can also 
be effective at lower costs, provided that farmers are willing to participate (Segerson, 2013).  
Theoretical economic studies that take into account the endogenous nature of infection risk, 
predict that farmers are likely to underinvest in private disease control measures compared to a 
social welfare optimum because of the presence of externalities (e.g. Beach et al., 2007; Rat-Aspert 
and Fourichon, 2010; Gramig and Horan, 2011; Zilberman et al., 2012), since vaccination helps a 
region become disease free, while no vaccination contributes to disease transmission. Public 
intervention may be justified when such market failures occur. Other market failures arise from 
information asymmetries, resulting in moral hazard and adverse selection problems (e.g. Gramig et 
al., 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2015).  
These studies mentioned previously focused on the design and use of financial, incentive-
based policy instruments to compensate for externalities. The farmer’s decision-making process is 
modelled as a “black box”, which does not consider how preferences are formed and choices are 
made (Ben-Akiva et al., 1999; McFadden, 1999) and are limited in their ability to account for process 
and context in decision making,  failing to account for heterogeneity in decision making among 
farmers. If the willingness to invest in vaccination is also driven by intrinsic and social motives, this 
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could imply that a mix of policy instruments, rather than simply financial compensation, is needed 
to make voluntary approaches more effective (Barnes et al., 2015; Ochieng’ and Hobbs, 2016). 
A complementary body of literature focuses on the identification and assessment of key 
factors that influence decision making on livestock disease control, using qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. In addition to instrumental considerations (e.g. private risks and income effects), 
the experiential consequences of disease control decisions are important for many farmers (Elbers 
et al., 2010; Gethmann et al., 2015; Sok et al., 2015). In the economic literature, these are 
described as non-use or passive values (e.g. Hansson and Lagerkvist, 2015; Schreiner and Hess, 
2016) or nonpecuniary benefits (Howley, 2015). Another key factor is that private decisions could 
be influenced by social pressures through different types of perceived norms (Jones et al., 2015; 
Vande Velde et al., 2015; Sok et al., 2016b). Furthermore, it is important to account for specific 
perceptions about disease risk, about the safety and effectiveness of applied measures and about 
the trust and confidence in the disease control approach chosen by animal health authorities (e.g. 
Perry et al., 2001; Flaten et al., 2005; Heffernan et al., 2008; Palmer et al., 2009; Valeeva et al., 
2011; Schemann et al., 2012; Toma et al., 2013; Alarcon et al., 2014; Enticott et al., 2014; Maye 
et al., 2014; Sok et al., 2016a). 
Several authors in the domain of economics of animal health have suggested 
complementing economic theory with insights from behavioural sciences to improve the 
understanding of livestock disease control decisions, to identify ways of motivating farmers to 
comply with voluntary approaches (Barnes et al., 2015; Gilbert and Rushton, 2016). It would be 
useful to develop and test a utility model representation of farmers’ behaviour that allows for 
heterogeneity in the motives to invest in disease control, before further studying the dynamic 
interactions between farmers’ collective behaviour and disease epidemiology. Given the nature of 
disease control efforts as public goods and the presence of non-use values in decision making, a 
stated preference approach can assess farmers’ preferences for different attributes of livestock 
disease control policies (Adamowicz et al., 1998). In addition to instrumental attributes, such as the 
vaccine effectiveness or costs (Bennett and Balcombe, 2012), key factors that were previously 
described can help in defining other attributes that are important for policy making.  
This study has two objectives: first, to assess farmers’ preferences for policy-related 
attributes of a bluetongue vaccination scheme; second, to improve the understanding of the factors 
underlying the behavioural heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for these attributes. We use a 
survey-based discrete choice experiment to derive farmers’ marginal utilities of attributes of public 
voluntary bluetongue vaccination schemes. Heterogeneity in preferences for attributes is commonly 
modelled via unobserved random effects (McFadden and Train, 2000; Hensher and Greene, 2003) 
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and readily observable and relatively objective characteristics. More recently, preference 
heterogeneity is partially modelled using latent constructs from social psychology to enhance the 
behavioural representation in choice models. Such models have been mainly developed in the 
marketing and transport literature, where they are known as the hybrid choice model or integrated 
choice and latent variable model (ICLV) (e.g. Ben-Akiva et al., 2012; Hildebrandt et al., 2012). The 
ICLV model offers a general econometric framework to supplement economic theory with concepts 
or theories from other social sciences (Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002; Walker et al., 2007). We use 
the ICLV approach to incorporate preferences for attributes, latent social-psychological constructs 
in addition to readily observable farm and farmer characteristics.  
6.2 Framework: Integrated choice and latent variable model 
The vaccination choice is formulated as a discrete choice problem, which is consistent with 
random utility theory and various econometric models. Vaccination schemes differ in terms of a few 
choice attributes. The utility derived from a vaccination scheme is the sum of the utilities derived 
from the choice attributes (Lancaster, 1966). Faced with alternative vaccination schemes, farmers 
are presumed to choose the alternative (or the option to not vaccinate) that is likely to give them 
the highest utility. 
The standard approach in econometrics to account for heterogeneity in preferences is to 
include a random component using a mixed logit model specification (McFadden and Train, 2000; 
Hensher and Greene, 2003) and readily observable and relatively objective characteristics. In the 
mixed logit model, the utilities of the choice attributes are assumed to vary across farmers 
according to some pre-specified (usually normal) distribution and the sufficient statistics describing 
the distribution are estimated (for a normal distribution: the mean and the standard deviation). If the 
estimated standard deviations are significant, statistical unobserved heterogeneity in preferences 
is present. However, as there are many sources of preference heterogeneity, researchers have 
indicated that the underlying causes of heterogeneity need to be better understood by linking the 
heterogeneity to the characteristics of the decision maker (e.g. Louviere et al., 2002; Rigby and 
Burton, 2005; Kjær and Gyrd-Hansen, 2008; Hess, 2012). 
In their seminal papers on the ICLV model framework, Ben-Akiva and colleagues (1999; 
2002; 2012) suggest taking more account of process (steps involved in decision making) and 
context (factors affecting the process) to enhance the behavioural representation in choice models. 
They do so by including social-psychological constructs in choice models (Hess, 2012). 
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In the ICLV model framework, attitudes are used most frequently for modelling preference 
heterogeneity (Hess and Beharry-Borg, 2012; O’Neill et al., 2014; Mariel et al., 2015), but 
personality traits (Vredin Johansson et al., 2006; Yangui et al., 2016) and specific perceptions 
(Márquez et al., 2014; Kassahun et al., 2016) are also used. Studies have also considered the 
effect of the social environment on decision making (Abou-Zeid and Ben-Akiva, 2011; Kamargianni 
et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2014; Czajkowski et al., 2017).  
We capture process and context by three latent constructs: attitude, the injunctive norm 
and the descriptive norm in relation to participation in a bluetongue vaccination scheme. These 
constructs are operationalized using latent constructs from the reasoned action approach (RAA) 
decision model from social psychology (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). This model not only suggests 
which constructs explain behaviour but also provides a method to measure them consistently. Sok 
et al. (2015, 2016b) previously applied the RAA model to the bluetongue vaccination problem. They 
found that attitude and social pressures (both perceived norms) best explained intention, while 
control considerations played only a minor role. Based on these results, only attitude, injunctive 
norm and descriptive norm were measured in the current survey.  
Attitude is defined as “a latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree of 
favourableness or unfavourableness to a psychological object”, where the latter includes behaviour 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010, p. 76). It is the farmer’s positive or negative evaluation of performing 
vaccination, and can be based on instrumental (e.g. risk insurance) as well as experiential beliefs 
(e.g. animal suffering) (Sok et al., 2015; Sok et al., 2016a). Injunctive norms are defined as 
“perceptions concerning what should or ought to be done with respect to performing a given 
behaviour”, while descriptive norms refer to “perceptions that others are or are not performing the 
behaviour in question” (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010, p. 131). Sok et al. (2015) identified the following 
referents of influence for the bluetongue vaccination problem: family members, the veterinarian, 
peers and leaders, and the buyer (Sok et al., 2015). 
The next section presents our materials and methods, including the choice experiment 
design, the indicator variables and the econometric models we use to estimate the relationships. 
Section 4 presents our results, while section 5 provides some discussion of the results and section 
6 concludes.  
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6.3 Materials and methods 
6.3.1 Survey 
The choice experiment survey7 measured three groups of variables: choices, indicators for 
the social-psychological constructs and socio-demographic characteristics. Respondents were 
asked to choose their preferred alternative from each of eight choice sets. Each choice set 
consisted of two hypothetical vaccination schemes and a no-choice option. Each vaccination 
scheme was defined in terms of a combination of levels for five choice attributes. Figure 1 shows 
an example of a choice card. Table 1 provides an overview of all attribute levels. The survey 
continued with statements that measured attitude and perceived norms and ended with questions 
about farm and farmer characteristics. 
6.3.1.1 Choice experiment design 
The Netherlands is currently free of bluetongue. A hypothetical scenario was therefore 
developed that described, as realistically as possible, a situation where bluetongue had been 
detected 100 kilometres from the premises of the respondent. Next, it was mentioned that 
veterinary experts estimated the probability of infection as 5 out of 10 farms during the summer of 
2015. Animal health authorities were preparing a vaccination scheme in which the respondent could 
participate during the spring of 2015 (when the survey was sent out). Participation in the vaccination 
scheme would reduce the probability of infection at the farm towards nil. Instructions explaining the 
choice task followed the scenario description. Attributes and their levels were explained and an 
example of a choice card was shown.  
 The scenario description and selection of choice attributes and their levels (see Table 1) 
were set by a multidisciplinary team, consisting of a veterinary epidemiologist, economists 
specialized in animal health and a statistician, to ensure that the choice card designed to capture 
farmers’ perceptions and preferences would be both actionable for policy makers and fit within a 
workable experimental design. The results from previous studies on the identification and 
assessment of key factors that influence decision making on bluetongue vaccination were also 
considered (Elbers et al., 2010; Sok et al., 2015; Sok et al., 2016a). 
                                              
7 The questionnaire is available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 6-1: Details of the selected choice attributes and attribute levels of the vaccination schemes. 
 Choice attributes  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
Description Probability of 
serious vaccine 
adverse effects 
Government 
communication  
Government 
subsidy 
Costs of 
vaccination per 
cow in euros 
Probability of 
infection in the herd 
      
Levels Significant No communication No subsidiy     4 Significant (ASC_no) 
Small Through leaflet 10 per cent     8 Nil (ASC_yes) 
Negligible Through vet 60 per cent   12  
 Through lflt & vet    
Note: The base levels are in cursive text 
 
The choice attributes 1 to 4 are policy related. The previous bluetongue vaccination scheme 
in the Netherlands (in 2008 – 2010) used inactivated vaccines, which have very low probabilities of 
adverse effects. The attribute ‘probability of serious adverse vaccine effects’ was still included to 
reflect farmers’ perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine safety and effectiveness and in the 
disease control approach chosen by animal health authorities. Two types of policy instruments were 
included as attributes: ‘government information’ (communication), as an informational instrument 
that can increase the motivation by reasoned opinions: and ‘government subsidy’, as an incentive-
based instrument to encourage participation by lowering the net cost of vaccination. The level of 
 
Figure 6-1: Example of a choice card with two hypothetical vaccination schemes and a no-choice 
alternative. 
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subsidy can also have a signalling function, indicating the extent to which the government takes the 
issue seriously. The attribute ‘vaccination costs per cow’ was included as a price attribute. The 
attribute ‘probability of infection in the herd’” only varied between the vaccination and no-vaccination 
(no-choice) alternatives. 
A fractional factorial main-effects experimental design resulted in 16 hypothetical 
vaccination schemes, from which 16 choice sets were generated by means of a cyclic design. 
Sixteen more choice sets were generated by permuting ‘communication’ levels in such a way that 
all possible pairs of ‘communication’ levels appeared in choice sets. The 32 choice sets were 
partitioned into four blocks. Each respondent was offered eight choice cards with three alternatives: 
two hypothetical vaccination schemes with varying levels on the first four attributes and an opt-out 
alternative, the latter representing the choice not to vaccinate. 
6.3.1.2 Indicators representing social-psychological constructs  
Attitudes towards participation in a bluetongue vaccination scheme were measured using 
five 7-point semantic differential scales with bipolar adjectives, such as (un)satisfying and 
(un)important, taking into account both instrumental and experiential (non-use) aspects (see Table 
3 below). Thus, the question for each scale was: “Participation in a vaccination scheme against 
bluetongue is <adjective> for my farm”. 
Injunctive norm with respect to participation in a bluetongue vaccination scheme was 
measured using three 7-point Likert-type scales with end points “disagree strongly” and “agree 
strongly”. The three statements were: “People who have a lot to do with my farm expect me to 
participate in a vaccinate scheme against bluetongue”, “People whose opinions or vision I value 
would approve of me participating in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue” and “People who 
are close to me expect me to participate in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue”. Descriptive 
norm with respect to participation in a bluetongue vaccination scheme was measured using two 7-
point Likert-type scales with end points “disagree strongly” and “agree strongly”. The statements 
were: “Surrounding dairy farmers will participate in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue” and 
“Dairy farmers in my social network will participate in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue”. 
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6.3.1.3 Farm and farmer characteristics 
Farm characteristics were selected to capture the variation in scale and intensity with which 
the farm is operated, namely herd size, average milk production and the amount of pasture land 
utilized. Whether heifers are kept for export was the final farm characteristic measured. The farmer 
characteristics measured were age and level of education. 
6.3.2 Econometric approach 
Figure 2 visualizes the ICLV model for the bluetongue vaccination problem as an integration 
of a discrete choice model and a latent variable model. The use of latent variables instead of 
observed variables for conceptualizing social-psychological constructs is advocated by e.g. Walker 
(2001). The latent variable model is supposed to capture some process and context of decision 
making by measuring farmers’ attitude and injunctive and descriptive norms. These social-
psychological constructs are expected to retrieve part of the behavioural heterogeneity farmers 
have for different vaccination scheme attributes. 
Various statistical approaches have been used to capture constructs in choice models 
(Walker, 2001). One approach is to include the indicators directly in the utility function (e.g. Onozaka 
et al., 2011). Measurement error can be introduced with this approach since the indicators are only 
a function of the construct and not the underlying construct itself. There is also a risk of creating 
endogeneity bias since it is likely that unobserved effects at the same time influence the response 
to choice as well as indicator questions (Ashok et al., 2002). Another approach is to first perform 
a factor analysis on the indicators, and then include the resulting construct(s) in the utility function 
(e.g. Greiner, 2015). In the aforementioned study no farm and farm characteristics were used to 
explain preference heterogeneity. Within the ICLV model framework, it is recognized that farm and 
farmer characteristics can impact both on latent variables as well as on utility (see Figure 2). Two 
statistical approaches result in consistent estimates for ICLV models: the sequential estimation 
approach (limited information, two steps) and the simultaneous estimation approach (full 
information, one step) (Walker, 2001). 
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Social psychological 
constructs ηln
Utility Uint
Stated choices to 
vaccinate or not dint
Farm and farmer 
characteristics zpn
Scores on attitude and 
perceived norm 
indicators ykln
Scores on attribute 
levels of the 
vaccination scheme Xsi
Latent variable model (MIMIC)
βs
λkl γlp 
αsp τsl 
Choice model (MNL)
ζln 
vint
εkln 
 
 
In the sequential estimation approach, a multiple indicator and multiple causes model 
(MIMIC) (Jöreskog and Goldberger, 1975; Diamantopoulos et al., 2008) is used to specify and test 
the relationships between farm and farmer characteristics and the attitude and perceived norm 
indicators (see Figure 2). A MIMIC model is a special case of structural equation modelling (SEM). 
The predicted conditional means (factor scores) of these constructs are saved and entered into the 
choice model specification. The simultaneous estimation approach estimates a MIMIC and choice 
model in a single step and is thus more efficient. However, the maximum likelihood procedure often 
suffers from convergence problems when multiple latent variables are included because of multiple 
integrals (e.g. Raveau et al., 2010; Bahamonde-Birke et al., 2015; Daziano and Rizzi, 2015). We 
therefore adopt the consistent but less efficient sequential estimation approach8. The models were 
estimated with Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013), which provides built-in commands for estimating SEM 
and alternative-specific conditional logit (McFadden's choice) models. The user-written command 
developed by Hole (2007) was used to estimate mixed logit models. 
                                              
8 Efforts were made to estimate the ICLV model simultaneously using Pythonbiogeme (Bierlaire, 2016) to test whether more efficient 
parameter estimates could be obtained. This was unsuccessful. Models with only one latent variable were successfully estimated but 
indicated only small differences in standard errors compared to similar models estimated in a sequential manner. 
Figure 6-2: The Integrated Choice and Latent Variable model specification used in this paper where 
squares represent observed variables and ellipses latent variables. 
114 
6.3.2.1 Latent variable model  
The MIMIC model was estimated using the two-step approach for SEM following Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988). The first stage consists of testing the measurement model that specifies the 
relations between the latent constructs (attitude, injunctive norm and descriptive norm) and their 
observed indicators, also known as a confirmatory factor analysis model.  
Scores on indicators 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 for latent variable l were modelled as effects of scores on their 
corresponding latent variables 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛: 
𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,                                                                                               (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 is the score for decision maker 𝑙𝑙 on the 𝑘𝑘th reflective indicator of latent variable 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤, 
𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 is the measurement error in that score and 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 are factor loadings, capturing the effect of 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤 
on 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 (Figure 2). The measurement errors for each indicator were assumed to be normally i.i.d. 
and uncorrelated across indicators. 
The overall model fit was assessed using the goodness-of-fit measures most commonly 
used in the SEM literature, along with their cut-off values for acceptance (see e.g. Hu and Bentler, 
1998; Hu and Bentler, 1999; Bagozzi and Yi, 2012): the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) ≤ 0.06, the Bentler comparative fit index (CFI) ≥ 0.95 and the standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR) ≤ 0.08. The validity of the hypothesized latent constructs was also 
assessed9. Hair et al. (2010) describe construct validity as the extent to which a set of observed 
variables actually reflects the latent construct which those variables are designed to measure, 
requiring convergent and discriminant validity. Good convergent validity (reliability) of a specific 
latent construct is indicated by a high proportion of shared variance among indicators, and is usually 
assessed with the average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR) statistics (Fornell 
and Larcker, 1981). Good discriminant validity means that a latent construct is truly distinct from 
other latent constructs, and is assessed by checking whether the AVE values of a latent construct 
exceed its correlations with other latent constructs.  
 
 
                                              
9 Although the simultaneous estimation approach has become standard in the ICLV literature, a potential danger when using this approach 
is that not enough attention is given to the validity of the hypothesized social-psychological constructs.  
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Given a good fit and acceptable validity, the structural model was estimated in the second 
stage. In addition to equation 1, the social-psychological constructs were modelled as being partially 
caused by observed farm and farmer characteristics (Figure 2): 
𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 = ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 + 𝜁𝜁𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 ,                                                                                               (2) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 are regression coefficients capturing the effect of the 𝑒𝑒th farm or farmer characteristic 
𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒 on 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤. The error terms 𝜁𝜁𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 were assumed to be normally i.i.d. and allowed to correlate across 
latent variables. Assuming that the farm and farmer characteristics are specified as error free, the 
error terms represent the impact of all remaining explanatory variables on the latent variables 
(Diamantopoulos, 2006). Equations 1 and 2 were jointly estimated as a MIMIC model. All farm and 
farmer characteristics were included simultaneously in the structural model to test their effects on 
the latent constructs. Effects that were not significant at the 20% critical level were removed one 
at a time in an iterative process, starting with the effect that had the lowest t-value (Diamantopoulos 
and Winklhofer, 2001). Scores for the latent variables included in the ICLV models were derived 
from the final MIMIC model.  
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6.3.2.2 Choice model  
Assuming a rational cognitive process of utility maximization, the decision maker 𝑙𝑙 chooses 
alternative 𝑐𝑐 in choice situation 𝑝𝑝 in which he or she faces the set of available alternatives 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 if: 
𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 > 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡;  ∀𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑐𝑐, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡.                                              (3) 
Utility 𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 of alternative 𝑐𝑐 for decision maker n in choice situation 𝑝𝑝 was modelled as: 
𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 + 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,                                                                                                (4) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 is called the representative utility, which is the part of the utility that is deterministic and 
𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 is a stochastic error term that is independently Type-1 extreme-value distributed, which leads 
to a multinomial (MNL) model specification (McFadden, 1974).  
In the case where no preference heterogeneity is considered among decision makers, the 
representative utility is dependent on the trade-offs made between attributes, and 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 is modelled 
as a linear specification: 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 ,       (MNL)                       (5) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 are the attributes with level 𝑠𝑠 of bluetongue vaccination scheme alternative 𝑐𝑐 and 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 are 
the regression coefficients that can be interpreted as marginal utilities. Preference heterogeneity 
among decision makers can be introduced in the model by adding a normally distributed stochastic 
component to the marginal utilities, which leads to a mixed logit (MXL) model specification (Hensher 
and Greene, 2003): 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = (𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 + 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛) ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 ,      (MXL)                     (6) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 is a vector of parameters that represents the individual decision maker’s deviations from 
the average marginal utilities, so that each decision maker now derives specific marginal utilities 
(𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 + 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛) from the attributes. These individual deviations are assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean. Regarding the relaxation of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) property in this study, correlations across alternatives and choice situations were still assumed 
to be zero. Preference heterogeneity can also be introduced deterministically, modelling it as a 
function of farm and farmer characteristics 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 as well as social-psychological constructs (latent 
variables) 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛: 
𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + �∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 + ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤 � ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 .  (MNL with interactions)    (7) 
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Considering five choice attributes with a total of 12 levels (Table 1), six farm and farmer 
characteristics and three latent constructs (Table 2), 108 interaction effects could be considered 
for inclusion in the model. To keep the model parsimonious, an interaction variable selection 
procedure10 was executed. The most important reason for this procedure was the expected high 
intercorrelations between latent constructs. High intercorrelations between attitudes and perceived 
norms are the rule rather than the exception (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), and therefore the risk of 
multicollinearity exists if all interactions with all latent constructs are retained. Leaving latent 
constructs out, on the other hand, can result in omitted variable bias. Finally, an overall MNL and 
an overall MXL model were estimated, including all selected interaction effects.  
The categorical choice attributes 1 – 3 were dummy coded, taking the levels in italics in 
Table 1 as base levels. Dummy coding was used to ensure an appropriate specification of the 
random components in the MXL models (see Walker et al., 2007). The base level for the cost 
attribute was located at €8. The fifth choice attribute was also dummy coded, with the value 1 for 
the opt-out alternative, thereby accepting a significant probability of infection in the herd. This shows 
the relative utility (equivalent to an alternative-specific constant (ASC)) farmers attach to the no 
vaccination alternative compared to the base vaccination scheme. The base vaccination scheme 
was represented by the following attribute levels: ‘probability of serious adverse vaccine effects’ is 
small, ‘government communication’ though leaflet, ‘government subsidy’ at 10 per cent and the 
‘costs of vaccination per cow’ at €8. 
6.3.3 Sample  
The sample consisted of 1,500 randomly selected Dutch dairy farms drawn from the 
National Cattle Identification and Registration Database. The farms selected for a previous survey 
on bluetongue conducted in 2014 were first removed from this database before the sample was 
drawn (see e.g. Sok et al., 2015). The selected farms were randomly subdivided into four groups. 
All of these groups received two different blocks in an ascending or descending order of choice 
cards. Each farmer in the sample was sent a paper copy of the survey along with an accompanying 
letter and a pre-paid return envelope. Farmers were offered two possibilities to fill in the 
                                              
10 Interactions were tested one at a time by adding each interaction (involving all dummies coded for the particular attribute) separately 
to equation 5. This extensive procedure was done to avoid the issue that some effects would already be masked at this stage due to 
multicollinearity among the observed and latent variables. The criterion used was a likelihood-ratio test between a restricted (choice 
attributes only) and unrestricted (interactions added) model. Using this criterion, 28 of the 108 possible interaction variables were 
selected. 
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questionnaire, using the paper copy or via a web page. By filling in their e-mail address, respondents 
had a 10 per cent chance of winning a gift coupon worth €25.  
The survey was sent out in the last week of April 2015. A reminder was sent three weeks 
after the survey was sent out, followed by another reminder three weeks later. A total of 280 
farmers responded, a response rate of almost 19 per cent. This was low compared to the response 
rate of almost 28 per cent for the survey on bluetongue vaccination conducted in 2014 (e.g. Sok 
et al., 2015). The difference in response rates is most likely because of the timing of the surveys. 
The first survey was held in January/February while the second was held in April/May, when farmers 
are more likely to be busy with field activities. 
Observations with missing values were excluded from the statistical analysis, resulting in an 
effective sample size of 211 respondents. Most of the excluded surveys missed the whole set of 
indicators or farm and farmer characteristics, or both. For surveys that missed only a few values, 
the most frequently missing variables were average milk production and education level (46 
responses were missing both variables).  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the stated choices, perceived experiences during 
the previous bluetongue epidemic, and the scores for farm and farmer characteristics and 
indicators for attitude and perceived norm. The first row shows the distribution of respondents’ 
vaccination choices. The next two rows show the perceived experiences during the previous 
bluetongue epidemic. The majority of the farmers always chose a vaccination alternative (64 per 
cent) while about one tenth never chose a vaccination alternative. Farmers who perceived their herd 
to be infected or perceived they vaccinated during the previous epidemic more often chose a 
vaccination alternative from the eight choice cards. Approximately 44 per cent of the farmers 
reported that they had vaccinated in the previous epidemic, indicating that the sample also captured 
farmers without previous vaccination experience. The sample representativeness was further 
checked by comparing the values for farm and farmer characteristics with the values measured by 
other sources. According to the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network, the average dairy farm in 
the Netherlands had 103 dairy cows and 55 hectares of land in 2015 (LEI, 2016). According to 
statistics from the Cattle Improvement Co-operative, average milk production (305 days) of dairy 
cows in the Netherlands was 8,573 kilograms in 2015 (CRV, 2015). A similar survey among dairy 
farmers executed in 2014 (Sok et al., 2016a) reported similar results for farmer characteristics 
(age and education level). 
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Table 6-2: Descriptive statistics of stated choices, perceived experiences of the previous bluetongue 
epidemic, and scores for farm and farmer characteristics and indicators of attitude and perceived norm. 
Variable  Unit Farmers who chose out of 8 choice cards Total or 
average Always no Sometimes yes  Always yes 
Farm(er)s Number 20 56 135 211 
Share of sample Percentage 9.5 26.5 64.0 100.0 
Past bluetongue epidemic experiences     
Infecteda Percentage ‘yes’ 30.0 39.3 48.1 44.1 
 Percentage ‘no’ 45.0 46.4 40.7 42.7 
 Percentage ‘don’t know’ 20.0 14.3 11.1 12.8 
Vaccinateda Percentage ‘yes’ 5.0 37.5 52.6 44.1 
 Percentage ‘no’ 85.0 58.9 43.7 51.7 
 Percentage ‘don’t know’ 5.2 3.6 3.7 3.8 
Farm and farmer characteristics     
Herd sizeb Number 105 119 97 104 
Milk production b Kilograms (avg. cow) 7,582 8,655 8,616 8,529 
Pasture landb Hectares 68 49 44 47 
Export of heifers Yes = 1, No = 0 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.26 
Ageb Years 52 46 48 48 
Higher education  Yes = 1, No = 0 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.27 
Average score on indicators     
Attitudec  Scale 1 – 7 3.32 4.29 4.72 4.47 
Injunctive normc  Scale 1 – 7 2.43 3.34 4.21 3.81 
Descriptive normc  Scale 1 – 7 2.60 3.22 4.12 3.74 
a One of the twenty farmers in the group ‘Always no’ left the questions open for past bluetongue experiences. 
b These variables were mean-centred, before entering the choice model. 
c These variables were factorized and normalized, before entering the choice model (see latent variable model). 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Latent variable model  
In the first step, the measurement model was tested to assess the overall model fit and the 
validity of the latent constructs (equation 1). Values of the indices measuring the overall model fit 
were all below the criteria for acceptance (χ2/df = 1.42 with p-value 0.06, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 
0.99 and SRMR = 0.03). The values of the AVE (0.69, 0.56 and 0.72 for attitude, injunctive norm 
and descriptive norm, respectively) and CR (0.80, 0.78 and 0.84) statistics further confirmed good 
validity of the hypothesized latent constructs. Therefore the proposed measurement model 
specification was accepted and the structural model was estimated. The final MIMIC model with the 
selected farm and farmer characteristics showed good model fit (χ2/df = 1.33 with p-value 0.03, 
RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.98 and SRMR = 0.04).  
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Table 3 shows the results of this estimation. Herd size, milk production level and pasture 
land availability are associated with variability in attitude. These associations suggest that farmers 
who have more intensive dairy farms are more favourable towards vaccination. Some of these 
associations also apply to variability in perceived norms. Another clear pattern is that farmers who 
export heifers have a more positive attitude and higher injunctive and descriptive norms. Finally, 
older farmers scored lower on descriptive norm. 
Farm and farmer characteristics explained only a little of the variance in each latent 
construct. Much of the unexplained variance, captured by the disturbance terms, is shared between 
latent constructs, as shown by the disturbance term correlations (Table 3).  
 
Table 6-3: Estimation results from the MIMIC model. 
 Attitude Injunctive norm Descriptive norm 
 Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Structural model       
Herd size 0.11 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08)**   
Milk production  0.08 (0.06)     
Pasture land -0.36 (0.08)*** -0.34 (0.09)*** -0.18 (0.07)*** 
Export of heifers 0.19 (0.07)*** 0.18 (0.07)*** 0.23 (0.07)*** 
Age     -0.11 (0.06)* 
Explained variance (R2) 0.14 0.10 0.10 
Measurement model          
Unsatisfying-satisfying scale   0.78 (0.03)***     
Unimportant-important scale 0.86 (0.02)***     
Bad-good scale 0.89 (0.02)***     
Useful-useless scale -0.83 (0.02)***     
Disturbing-reassuring scale 0.79 (0.03)***     
People who have to do a lot with my farm […]   0.79 (0.04)***   
People whose opinions or vision I value […]   0.54 (0.06)***   
People who are close to me […]   0.87 (0.03)***   
Surrounding dairy farmers […]     0.80 (0.04)*** 
Dairy farmers in my social network […]     0.89 (0.04)*** 
Disturbance term intercorrelations       
Attitude 1      
Injunctive norm 0.59 (0.06)***  1    
Descriptive norm 0.58 (0.06)*** 0.64  (0.06)***   1  
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
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6.4.2 Choice model results 
Table 4 reports the final model estimations after the selection procedure for the interaction 
variables. All models fitted the data well: the McFadden’s pseudo R2 measures were within the range 
for a good model fit (0.2 – 0.4) (Hensher et al., 2005). The MXL models outperformed the MNL 
models, reflected in the values for the pseudo R2, Akaike information criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC)11. 
Starting with the MNL and MXL models without interactions, positive marginal utilities imply 
an increase in utility relative to the base level, making participation in a vaccination scheme more 
probable. All marginal utilities had the expected sign, e.g. the marginal utility of vaccination costs 
was negative, meaning that higher cost decreases utility and the likelihood of participation in a 
vaccination scheme. Compared to the vaccination scheme with base levels, the likelihood of 
participation increased with the probability of serious adverse vaccine effects being negligible, 
government communication provided via veterinarians and government subsidy of 60 per cent. The 
likelihood of participation decreased with vaccination costs and the probability of serious adverse 
vaccine effects being significant. The utility of no government subsidy was not significantly different 
from the base level of 10 per cent, suggesting that the level of subsidy has a categorical rather 
than a marginal effect on preferences. Something similar held for government communication: the 
utility of no communication was not significantly different from the base level of providing information 
through leaflets. Finally, the significant negative beta of the no-choice or opt-out alternative indicated 
that if farmers did not choose any vaccination alternative, their utility significantly reduced. This 
suggests that many farmers are willing to participate in a bluetongue vaccination scheme to 
minimize the probability of infection in their herd. 
The estimated sigma’s in the MXL model show the choice attributes that have preference 
heterogeneity. This was the case for all choice attributes except government communication. In the 
MNL and MXL models with interactions, most interaction effects related to the probability of infection 
in the herd (ASC) and the probability of serious adverse vaccine effects.  
 
  
                                              
11 Both mixed models were also estimated without any identification constraints on the standard deviations of the random marginal utility 
coefficients. Results showed that our identification constraints (fixing the standard deviations of the marginal utilities for the base levels 
to 0), closely (for the model without interactions) or perfectly (for the model with interactions) coincided with the recommendation by 
Walker et al. (2007) to constrain the smallest standard deviations from the unconstrained models to 0 for identification.  
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Table 6-4: Estimation results from the choice models after selection of the interaction variables. 
  MNL MNL with interactions MXL
b MXL with                                        
interactionsb 
Main effects  𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 𝜎𝜎 𝛽𝛽 𝜎𝜎 
Adverse effects prob.   
(base: small) 
Significant -1.77 (0.10)*** -1.78 (0.12)*** -6.68 (0.98)*** 5.37 (0.81)*** -6.48 (1.03)*** 4.64 (0.67)*** 
Negligible 0.41 (0.09)*** 0.50 (0.11)*** 1.69 (0.32)*** 2.39 (0.44)*** 1.69 (0.37)*** 2.62 (0.56)*** 
Government comm.           
(base: through leaflet) 
No communication 0.16 (0.12) 0.09 (0.13) 0.03 (0.28) 0.31 (0.59) -0.14 (0.29) 0.35 (0.59) 
Through vet 0.30 (0.12)** 0.25 (0.13)** 0.72 (0.27)*** 0.03 (0.59) 0.65 (0.29)** 0.71 (0.46) 
Through lflt & vet 0.13 (0.11) 0.09 (0.12) 0.10 (0.26) 0.02 (0.49) 0.06 (0.27) 0.13 (0.56) 
Government subsidy     
(base: 10 per cent) 
No subsidy -0.09 (0.08) -0.10 (0.09) -0.18 (0.20) 1.17 (0.37)*** -0.12 (0.21) 1.10 (0.41)*** 
60 per cent  0.83 (0.11)*** 0.91 (0.12)*** 2.51 (0.39)*** 1.45 (0.41)*** 2.74 (0.44)*** 1.46 (0.45)*** 
Vaccination costs   -0.14 (0.01)*** -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.54 (0.08)*** 0.33 (0.06)*** -0.58 (0.09)*** 0.31 (0.07)*** 
Infection probability ASC_no -0.62 (0.11)*** -0.83 (0.15)*** -4.96 (0.99)*** 9.29 (1.61)*** -3.80 (0.97)*** 6.95 (1.09)*** 
Interaction effects    𝛼𝛼 or 𝜏𝜏     𝛼𝛼 or 𝜏𝜏   
Herd sizea × ASC_no    0.06 (0.02)***     0.21 (0.11)*   
Milk productionb × ASC_no   -0.27 (0.07)***     -0.85 (0.55)   
Pasture landa × Significant   -0.19 (0.06)***     -0.55 (0.23)**   
 × Negligible   0.05 (0.03)     0.20 (0.12)*   
 × ASC_no   -0.01 (0.04)     0.02 (0.24)   
Export of heifers × ASC_no   -0.56 (0.21)***     -2.33 (1.80)   
Agea × No subsidy   -0.16 (0.09)*     -0.42 (0.21)**   
 × 60 per cent   -0.34 (0.11)***     -0.90 (0.30)***   
 × Vaccination costs   0.02 (0.01)*     0.10 (0.05)**   
 × ASC_no   -0.11 (0.09)     -0.90 (0.65)   
Education × Significant   -0.56 (0.23)**     -1.43 (1.01)   
 × Negligible   0.06 (0.22)     0.48 (0.64)   
Attitude × No communication   0.08 (0.14)     0.61 (0.36)*   
 × Through vet   0.30 (0.15)**     0.87 (0.37)**   
 × Through lflt & vet   -0.14 (0.14)     -0.19 (0.31)   
 × ASC_no   -0.93 (0.15)***     -3.03 (1.06)***   
Injunctive norm × No subsidy   -0.07 (0.10)     -0.32 (0.23)   
 × 60 per cent   -0.21 (0.12)*     -0.69 (0.32)**   
 × ASC_no   -0.51 (0.14)***     -2.02 (1.05)*   
Descriptive norm × Significant   -0.12 (0.11)     -0.53 (0.50)   
 × Negligible   0.18 (0.11)*     0.73 (0.31)**   
 × ASC_no   -0.19 (0.13)     -0.87 (0.99)   
Model fit statistics              
Parameters  9 32 18 41 
L0 (with ASC only)  -1771 -1771 -1407 -1407 
LL   -1395 -1134 -842 -774 
McFadden pseudo-R2  0.21 0.36 0.40 0.45 
AIC/N  1.67 1.39 1.02 0.97 
BIC/N  1.71 1.51 1.09 1.13 
Note: Nchoice cards = 1680, Nrespondents = 211. Std. deviation in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
 a,b All observations were divided by 10 and 1000 respectively, for scaling reasons. 
 c The simulated maximum likelihood was based on 5,000 Halton draws (Hole, 2007). 
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Results from the MIMIC model previously suggested that higher scores on the latent 
constructs are relatively weakly associated with larger-scale farms, more intensive farms and farms 
that keep heifers for export. Part of these effects are thus absorbed in the predicted conditional 
means of these latent constructs. However, the underlying farm characteristics still interacted 
significantly with some choice attributes, in particular with the marginal utility of the no-vaccination 
option. Thus, farmers operating larger-scale and/or more intensive dairy farms are more likely to 
vaccinate, as are farmers who export heifers. 
Farmers’ age and education level were not influential in the MIMIC model in explaining 
variability in the latent constructs. In the choice models with interactions, age had a moderating 
effect on monetary attributes: the level of government subsidy and vaccination costs. Older farmers 
appear willing to pay more for the vaccine given that they derive less utility from the government 
subsidy of 60 per cent and less disutility from higher vaccination costs. Farmers with higher 
education degrees are less likely to vaccinate if the probability of serious adverse vaccine effects 
is significant12. 
Attitude and injunctive norm interacted negatively with the ASC – the utility of the no-choice 
or opt-out alternative. Thus, the more favourable the farmer’s attitude towards vaccination and the 
more social pressure perceived by the farmer, the more likely the farmer is to vaccinate. Attitude 
also interacted positively with government communication provided via veterinarians, while 
injunctive norm interacted negatively with government subsidy of 60 per cent. Descriptive norm 
interacted positively with the probability of serious adverse vaccine effects being negligible. 
 
  
                                              
12 An interaction effect between education level and the ASC was highly significant in both the MNL and MXL models. However, the 
interaction variable selection procedure revealed that this correlation was spurious. Since dummy coding was used, the effect captured 
was the significant interaction between education level and the probability of serious adverse vaccine effects being small (see Bech and 
Gyrd-Hansen (2005) for an explanation).  
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6.5 Summary and discussion  
In their utility trade-offs between choice attributes, farmers perceived the probability of 
serious adverse vaccine effects as one of the most important attributes. Preference heterogeneity 
for this attribute was retrieved via interactions with pasture land, education level and descriptive 
norm. The first two interaction effects might show that farmers’ views on disease resistance (or 
resilience) and its consequences for the intensity with which a farm should be operated are linked 
with how they perceive the likelihood and impact of adverse vaccine effects. This links to results 
from the latent variable model, where it was found that farmers who have more (less) intensive dairy 
farms are more (less) favourable towards vaccination.  
The importance of perceived trust and confidence in vaccine safety and effectiveness and 
in the disease control approach chosen by animal health authorities is highlighted by two interaction 
effects in particular. Descriptive norm interacted positively with the probability of serious adverse 
vaccine effects being negligible. This suggests that farmers are more likely to vaccinate if they 
perceive that others in their social network vaccinate (presumably without experiencing adverse 
effects). Furthermore, attitude interacted positively with government communication provided via 
veterinarians. Attitude change, communication and persuasion are closely related. Source and 
message characteristics (e.g. credibility) together with the internal motivation and ability to process 
information determine whether attitude change is induced (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 1996; 
Blackstock et al., 2010). Sok et al. (2015) previously showed for the same research problem that 
the government representative was one of the least important referents, while the veterinarian and 
peer farmers were more important referents. Frewer et al. (1996) show that for food-related risks, 
government representatives are among the least trusted sources of risk information.  
Another important finding relates to the provision of a government subsidy as a means to 
lower the vaccination costs for the farmer. Injunctive norm interacted negatively with government 
subsidy of 60 per cent. Subsidization is an incentive-based policy instrument and functions, just as 
certain norms, as an external motivating factor. As such, subsidization and social pressures via 
injunctive norms are both external motivating factors. Our results indicate that these factors might 
function as substitutes for at least some farmers. 
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This ‘crowding out’ effect has been reviewed by Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012, p. 368), 
who indicate that “this may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals’ altruism, ethical 
norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences”. One of the suggested 
underlying mechanisms for the substitution effect is that subsidies can negatively affect one’s sense 
of autonomy (and not the capacity) over the behaviour, resulting in resistance to rather than 
compliance with the policy. 
The interactions found between farm characteristics and the ASC reveal some clear 
economic motives for farmers to prefer vaccination to no vaccination. Herd vaccination is often 
used as an insurance against the production risk from disease infection, and also guarantees that 
heifers can be continuously exported irrespective of the status of the epidemic (Sok et al., 2014). 
However, the interactions found between social-psychological constructs and the ASC suggest that 
perceived social pressures also induce vaccination behaviour as well as the experiential 
components of attitude (e.g. animal welfare considerations). This suggests that in addition to 
economic motives, farmers can have social and intrinsic motives to invest in disease control.  
This study brings together different perspectives from economics and social psychology13 
using the flexible structure of the ICLV model framework. Compared to the MNL, the social-
psychological constructs explain a considerable part of the preference heterogeneity in the ASC, 
resulting in better model fit statistics. Compared to the MXL model with preference heterogeneity 
modelled randomly, the social-psychological constructs retrieve some preference heterogeneity 
and provide behavioural explanations for the diverse preferences underlying farmers’ choices to 
vaccinate against bluetongue. In particular farmers’ attitude provided a sound behavioural 
interpretation of why vaccination is preferred to no vaccination. Attitude has also been used to 
explain status quo effects in choice experiments (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2009). Other latent 
constructs that could be relevant for modelling preference heterogeneity in livestock disease control 
decisions are anticipated emotions, such as guilt or regret (Onwezen et al., 2013), or dimensions 
of personal norms (Thøgersen, 2006). In this respect, choice models are emerging that are based 
on minimizing anticipated random regret rather than on maximizing random utility (Thiene et al., 
2012; Hensher et al., 2013; Chorus, 2015). 
 
  
                                              
13 Some of the axioms underlying the standard economic model could have been violated with the inclusion of social-psychological 
constructs, for a discussion see Ben-Akiva et al. (1999).  
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6.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
Results of this study suggest that, in the presence of a bluetongue outbreak, many dairy 
farmers in the Netherlands are willing to participate in a vaccination scheme to minimise the 
probability of herd infection. Farmers have economic, intrinsic or social motives to invest in livestock 
disease control. The likelihood of participation can be increased with providing information and 
subsidies, however, the efficacy of these policy instruments to motivate farmers to vaccinate is 
heterogeneous and not necessarily positive for each farmer. This study has two implications for the 
design of policy instruments to increase the effectiveness of voluntary approaches to livestock 
disease control. 
The first policy implication relates to the provision of subsidies. In designing livestock 
disease control schemes, it is often argued that governments should use financial, incentive-based 
policy instruments to compensate farmers for externalities, assuming they act in rational self-
interest. The results of this study suggest that farmers can have private economic motives 
(incentives) to participate in a vaccination scheme, such as to insure the production risk from 
disease infection and to maintain the export of heifers. This suggests that a government subsidy 
might not be necessary for each farmer to guarantee a positive net benefit from vaccination. Results 
further suggest that the relationship between the level of subsidy and the likelihood of participation 
in voluntary vaccination schemes is not necessarily positive. A crowding-out effect was found 
between injunctive norm and government subsidy. The crowding out of intrinsic and social motives 
could be minimised by explaining to farmers what the meaning is of providing subsidy and where 
the financial sources come from. The level of subsidy and the manner in which compensation and 
reimbursement is offered can have a signalling function, indicating the extent to which the animal 
health authorities take the issue seriously. 
The second implication relates to the provision of information. Perceived trust and 
confidence in the vaccine safety and effectiveness and in the government approach, which were 
reflected in preferences for the attributes ‘probability of serious adverse vaccine effects’ and 
‘government communication’, were conditional on farmers’ attitude and descriptive norm towards 
participation in a vaccination scheme. Information about the vaccine and the way in which animal 
health authorities plan to coordinate the vaccination strategy is best provided via communication 
channels that are perceived as credible and trustworthy. Farmers are more likely to vaccinate if 
they perceive that others in their social network perform vaccination without experiencing adverse 
effects. 
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Abstract 
Voluntary livestock disease control is an interplay between the dynamics of farmers’ 
collective behaviour and disease epidemiology. This study used an agent-based model to study this 
interplay for bluetongue disease. Farmers’ utility function was derived from the results of a discrete 
choice model in which economic, intrinsic and social motives to vaccinate were considered. The 
epidemiology was modelled by a stochastic spatial explicit susceptible-latent-infectious-recovered 
model. Under specific vaccination scheme designs, an emergent effect evolves from the 
interactions between farmers themselves and with the environment from which they observe the 
progress of the disease. These schemes focus more on serving farmers’ information needs and 
raising perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine and in the disease control approach chosen 
by animal health authorities. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The EU has set specific legislation for a number of livestock diseases, describing what 
control measures each member state should adopt in case an outbreak is observed. One of such 
livestock diseases is bluetongue (BT), which is a vector-borne disease caused by the bluetongue 
virus (BTV). A large epidemic of BTV serotype 8 occurred in Europe during 2006 to 2009. After the 
august 2006 outbreak it was commonly assumed that the epidemic would be halted by the 
2006/2007 winter period. The epidemic did, however, spread quickly over a vast area in 2007 
(Elbers et al., 2009a). The adoption of the recommended measures (European Council, 2000; 
European Council, 2007) did not control the spread. New legislation was developed in which it was 
proposed to apply a mass emergency vaccination campaign “to achieve the objectives of reducing 
clinical disease and losses, containing the spread of the disease, protecting free territories in the 
Member States and facilitating safe trade in live animals” (European Council, 2008). The Dutch 
animal health authorities used a voluntary vaccination approach and two types of policy instruments 
to motivate participation. A communicative intervention was implemented in which the government 
representatives as well as farmer organizations conveyed written or oral recommendations to the 
farmers to vaccinate their cattle. Subsidization of the vaccination costs was another policy 
instrument put in place (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008). 
Voluntary livestock disease control is an interplay between the dynamics of farmers’ 
collective behaviour and disease epidemiology. Principal-agent theory suggests that livestock 
disease control can be seen as a contractual relationship between the (national) animal health 
authorities and a group of farmers (Hennessy and Wolf, 2015). While the animal health authorities’ 
prime interest is to control the disease transmission as efficiently as possible given the European 
and international responsibilities, the farmers want to avoid a disruption of the business and 
consequently high economic damage. By investing in disease control measures, such as 
vaccination, the probability of being infected itself is reduced. It also creates positive off-farm effects 
since the farm in its vaccinated state is not likely to infect other susceptible farms. If enough farmers 
would vaccinate, this could even lead to so-called herd-immunity (Topley and Wilson, 1923), such 
that the epidemic is halted completely. No disease control efforts, on the other hand, increase the 
probability of being infected itself and create negative off-farm effects. It is therefore important to 
understand and explicit account for this interplay between disease dynamics and farmers’ 
behavioural dynamics in models that are used to provide underpinnings for livestock disease control 
policies. 
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As different authors in the field of economics of animal health have noticed (Rich and Perry, 
2011; Barnes et al., 2015; Gilbert and Rushton, 2016), a body of economic literature that studied 
the effects of the abovementioned dynamic interplay used stylised economic models, mostly without 
epidemiological input, based on mainly information economics approaches, principal-agent theory 
and game theory to describe farmers’ behaviour (Hennessy et al., 2005; Gramig et al., 2009; Horan 
et al., 2015; Wang and Hennessy, 2015). The models used are limited in their ability to account for 
process and context in decision making, while future conditions depend heavily on actions of other 
farmers (Nolan et al., 2009). They assume all farmers can only be extrinsically motivated via 
(monetary) incentives. Intrinsic or social motives to invest in livestock disease control are assumed 
not to play a role or remain constant. Given the expected information asymmetry in disease status 
and control efforts of others, the emphasis is on setting the right level of financial compensation to 
create the right incentives to invest in voluntary livestock disease control. 
This study uses a bottom-up approach by means of an agent-based model (ABM) to study 
the dynamic interplay between farmers’ collective behaviour and disease epidemiology. ABM is a 
computational method, and its advantage lies in the possibilities to model individual behaviour, 
connect farmers (agents) with each other through a social network, and situate them in an 
environment that accounts for spatial and temporal effects (Gilbert, 2008; Nolan et al., 2009; Rich 
and Perry, 2011; Chhatwal and He, 2015). 
A variety of decision models has been applied in ABM to represent agent’s behaviour, 
ranging from rational choice theories, to social-psychological and cognitive theories to just empirical 
or heuristic rules with or without any theoretical foundation (An, 2012; Klabunde and Willekens, 
2016; Groeneveld et al., 2017). Here, farmers’ behaviour in the ABM is modelled using the 
integrated choice and latent variable model (ICLV) framework. The ICLV model offers a general 
econometric framework to supplement economic theory with concepts or theories from other social 
sciences (Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002; Ben-Akiva et al., 2012). Such models are seen as a 
promising way to model individual behaviour in ABM (Bruch and Atwell, 2015; Klabunde and 
Willekens, 2016). The ICLV model framework was applied to empirical data from a survey-based 
discrete choice experiment in which farmers’ preferences for BT vaccination scheme attributes 
were elicited (Sok et al., 2017).  
 
 
 
133 
The main results from the study of Sok et al. (2017) can be summarised as follows. There 
is heterogeneity in farmers’  motives to invest in livestock disease control. Economic motives 
(incentives) relate to insuring the production risk from infection and maintaining the export of heifers. 
Farmers can have social and intrinsic motives to invest. They consider what important referents, 
such as the veterinarian or family members, think they should do and taken into account the 
perceived behaviour of peers. They do not want to be confronted with animal suffering but want to 
keep job satisfaction high from working with healthy animals. This suggests that a mix of policy 
instruments, rather than financial compensation only, is needed to make voluntary approaches 
effective (Barnes et al., 2015; Ochieng’ and Hobbs, 2016). Interaction effects found between social-
psychological constructs and specific designs of policy instruments highlighted the importance of 
perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine safety and effectiveness and in the disease control 
strategy chosen by animal health authorities. For example, some farmers were more likely to 
vaccinate if they perceive that others in their social network perform vaccination without 
experiencing adverse effects. Some farmers were less likely to vaccinate with a higher level of 
government subsidy. This pointed to a crowding-out mechanism (Frey and Jegen, 2001) in which 
subsidization adversely affect farmer’s motivation to comply with the vaccination policy. 
The objective of this study was to analyse farmers’ willingness to invest in BT disease control 
under different voluntary vaccination scheme designs, considering economic, social and intrinsic 
motives and the dynamic interplay between farmers’ collective behaviour and disease epidemiology. 
The past BT epidemic of 2006 – 2009 served as a case study. The epidemiology of BT is modelled 
by a stochastic spatial explicit susceptible-latent-infectious-recovered (SLIR) model, in which the 
probability of transmission from an infectious farm to a susceptible farm is a function of interfarm 
distance and the infectious period (Boender et al., 2007; de Koeijer et al., 2011).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a model outline, the 
verification steps, and other details. Section 3 reports on simulations in which different vaccination 
scheme designs were tested on disease rate and vaccination uptake level. Section 4 and 5 are the 
discussion and conclusion.   
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7.2 Materials and methods 
7.2.1 Agent-based model outline 
The agent-based model (ABM) was programmed in Netlogo 5.3 (Wilensky, 1999). A two-
dimensional geographical space 𝐴𝐴 × 𝐴𝐴 in km2 is formed, and the total number of farms 𝑁𝑁. Each 
farm is placed in the two-dimensional space at a random position. One vector season (Spring to 
Autumn) is simulated and denoted with a time period 𝑇𝑇 (in days) in which the epidemic starts with 
an initial number of infectious farms. 
All farms are subjected to the decisions of one farmer, and each farmer only makes 
decisions for one farm. Farmers in the model observe and collect information about the closeness 
and number of infected farms, and about vaccination behaviour of others in their social network. 
Figure 1 shows the dynamic interplay between farmers collective behaviour and the BT disease 
epidemiology. Section 2.1.1 and subsections describe in more detail how farmers use this 
information to decide whether they should participate in a BT vaccination scheme offered by the 
animal health authorities. Section 2.1.2 describes how the BT transmission is modelled. 
Section 2.2 describes the verification and validation steps done. Section 2.3 describes a 
sensitivity analysis done on some input parameters relating to the social network and transmission. 
Section 2.4 describes the vaccination scheme designs tested on the percentage of farms infected 
or vaccinated over time. 
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7.2.1.1 Modelling farmers’ bluetongue vaccination behaviour  
7.2.1.1.1 Choice model framework  
The vaccination decision is essentially formulated as a discrete choice problem, which is 
consistent with random utility and other econometric models (Lancaster, 1966; McFadden, 1974). 
Farmers in the ABM are offered a vaccination scheme. The utility derived from that vaccination 
scheme is the sum of utility derived from the attributes of that vaccination scheme. Five attributes 
of a BT vaccination scheme were identified (Table 1).  
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Figure 7-1: Overview of the information flow between and within sub models of farmers' vaccination 
behaviour and disease epidemiology. 
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Table 7-1: Attributes of a bluetongue vaccination scheme (Sok et al., 2017). 
Attribute (𝐸𝐸) Levels (𝑠𝑠) Description 
Adverse effects 
probability 
Significant 
Small 
Negligible 
Farmers’ perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine 
safety and effectiveness and in the disease control 
approach chosen by animal health authorities 
 
Government 
communication 
No information 
Via leaflet   
Via veterinarian 
Via leaflet and veterinarian 
 
Informational policy instrument that can increase the 
motivation to vaccinate by reasoned opinions 
Government subsidy No subsidy 
10 per cent              
60 per cent 
 
Incentive-based policy instrument that can increase the 
motivation to vaccinate by lowering the net costs 
Vaccination costs per 
cow  
  4 Euro 
  8 Euro 
12 Euro 
 
Farmers’ contribution to the costs of herd vaccination 
(excluding financial compensation) 
Infection probability  Significant 
Nil 
If farmers’ choose to vaccinate, the probability of herd 
infection becomes nil  
 
The ICLV model is an extended discrete choice model, in which the random utility model is 
generalised (Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002). Social-psychological constructs are modelled as latent 
variables to account for heterogeneity in preferences to enhance the behavioural representation in 
choice models. The latent constructs that were used in the study of Sok et al. (2017) to explain 
preference heterogeneity were attitude, injunctive norm and descriptive norm. These constructs 
from the reasoned action approach successfully explained farmers’ intention to vaccinate against 
BT (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010; Sok et al., 2016b). 
Farmer’s attitude towards BT vaccination is the positive or negative evaluation of performing 
it, and can be based on instrumental as well as experiential aspects (Sok et al., 2015; Sok et al., 
2016a). The injunctive norm refers to the farmer’s perceptions of what referents think he or she 
should do. Influential referents are: family members, the veterinarian, peers and leaders, and the 
buyer (Sok et al., 2015). The descriptive norm refers to farmer’s perceived behaviour of others 
(peers).  
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7.2.1.1.2 Social network 
A social network structure is imposed that connects farmers in the ABM by the idea of social 
circles (Hamill and Gilbert, 2015). The latter provides a simple structure that fits with sociological 
observations of real social networks, such as low density, high clustering and communities. In the 
setting of a network model using the idea of social circles, Hamill & Gilbert (2009) indicate that the 
distance between any pair of farmers (𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚) is seen as the strength of the tie between them, the 
social dimension of distance. Since the geographical dimension of distance is essential in this ABM, 
it is assumed that geographical distance alone determines social relationships. 
Specifically, a two-reach network model is applied (Hamill and Gilbert, 2009). The total 
number of farms 𝑁𝑁 is randomly split into two groups, a major (𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) and a minor (𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡), the 
first with a small radius (𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤), the second with a larger radius (𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒). Farmers in 𝑁𝑁 are 
connected if 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 (peer connections). Farmers within 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 are in addition connected if 
𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 < 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒. This approach results in a so-called fat-tailed distribution of connectivity, i.e. 
some farmers have large networks. The latter group has in addition to peer connections, contacts 
with farmers from e.g. a study or pressure group or board. 
7.2.1.1.3 Farmer profiles 
In total, 211 complete dairy farmer profiles were obtained with data on stated choices to 
different vaccination scheme designs (five attributes with one selected level), indicators for social-
psychological constructs and farm and farmer characteristics (see Sok et al., 2017). Each farmer 
agent in the ABM was attributed with one of these farmer profiles. The descriptive statistics of these 
farmer profiles are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 7-2: Descriptive statistics of farmer profiles from Sok et al. 2017. 
Variable  Unit Mean Standard deviation 
Farm characteristics    
Herd sizeb Number 104 48 
Milk productionb Kilograms (avg. cow) 8,529 1,118 
Pasture landb Hectares 47 33 
Export of heifers Yes = 1, No = 0 0.26  
Farmer characteristics   
Ageb Years 48 10 
Higher education  Yes = 1, No = 0 0.27  
Social-psychological constructs    
Attitudea,b Scale 1 – 7  4.71 1.32 
Injunctive norma,b Scale 1 – 7 3.81 1.44 
Descriptive norma,b  Scale 1 – 7 3.74 1.33 
a These variables were factorized, see Sok et al. (2017) 
b These variables were scaled to a value between 0 and 1 
 
A multinomial model specification from the related econometric study of Sok et al. (2017) 
was used to assign each farmer profile with an initial vaccination probability for different vaccination 
scheme designs that are composed of the same five attributes (Table 1) but with different levels 
(Table 4): 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 11+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(−𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),                           (1) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 + �∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 + ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤 � ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,                         (2) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 is the vaccination probability and 𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 the utility derived from vaccination scheme design 𝑐𝑐 for 
decision maker 𝑙𝑙, 
𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 five attributes with selected level 𝑠𝑠; 
𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠  estimated main effects that can be interpreted as marginal utilities; 
𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 value of farm and farmer characteristic 𝑒𝑒 in a farmer profile; 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 estimated interaction effects between 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 and 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐; 
𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 score on social-psychological construct 𝑙𝑙 in a farmer profile; 
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 estimated interaction effect between 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 and 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐. 
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The estimated effects are given in Appendix I. Given the variety in scores on social-
psychological constructs and values for farm and farmer characteristics, each farmer profile (Table 
2) has a different total utility score, that leads to a different initial vaccination probability. When this 
probability exceeds a given threshold the farmer decides to vaccinate his farm (see Figure 1). 
7.2.1.1.4 Updating vaccination probabilities  
The vaccination decision problem is short-term and therefore all farm and farmer 
characteristics will not change and are of no influence in the decision-making process. Attitude, 
injunctive and descriptive norm however, are belief-based and formed in daily encounters in the real 
world (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). These constructs are used in the decision-making process to 
update the vaccination probabilities (Figure 1). Two simple heuristics update the attitude, injunctive 
norm and descriptive norm using temporal and spatial information available from the ABM. 
Each farmer observes and collects the number and closeness of BT infected farms and 
construes a risk perception (𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃) as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = �𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,                                                         (3) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 the number of 𝑁𝑁 infected farms at time 𝑝𝑝,  𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 the inter-farm distance between a farm 𝑙𝑙 
and infected farm 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒  the maximum possible distance between two farms in the simulation. 
Farmers’ attitude (𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴) is during the simulation updated as: 
𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴0,𝑛𝑛 × (1 + 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡),                         (4) 
where 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴0,𝑛𝑛 is the initial attitude score, being normalised score with a value between 0 and 1. Note 
that the effect of risk perception on the updated attitude score is multiplicative through the initial 
attitude score, i.e. the effect of risk perception will be proportional to the initial attitude score.  
For each connection between farmer 𝑙𝑙 and farmer neighbour 𝑑𝑑 in the social network the 
similarity (𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚) is calculated by taking the inverse Euclidean distance of the differences in herd 
size, milk production, land and farmer’s age. Each farmer observes the number of vaccinated 
network links (𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) and perceives social pressure (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃) to vaccinate as a function of the number 
of neighbour farmers who already vaccinated: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = �∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡×𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.                             (5)  
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Note that neighbour farms with higher similarity contribute more to perceived social pressure. The 
network size sensitivity (𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆) parameter in the power term is a value between 0 and 1. A value < 
1 results in giving more weight to the first neighbour farmer who vaccinated, especially in smaller 
social networks. 
Farmers’ descriptive norm (𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁) is updated during the simulation as: 
𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁0,𝑛𝑛 × (1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡),                         (6) 
where 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁0,𝑛𝑛 is the initial descriptive norm score, being normalised score with a value between 0 
and 1. Note that the effect of perceived social pressure on the updated descriptive norm score is 
multiplicative through the initial descriptive norm score, i.e. the effect of perceived social pressure 
will be proportional to the initial descriptive norm score.  
Farmers’ injunctive norm (𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁) is during the simulation updated as: 
𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁0,𝑛𝑛 × (1 + 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 × 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 × 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁),                       (7) 
 where 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁0,𝑛𝑛 is the initial injunctive norm score, being normalised score with a value between 0 and 
1. Farmers’ injunctive norm is updated by a weighted average of the updated attitude and 
descriptive norm scores (𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 = 1). Note that the effect of the risk perception and the 
perceived social pressure on the updated injunctive norm score is multiplicative through the initial 
injunctive norm score, i.e. the effect of perceived social pressure will be proportional to the initial 
injunctive norm score.  
7.2.1.2 Modelling bluetongue transmission  
The epidemiology of BTV is modelled by a stochastic spatial explicit SLIR model. A farm, 
which is subject to one farmer 𝑙𝑙, is in one of four possible states; susceptible (𝑆𝑆), latent infected 
(𝐿𝐿), infectious (𝐴𝐴), or recovered (𝐸𝐸). BT is introduced at time moment 𝑝𝑝0 at a number of randomly 
selected farms. Farms transit from the 𝑆𝑆 to the 𝐿𝐿 state during transmission of the BTV. The farms 
will be latently infected for a constant latent period 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 during which transmission cannot occur. 
During the infectious period with a constant length 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐, farms can infect other farms. After the 
constant infectious period the infectious farm recovers and goes into the 𝐸𝐸 state. Farms in the 𝐸𝐸 
state cannot be reinfected.  
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Transmission is modelled stochastically by a Poisson process in which an infectious farm 
infects susceptible farm at distance 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 with rate 𝜆𝜆(𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚) (Law and Kelton, 2000). A susceptible 
farm is infected at the earliest infection moment for all infectious farms. The rate at which the virus 
is transmitted is modelled as:  
𝜆𝜆(𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚) = 𝜆𝜆0
1+�
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑟𝑟0
�
𝛼𝛼                                        (8) 
where 𝜆𝜆0 is the rate of transmission at distance 0, 𝑟𝑟0 a scaling distance and 𝛼𝛼 determines the shape 
of the kernel. Small values of 𝛼𝛼 represent global transmission and high values depict transmission 
kernels with primarily local spread (Boender et al., 2007; de Koeijer et al., 2011). 
Vaccination of farms will render susceptible farms protected against infection. Vaccination 
of infected farms in the 𝐿𝐿 state will not affect the status of these farms. Farms in the 𝐴𝐴 state cannot 
be vaccinated.  
7.2.2 Verification and validation  
Verification and validation steps were run before the effectiveness of different vaccination 
scheme designs is tested. Verification is defined by Gilbert Gilbert (2008) as: “the task of ensuring 
that a model satisfies the specification of what it is intended to do”. Specific verification steps done 
were the checking of the Netlogo numerical code by both authors, diagnosing intermediate outputs 
(e.g. the updating of the social-psychological constructs), observing the simulation one at a time, 
and corner testing with extreme values (e.g. setting the infectious period at zero, which should lead 
to no additional infected farms). 
Validation is defined by Gilbert (2008) as “checking that the model is a good model of the 
phenomenon being simulated”. Two output variables were defined (see also Figure 1): (1) the 
percentage of infected farms during the simulation and (2) the percentage of vaccinated (immune) 
farms during the simulation. All input parameters were set at their default value (see Table 3). First, 
50 simulations were run in which no vaccination scheme was offered. Then, 50 simulations were 
run with the base vaccination scheme design offered at 𝑝𝑝 = 56 (approx. after 2 months) to the 
farmers in the model (see Table 4). The simulation is calibrated to reflect the percentage of infected 
and vaccinated farms in Velthuis et al. (2010), Elbers et al. (2010) and Sok et al. (2016a).  
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7.2.3 Sensitivity analysis: testing input parameters  
The parameters relating to the social network and transmission were subject to a sensitivity 
analysis to study the effect on the two output variables defined. The sensitivity of each parameter 
value was analysed over a range of values while keeping all other parameters fixed to the default 
value. For each parameter value, 50 simulations were run and output is shown at the end of the 
time period, at 𝑝𝑝 = 175. Parameters for describing farmer behaviour that were obtained from 
empirical data in the discrete choice experiment survey and the econometric analysis were not 
varied. Table 3 presents the input parameters in the ABM. 
 
Table 7-3: Input parameters, their default values and the range of values simulated in the agent based 
model. 
Input parameters Symbol Default [Range of values ] 
(incremental step) 
Unit Source 
General       
Vector-active season (sim. period) 𝑇𝑇 175 - days (Fischer et al., 2013) 
Scaling distance 𝑟𝑟0 3.9  km de Koeijer et al. (2011) 
Social network       
Minor farm group 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 20 [0 – 30]   (10) per cent  
Small radius  𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 2 [1 – 4]   (1) km  
Large radius 𝐸𝐸𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 4 [2 – 8]   (2) km  
Network size sensitivity 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 0.5 [0.25 – 1] (0.25) -  
Inj. norm updating mechanism 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 / 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 0.5 [0 – 1]   (0.5) -  
Transmission       
Initial number of infectious farms - 6 [1 – 11]   (5) farms  
Initial transmission rate 𝜆𝜆0 1500 [750 – 3000]   (750) 10-6 day-1    
Latent period  𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 14 [7 – 21]   (7)  days de Koeijer et al. (2011) 
Infectious period 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 56 [28 – 84]   (28)  days Based on Gubbins et al. (2008) 
 
Regarding the social network structure, the share of farmers in the minor group with large 
networks, the size of the small and large radius were varied to test if smaller or larger networks 
would lead to different percentages of farms infected or vaccinated. The network size sensitivity 
and weights used in updating the injunctive norm were also varied to test whether it would matter if 
either risk perception or perceived social pressure or a combination of the updating mechanisms 
would give different values for the outcome variables. 
Regarding the BT epidemiology the parameter values in the study of de Koeijer et al. (2011) 
were used, but the initial transmission rate  𝜆𝜆0  was increased to obtain an similar sized outbreak. 
The sensitivity of the model was analyzed for the initial number of infectious farms, the initial 
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transmission rate 𝜆𝜆0 , the length of the latent period 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 and the length of the infectious period 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐. 
The initial number of infectious farms during the 2006 outbreak is unknown and might affect the 
initial speed of spread of the infection. The transmission rate might change from year-to-year due 
to differences in vector-abundance. For the length of the latent period the same assumption as in 
the study of de Koeijer et al. (2011) was used, but evidence is scarce and therefore this parameter 
was subject to sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, De Koeijer et al. (2011) assumed that farms remain 
infectious until the end of the vector season. Here it is assumed that a farm is infectious only when 
its cattle is infected, resulting in a shorter infectious period of 56 days. This assumption  was 
obtained by simulating a BT outbreak on a farm using the model in the study of Gubbins et al. (2008) 
with an average temperature of 19.5ºC and 100 cows.  
7.2.4 Scenario analysis: testing different vaccination schemes 
Table 4 presents five vaccination scheme designs in terms of the selected levels for the 
attributes (see also Table 1). The effect of the time of introduction of the intervention on the 
percentage of farms infected or vaccinated was considered. Each scheme was simulated for three 
moments of introduction: at 𝑝𝑝 = 28, 56 and 84 (approx. after one, two and three months). The 
threshold value was set at 0.97, and calibrated in such a way that the average percentage of 
vaccinated farms in the base scenario is about equal to the average of the initial vaccination 
probability distribution of that scenario. Output is shown at the end of the time period, at 𝑝𝑝 = 175. 
For each design the vaccination costs per cow are kept constant at 8 Euros and the 
probability of herd infection when vaccinating, per definition, is nil. The vaccination schemes thus 
only differ from each other in selected levels for the first three attributes. 
Vaccination scheme 1 is the base scenario with no distinct levels on the first three attributes. 
The average uptake level is estimated at 48 per cent (Sok et al., 2017), and this percentage is used 
to calibrate the model.  
Compared to the base scenario, in vaccination scheme 2 the risk communication strategy 
is changed by disseminating government information via veterinarians rather than via leaflets. 
Serving the information needs of intrinsically motivated farmers might be enough to encourage 
vaccination. Veterinarians are perceived as a highly trusted information source (Sok et al., 2015). 
Farmers’ preference for receiving information via veterinarians is positively correlated with attitude 
(Sok et al., 2017), and updated in the ABM via a measure of risk perception based on  the number 
and closeness of BT infected farms (equation 3 and 4). 
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Table 7-4: Selected levels of attributes and expected vaccination uptake level for each of the five 
vaccination schemes. 
 Scheme 1: 
Base 
Scheme 2: 
Comm. via 
vets 
Scheme 3: 
Comm. via 
vets, more 
confidence 
Scheme 4: 
Extra 
subsidy 
Scheme 5: 
Comm. via 
vets and 
extra subsidy 
Vaccination scheme attributes      
Prob. of serious vaccine adverse 
effects 
Small - Negligible - - 
Government communication Leaflet Veterinarian Veterinarian - Veterinarian 
Government subsidy 10% - - 60% 60% 
Vaccination costs per cow 8 euro - - - - 
Prob. of herd infection Nil - - - - 
Initial vaccination prob. distribution (Sok et al., 2017)   
Average 0.48 0.53 0.61 0.65 0.68 
Min 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
25th percentile 0.24 0.26 0.38 0.50 0.54 
Median 0.50 0.58 0.69 0.69 0.76 
75th percentile 0.70 0.78 0.86 0.85 0.89 
Max 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 
 
In vaccination scheme 3 it is assumed that a risk communication strategy via veterinarians 
also leads to more perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine and in the disease control strategy 
chosen by animal health authorities, and therefore the probability of serious vaccine adverse effects’ 
is perceived as negligible. Farmers’ preference for the latter is positively correlated with descriptive 
norm (Sok et al., 2017), and updated in the ABM via a measure of perceived social pressure based 
on the number of vaccinated network links (equation 5 and 6).  
Vaccination scheme 4 is aimed at increasing farmers’ motivation by providing a higher 
financial compensation. Farmers’ preference for receiving more subsidy is negatively correlated 
with injunctive norm (Sok et al., 2017), and updated in the ABM via a weighted average of the 
perceived risk and perceived social pressure (see equation 7). 
The final vaccination scheme tested has favourable levels on both the informational and 
incentive-based policy instrument. The average uptake level for this scheme is estimated at 68 per 
cent (Sok et al., 2017). 
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7.3 Results 
The symbols depicted in the Figures 2, 3 and 4 represent the percentage of farms infected 
(circles) or vaccinated (crosses) at the end of the time period, at 𝒕𝒕 = 175. The dashed horizontal 
lines in Figure 3 are the average uptake levels of the base vaccination scheme, and in Figure 4 
these lines are the average uptake levels of the corresponding vaccination scheme, based on the 
estimations of the related econometric study of Sok et al. (2017), 
7.3.1 Validation of the model 
Figure 2 shows the results of two simulations with in the first graph the percentage of 
infected farms if no vaccination scheme is offered, and in the second and third graph the percentage 
of vaccinated and infected farms if the base vaccination scheme is offered. With this scheme, 
approximately 50 per cent of the herd on the farms in the model become immune through 
vaccination, and consequently the percentage of infected farms drops with approximately 50 per 
cent compared to the simulation in which no scheme is offered. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Time trajectories of simulations without vaccination and with the base vaccination scheme. 
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Although the simulated world differs spatially and socially from the Netherlands, a 
comparison of the simulations with the BT serotype 8 epidemic from 2006 – 2009 in the 
Netherlands shows that it has a reasonable description of the epidemiology and vaccination uptake 
levels. Based on data from the Animal Health Service on screening farms, Velthuis et al. (2010) 
estimated the percentage of BT infected farms in the Netherlands (all types) in 2006 at 2.6 per 
cent and in 2007 at 82.7 – 99.9 per cent, depending on the region (North, Middle or South). The 
percentage of infected farms in the simulated epidemics in the ABM without vaccination are  in line 
with these percentages. 
A vaccination scheme at transnational level started in Spring 2008. In the Netherlands, the 
vaccines and associated costs were subsidized in 2008, but in 2009 this was stopped. In a 
questionnaire undertaken in 2009, the level of participation among cattle farmers in 2008 was 
estimated at 71 per cent and at 57 per cent in 2009. The latter percentage was measured either 
as actual participation or a stated intention to vaccinate (Elbers et al., 2010). In a questionnaire 
undertaken in 2014, Sok et al. (2016a) estimated the lower limit of participation at 40 per cent of 
the total population of farmers. The number of farms with vaccinated herds in the ABM under the 
base vaccination scheme is in the range of these values. 
7.3.2 Sensitivity analysis  
The output variables, the percentage of infected farms and the percentage of vaccinated 
farms during the simulation, were hardly sensitive to the parameters relating to the social network. 
Results are therefore not extensively discussed in this section, but only shown graphically in 
Appendix II. 
Figure 3 shows the simulation results in which some sensitivity of the output variables to 
the input parameters relating to the transmission was observed. The initial transmission rate and 
the infectious period are both positively correlated with the number of infected farms at the end of 
the simulation run. Both parameters increase the speed of transmission between farms either by a 
direct increase of the transmission rate or by increasing the force-of-infection, because farms 
remain infectious for a longer period. Increasing the latent period will reduce the speed of spread, 
such that less farms than the potential maximum (i.e. the final epidemic size) are infected at the end 
of the vector season. However, if the final epidemic size can be reached within one vector season, 
the final size is expected to increase with an increase in the basic reproduction number. The latter 
is proportional to both the initial transmission rate and the length of the infectious period, and will 
thus increase if these parameters are increased. 
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The effect of the initial number of infectious farms is two-fold. Firstly, increasing the number 
of initial farms will increase the initial speed of spread, such that more farms are infected during a 
vector-season. Secondly, a higher initial number of infectious farm will decrease the stochastic 
variation at the start of the vector-season, which results in less variation in the percentage of 
infected farms at the end of the vector season. 
 
 
7.3.3 Scenario analysis  
Figure 4 shows the simulation results  of the five vaccination scheme designs described in 
section 2.4. The numbers for scheme 1 at 𝑝𝑝 = 56 is the same result as described in Figure 2. 
The relative effect of the time of vaccination introduction on the percentage of infected or 
vaccinated farms is about the same for all vaccination schemes. Starting vaccination at 𝑝𝑝 = 28 or 
56 does not lead to different vaccination uptake levels. Starting earlier can results in a somewhat 
lower percentage of infected farms. At 𝑝𝑝 = 84, the uptake is considerably lower since farmers who 
might consider vaccination have already observed that their herd is infected.   
 
Figure 7-3: Sensitivity of the percentage infected and vaccinated farms to epidemiological parameters. 
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Vaccination schemes 2 to 5 give an improvement over the base scheme in terms of higher 
percentages of vaccinated farms and lower percentages of infected farms. Schemes 2 and 3 with 
a focus on informing farmers using a risk communication strategy perform equally well or better 
than scheme 4 with a focus on incentivising farmers through financial compensation. Scheme 5 
with both policy instruments actively used performs equally well as scheme 3. 
A comparison of the dashed horizontal lines with the simulated uptake levels suggests that 
the usefulness of informational policy instruments was underestimated in the study of Sok et al. 
(2017) while the usefulness of incentive-based policy instrument was overestimated. This might be 
explained as an emergent effect (see e.g. Chhatwal and He (2015) for an explanation) that evolves 
under specific vaccination scheme designs from the interactions between farmers themselves and 
with the environment from which they observe the progress of the disease. 
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Figure 7-4: Scenario analysis of the different vaccination schemes. 
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7.4 Discussion 
This ABM combined two widely used modelling frameworks for describing on the one hand 
the spread of infectious diseases and on the other hand human decision making. A susceptible-
latent-infectious-recovered (SLIR) model framework was combined with an integrated choice and 
latent variable (ICLV) model framework, rooted in random utility and different econometric models. 
The social-psychological constructs attitude, injunctive norm and descriptive norm from the 
reasoned action approach decision model that were incorporated in the choice model provided a 
way to describe the process and context of decision making. The research objective was to analyse 
farmers’ willingness to invest in BT disease control under different voluntary vaccination scheme 
designs, considering economic, social and intrinsic motives given an on-going epidemic. 
Two discussion points arise from this modelling study. The first is about the limited absolute 
effect found of the epidemiological parameters on farmers’ collective behaviour. The second relates 
to what factors make voluntary approaches to (BT) disease control more effective.  
In the ABM, farmers processed the information on a daily basis by two simple heuristics: a 
risk perception that was construed from the number and closeness of infected farms and the 
perceived social pressure based on the number of vaccinated farms in the social network. Social 
interaction was modelled in the ABM using the two-reach network model (Hamill and Gilbert, 2009; 
Hamill and Gilbert, 2015). Social relationships (network links) were formed on the basis of 
geographical distance, while the strength of influence via the measure of perceived social pressure 
was fixed and based on the similarity in the farm and farmer characteristics of herd size, milk 
production, land and age. A minor group of farmers in addition to peer connections in the immediate 
neighbourhood also had contacts with farmers located further away. Information about the disease 
spread and vaccination behaviour of peers in the social network was readily available in the model. 
Both diffusion processes impact farmers’ collective behaviour interchangeably (Keeling and Eames, 
2005; Bauch and Galvani, 2013).  
The limited effect of the BT disease transmission parameters, i.e. fast spreading or starting 
with a high initial number of infectious farms, on farmers’ collective behaviour is explained by the 
difference in the speed of the information and disease diffusion processes. The BT epidemiology 
was modelled with a susceptible-latent-infectious-recovered model in a spatial context with many 
local transmissions and a small number of long-distance transmission events. The presence of this 
latency period results in the slower spread of disease compared to the spread of vaccination, 
because the diffusion of information in the social network is updated daily. 
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For future research using computational methods to study the dynamic interplay between 
farmers’ collective behaviour and disease epidemiology this shows that small differences in time 
scale of diffusion processes will show strong responses independent of the underlying risk, i.e. local 
infections. 
Reasoned action theory (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010) that was used 
in the ABM advocates that beliefs can be established in three different ways: via direct observation, 
via  accepting information from some outside source, or via a process of inference from some 
other belief. Farmers in the ABM influenced each other in a way as described by the threshold model 
(Granovetter, 1978), in which the threshold is the proportion of vaccinated neighbours that is 
necessary to convince the farmer to also vaccinate. Another possibility to model the social 
interaction influences and investigate more the role of opinion leaders is by the relative agreement 
algorithm model (Deffuant et al., 2002; Deffuant et al., 2005); Farmers can persuade their peer 
farmers to adopt an innovation given diverging attitudes (opinions) about the innovation and the 
uncertainty, conviction, and openness to the opinion of others.   
It was a priori expected that the highest vaccination uptake level could be reached by 
incentivising farmers through financial compensation. The results of the ABM simulations, however, 
suggests that informing farmers using a well-designed risk communication strategy is at least as 
effective especially when there is trust and confidence in the vaccine safety and effectiveness. First, 
this shows that dynamic models can provide valuable insights into complex interactions between 
variables over time. They can capture remarkably subtle feedback effects that are easily missed by 
comparative static models (Nolan et al., 2009; Schreinemachers et al., 2009). Second, the results 
indicate that different perceptions of farmers need to be understood well before (BT) disease control 
strategies based on a voluntary approach can be effective. Using social interaction mechanisms, 
such as the perceived social pressure to vaccinate, in policy making to increase the uptake level 
would only work when farmers have trust and confidence in the suggested approach to control the 
disease.  
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The strength of an agent-based model is the ability to define interaction processes at the 
individual level in order to study population level dynamics. In this ABM study, the individual farmer 
level decision making process was a strong driver for the overall effects, while the social 
interactions between farmers was less pronounced. The interactions between farms via the 
transmission network was even less pronounced, due to a difference in time scale between decision 
making (days) and infection dynamics (weeks). Interestingly, with a low disease spread the overall 
effects were visible at population level, while as soon as a certain speed was reached the diffusion 
of information on the social network drives the dynamics. 
Although targeted and risk-based vaccination strategies are more effective in controlling 
infectious diseases on a network (Miller and Hyman, 2007; Nian and Wang, 2010), the simulations 
show that a voluntary approach based on proximity is reducing the number of infected farms. 
Vaccination does, however, not confer herd immunity such that a proportion of susceptible farms 
is still infected in each scheme design tested. 
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Appendix  
Appendix table A7.1: Estimated effects from Sok et al. (2017), adapted for the purpose of this study. 
  Original coding for 
meaningful interpretationa  
Coding for 
ABMb  
Main effects (𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠) of attribute 𝐸𝐸 with level 𝑠𝑠   
Adverse effects probability Significant -1.34 -0.36 
 Small 0.41 0.26 
 Negligible 0.93 0.09 
 No information -0.01 -0.07 
Government communication Via leaflet -0.11 0.07 
 Via veterinarian 0.15 -0.54 
 Via leaflet and veterinarian -0.02 0.54 
Government subsidy No subsidy -0.37 -0.44 
 10 per cent -0.27 -0.94 
 60 per cent 0.64 1.38 
Vaccination costs (per euro)  -0.16 -0.23 
Infection probability Significant -0.90 3.75 
Interaction effects (𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒) between farm or farmer characteristic 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 and attribute 𝐸𝐸 with level 𝑠𝑠 
Herd size × Significant (infection probability) 0.06 1.71 
Milk production × Significant (infection probability) -0.28 -1.96 
Pasture land × Significant (adverse effects probability) -0.15 -5.69 
 × Small 0.04 1.70 
 × Negligible 0.10 3.99 
 × Significant (infection probability) 0.03 1.19 
Export of heifers × Significant (infection probability) -0.53 -0.53 
Age × No subsidy 0.01 0.06 
 × 10 per cent 0.17 1.18 
 × 60 per cent -0.18 -1.24 
 × Vaccination costs (per euro) 0.02 0.16 
 × Significant (infection probability) 0.10 0.71 
Higher education × Significant (adverse effects probability) -0.49 -0.49 
 × Small 0.24 0.24 
 × Negligible 0.25 0.25 
Interaction effects (𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 ) between social-psychological construct 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 and attribute 𝐸𝐸 with level 𝑠𝑠 
Attitude × No information 0.02 0.09 
 × Via leaflet -0.06 -0.28 
 × Via veterinarian 0.23 1.10 
 × Via leaflet and veterinarian -0.19 -0.90 
 × Significant (infection probability) -0.97 -4.67 
Injunctive norm × No subsidy 0.02 0.10 
 × 10 per cent 0.09 0.40 
 × 60 per cent -0.11 -0.49 
 × Significant (infection probability) -0.38 -1.63 
Descriptive norm × Significant (adverse effects probability) -0.13 -0.63 
 × Small -0.02 -0.11 
 × Negligible 0.15 0.73 
 × Significant (infection probability) -0.19 -0.91 
a The reason why the reported coefficients differ from those published in Sok et al. (2017), is that effect coding instead of dummy 
coding was used.     
b While the variables 𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 and 𝛥𝛥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 used in the model estimation in Sok et al. (2017) were prepared for maximum meaningful 
interpretation (e.g. through mean-centering), for the ABM they were only scaled between 0 and 1 before estimation. This was done 
for the development of consistent heuristics (risk perception and perceived social pressure).         
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Appendix figure A7.1: Rank scores and some descriptive statistics of the attitudinal beliefs (𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) and 
outcome evaluations (𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊). 
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8.1 Introduction 
Voluntary approaches are being considered nowadays by animal health authorities as a tool 
for controlling livestock diseases. In 2008, the Dutch animal health authorities used a voluntary 
vaccination approach to control an emerging bluetongue epidemic that started end of 2006. Two 
types of policy instruments were used at that time to motivate participation: a communication 
intervention and subsidization of the vaccination costs.  
The overarching research objective of this thesis was to assess the key determinants of 
farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue and study the impact of different policy designs 
on the effectiveness of voluntary vaccination approaches to bluetongue disease control. 
A three-stage research approach was conducted. Two models of decision making, one from 
economics and one from social psychology, were first applied to the case study to obtain a solid 
understanding of important perceptions and motivations that farmers have for investing in livestock 
disease control. These motivations (sometimes incentives) and perceptions were then related to 
different attributes of a vaccination scheme to have a better understanding in which way a higher 
uptake can be obtained. In the third stage, the effect of the interplay between farmers collective 
behaviour and disease epidemiology on disease rate and vaccination uptake was studied. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, a synthesis of the results of 
this thesis is given. Three research themes emerged from the findings: how farmers cope with risk 
in the context of livestock diseases, on the usefulness of financial compensation as a policy 
instrument, and the role of trust and social norms. The implications for policy making are 
subsequently discussed, followed by the main scientific contributions of this thesis, and 
recommendations for future research. 
8.2 Synthesis of the results 
Starting point in reasoning how farmers likely make decisions to invest in livestock disease 
control was expected utility theory (EUT) in chapter 2. With high probabilities of herd exposure and 
disease effects at the start of the outbreak, according to EUT, the theoretical expectation is that 
the farmer decides to vaccinate. Re-vaccination is uncertain during the course of the epidemic due 
to a lower probability of herd exposure and enduring protection against infection from previous 
vaccination. Factors that make re-vaccination more likely to happen are risk-averse behaviour and 
farm management aimed at the export of heifers, since herd vaccination allows export to continue 
even though the country is not free from disease.  
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Economic motives to invest in livestock disease control were considered only in chapter 2; 
intrinsic or social motives were not considered. The farmer was modelled as an economic rational 
decision maker, i.e. a person that acts autonomously and in its own self-interest. In chapter 3 and 
4, the reasoned action approach (RAA) from social psychology was tested on a sample of dairy 
farmers. The relative importance of the social-psychological constructs in predicting the intention 
to participate in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue was assessed in chapter 3. It was found 
that intended vaccination behaviour is mainly explained by farmers’ attitude, but also by social 
pressures from injunctive and descriptive norm. With respect to expected utility theory, the latter 
suggests that farmers do not act as autonomous actors but are influenced by what referents think 
what ought to be done and what the expected behaviour of other farmers will be. 
The most influential beliefs underlying the social-psychological constructs were assessed in 
chapter 4. Results suggests that for attitude, instrumental beliefs (e.g. risk reduction) as well as 
experiential beliefs (e.g. animal welfare) are important drivers of the vaccination decision. This 
indicates that in addition to monetary outcomes of the decision, at least a group of farmers also 
consider the non-monetary (or non-pecuniary) outcomes. The results further showed that the most 
influential referents for the farmer are the veterinarian, his or her family members and colleague 
dairy farmers (peers). 
From the findings thus far, three themes for livestock disease control will be further 
elaborated on. These themes coincide with shortcoming of the standard economic model of rational 
choice to describe and predict behaviour. The first theme is about understanding how farmers cope 
with risk in the context of livestock diseases. The standard economic model’s explanation is risk 
aversion, which comes from the expected utility maximisation of a concave utility of wealth function. 
Research from the field of human judgement and decision making shows different anomalies of this 
view (e.g. Kahneman and Knetsch, 1991; Rabin and Thaler, 2001). The second theme focuses       
on the usefulness of financial compensation as a policy instrument given farmers’ heterogeneity in 
motives to invest in livestock disease control. The standard economic model’s view is that people 
have no incentives to invest in a contribution to a public good, and therefore should be compensated 
to maintain their private welfare and induce contribution. The third theme discusses the role of trust 
and social norms. Recognising that the market, which is a central concept in the standard economic 
model, is only one of the coordination mechanisms for carrying out transactions, insights from new 
institutional economics highlight the role of trust and social norms as a means to lower the 
transaction costs (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Williamson, 2010).   
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Understanding how farmers cope with risk 
Chapter 2 based on EUT and the chapters 3 and 4 based on the RAA all highlight that 
disease risk reduction is an important motivation for investing in herd vaccination. How farmers 
cope with risk is a process that is determined by their risk attitude and their risk perceptions. Much 
of the scientific debate in agricultural decision (or risk) analysis has been on the assessment of the 
risk attitude (or preferences), which is reflected by the shape of the utility function. Nowadays, the 
proposed s-shaped utility function from cumulative prospect theory is also tested (Bocquého et al., 
2013; Franken et al., 2014). Less attention is given to how farmers make judgments about 
probabilities and consequences of uncertain events (Lybbert and Just, 2007; Hardaker and Lien, 
2010; Just et al., 2010). 
In chapter 5, farm management and behavioural characteristics were explored that could 
explain heterogeneity in farmers’ attitudinal beliefs regarding vaccination against bluetongue. Self-
reported measures of risk attitude, risk perception, and the Big Five personality traits from 
psychology were associated with variability in these beliefs. Risk attitude and risk perception were 
positively related to milk production intensity and discriminated ‘vaccination intenders’ from non-
intenders. These observations suggest that not all farmers might be risk averse with respect to 
production risks from livestock disease outbreaks, as is often assumed in the economic literature 
(Saha et al., 1994; Hardaker et al., 2015). 
Production risks, however, stem from different sources, and livestock disease is one of 
these. Behavioural decision research emphasizes that the risk attitude can differ from domain to 
domain (Weber et al., 2002; Hansson and Lagerkvist, 2012; Reynaud and Couture, 2012) and 
highlight the importance of experiences, emotions and affect in perceptions of risk (Slovic et al., 
2004; Slovic et al., 2007). Within the risk domain of livestock diseases, risk attitude and risk 
perception can already differ by the characteristics of the disease. For example, endemic livestock 
diseases might be seen as an operational risk while epidemic livestock diseases as a catastrophic 
risk (Valeeva et al., 2011). In the middle of an emergent (bluetongue) livestock disease epidemic, 
farmers’ perception of risk may be higher than more objective risk estimations from veterinary 
experts (Zingg and Siegrist, 2012). 
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Conscientiousness, in addition to measures of risk, discriminated farmers in chapter 5 into 
‘vaccination intenders’ and non-intenders. High scores in conscientiousness are typically associated 
with risk aversion (Nicholson et al., 2005). It remained somewhat unclear how conscientiousness 
relates to livestock disease control, as it can be a sense of duty, achievement striving or both (Moon 
et al., 2012). The feasibility and necessary conditions for combining personality psychology and 
economic theory are investigated (Borghans et al., 2008; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012).  
On the usefulness of financial compensation as a policy instrument 
Results of the chapters 2 to 4 indicate that farmers’ willingness to invest in livestock disease 
control is driven by economic, intrinsic and social motives. This is partly explained by personal 
differences in perceived risk and personality traits. In chapter 6, a survey-based discrete choice 
experiment was used to study more deeply farmers’ choices for different voluntary bluetongue 
vaccination scheme designs. A generalised random utility model of farmers’ behaviour allowed for 
heterogeneity in motives to invest in livestock disease control. Findings from chapter 6 empirically 
confirmed theoretical expectations from chapter 2 which stated that farmers can have private 
economic motives (incentives) to participate in a vaccination scheme, such as to insure the 
production risk from disease infection and to maintain the export of heifers. For farmers who see 
the economic benefits of vaccination, providing subsidies as a means to create net monetary 
benefits is redundant. A commonly held view among economists about the role of subsidization to 
incentivise behaviour is that governments should use it when farmers do not see a private benefit 
from vaccination, e.g. due to lower perceived risk or negative net benefit, while there is still a need 
to increase the vaccination uptake for the sake of the whole (e.g. Bennett, 2012). 
This line of reasoning was worked-out in chapter 2, and it was recommended to adjust the 
provision of financial compensation to the farmers’ willingness to vaccinate over time. In the light of 
the results of all other chapters, this recommendation is not complete. It is important to account 
for the fact that voluntary behaviour can be motivated intrinsically, extrinsically, or both. 
Subsidization is an incentive-based policy instrument and functions, just as certain norms, as an 
external motivating factor. In chapter 3 and 4, it was shown that farmers’ willingness to vaccinate 
against bluetongue is partially driven by perceptions what ought to be done, called injunctive norms. 
Among the most influential referents were the veterinarian, family members and peers, while 
government representatives were one of the least influential referents.  
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A key result from the choice experiment in chapter 6 was the finding that subsidization 
adversely affected farmer’s motivation to comply with the vaccination policy. One of the vaccination 
scheme attributes defined in the choice experiment was the level of government subsidy (none, 10 
per cent or 60 per cent). It was found that providing more subsidy interacted negatively with the 
strength of injunctive norm. Explanations in the economic literature exist and can be linked to 
motivation crowding theory (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy 
et al., 2011; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012). Results of this thesis therefore show that the widely 
held view among economists that providing more financial compensation increases the likelihood 
of participation does not hold in livestock disease control. 
The role of trust and social norms 
 The most important control beliefs in chapter 4 were related to farmers’ information needs 
and the role of perceived trust and confidence in the disease control strategy chosen by animal 
health authorities. The role of trust and social norms was studied in more detail using discrete 
choice experiment methodology in chapter 6, and subsequently using an agent-based model in 
chapter 7. Two other vaccination scheme attributes in the choice experiment were defined for this 
purpose, one about the way government information was provided to farmers (none, via leaflets, 
via veterinarians, or both) and the other about the vaccine adverse effects probability (significant, 
small, negligible), capturing farmers’ perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine safety and 
effectiveness. The results of the econometric model showed that farmer’s attitude interacted 
positively with information provided via veterinarians while descriptive norm interacted positively 
with a lower perceived adverse effects probability. 
The agent-based model simulated the interplay between farmers’ collective behaviour and 
bluetongue disease epidemiology. The utility model specification from chapter 6 described the 
decision-making process of farmers. Other components added that made the model dynamic were 
a social network structure to describe the diffusion process of sharing information about vaccination 
status and a susceptible-latent-infectious-recovered (SLIR) model to describe the disease spread. 
The effectiveness of different bluetongue vaccinations scheme designs was studied as measured 
by disease rate and vaccination uptake.  
Vaccination schemes that focused more on motivating farmers via informational instruments 
were more effective than predicted from the comparative static analysis in chapter 6. Motivation 
via financial incentives resulted in a lower effectiveness than was predicted from that same model. 
With vaccination scheme designs that aim at serving farmers’ information needs, a group of farmers 
is readily motivated to vaccinate. These farmers in turn positively influence other farmers in their 
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social network to vaccinate. This emergent social interaction effect is strengthened with raising 
perceived trust and confidence in the disease control approach. Vaccination is more likely to happen 
if farmers perceive that others in their social network who yet vaccinated experience no adverse 
effects. 
8.3 Implications for policy making 
For several reasons, designing policies for the control of livestock diseases in the 
Netherlands is a complex task. National animal health and livestock disease control in Europe is 
more and more coordinated supranationally via the European Union and the World Organisation for 
Animal Health. Policy makers need to have a good working knowledge of national and supranational 
legislation regarding livestock disease control. At the same time they need to give account to 
society for their policy choices.  
In the forthcoming paragraphs some suggestions are made for improving the design of 
future livestock disease control policies based on a voluntary approach. The implications for policy 
making are better understood when first some attention is given to recent developments in the 
governance of livestock disease control. The key behavioural determinants of the willingness to 
vaccinate found in this thesis are then shortly described, and given the heterogeneity in motives it 
is discussed next what policy makers can do to persuade farmers to cooperate. The final 
paragraphs have some concluding remarks on the regulatory context of disease control 
approaches. 
Recent developments in the governance of livestock disease control 
During the past bluetongue epidemic of 2006 to 2009, the Netherlands, England and Wales 
opted for a voluntary vaccination scheme (Wilson and Mellor, 2009). At the same time, policy 
makers in these countries have considered using insights from behavioural economics and social 
psychology in the design of policies (Collier et al., 2010; Stroeker, 2016). That is making use of 
people’s systematic cognitive biases and heuristics and frame choices in a way that leads to the 
desired behaviour (also called nudging). It is based on the notion that behaviour is governed not 
only by reflective and conscious processes but also by automatic and unconscious processes 
(Ölander and Thøgersen, 2014). Following the formation of a Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in 
2010 in the United Kingdom, in the Netherlands a network of BITs are now formed, for example at 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016). Also the Netherlands Food 
and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) is involved. 
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In recent years, the governance of animal health and livestock disease control is shifting in 
the direction of a neoliberal model of cost and responsibility sharing (Bergevoet et al., 2011). The 
idea behind this model is that when farmers have more control over their actions and have to pay 
for the consequences, then they will take more interest in disease prevention and control actions 
and act more responsibly (Anonymous, 2006). Neoliberalism is a contemporary variant of liberalism. 
According to Humphreys (2009), neoliberalism is based on three core principles: marketisation, an 
enhanced role for the private sector, and deregulation and voluntarism. Individual people and firms 
know what is best for themselves, and should be free to pursue their own interests. Transactions 
should occur via market mechanisms. Deregulation is important to let markets work more effectively 
and efficient. The government’s main role is to secure property rights and act as an initiator, for 
example to create a ‘tradeable phosphate rights’ system. Regulation should be soft and optional 
(e.g. via subsidization). However, it should be noted that with the openness towards using nudging, 
policy makers, in fact, use forms of paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003).  
What policy makers can do to persuade farmers to cooperate 
First of all, policy makers need to account for heterogeneity among farmers in their 
motivation to invest in livestock disease control (Barnes et al., 2015; Ochieng’ and Hobbs, 2016). 
Some farmers will see vaccination mainly as a way to insure against the production risk from disease 
infection. They perceive the risk of disease infection as high and consequences as large. Results in 
chapter 6 indicated that farmers who operate large and intensive farms or who keep heifers for 
export were more likely to vaccinate. 
Other farmers might be more concerned about the adverse effects of vaccination. They do 
not want to be confronted with animal suffering but keep job satisfaction high from working with 
healthy animals. Results in chapter 3, 4 and 6 suggest that farmers can have social and intrinsic 
motives to participate in disease control programs. For example, they consider what important 
referents, such as the veterinarian or family members, think they should do and take into account 
the perceived behaviour of peers.  
A ‘one size fits all’ policy is likely ineffective in livestock disease control given the above. 
Different policy instruments have to be deployed to reach different groups of farmers who vary in 
motives to invest in livestock disease control. Three main types of policy instruments are commonly 
distinguished: financial, incentive based (carrots), regulative (sticks), and informational (promises or 
sermons) instruments (Rothschild, 1999; Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2011). Some authors see 
motivational or social interaction mechanisms, such as social pressures from a group as a fourth 
type of policy instrument to motivate participation (Leeuwis, 2007; Collier et al., 2010). 
163 
Given the actual view on how diseases should be managed in the society, it can be argued 
that information and communication tools are the most obvious policy instruments to inform and/or 
persuade farmers about the need to participate in government-initiated livestock disease control 
policies. Farmers should have a deliberate choice to participate in interventions that serves private 
and public objectives, and should be given the possibility to compare their risk perceptions with 
factual information about the expected probabilities and monetary and non-monetary consequences 
of disease infection with and without the disease control intervention.  
Farmers in the two samples used in this thesis, on average, expressed a fairly positive 
evaluation of performing vaccination against bluetongue. This means that for many of them their 
internal motivation is likely increased by reasoned opinions (Leeuwis, 2007). A well thought-out risk 
communication strategy considers that information is more likely accepted if the source and 
message characteristics are perceived as credible and trustworthy. It is therefore advisable to 
communicate more via personal and local rather than anonymous and distant sources, provided 
that there is agreement on the approach taken by the government. Results of chapter 4 and 6 
suggest that the most obvious communicator would then be the veterinarian.  
The role of subsidization in addition to information provision remains somewhat unclear. 
Economists often advise policy makers to use subsidization to compensate farmers for the positive 
off-farm effects (externalities) from livestock disease control investments such as herd vaccination. 
Oher views are that accepting financial compensation is a free choice which can be rejected or that 
financial compensation manipulates behaviour by making the desired choice more appealing 
(Rothschild, 1999). Results of this thesis on the role of subsidization in voluntary vaccination against 
bluetongue are as follows. It was pointed out in chapter 2 and 6 that production risks and the 
guarantee to continue export of animals might already be sufficient for a group of farmers to 
recognise the economic benefits, so that financial compensation is not needed to have a net return 
from vaccination. Furthermore, for the bluetongue vaccination problem a crowding-out effect was 
found in chapter 6 between injunctive norm and government subsidy. Farmers who felt more social 
pressures from perceptions of what referents think what ought to be done were less likely to 
vaccinate with providing more subsidy. This can occur when “when incentives adversely affect 
individuals’ altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social 
preferences” (Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012, p. 368).  
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Compensation rules in plant and animal health in the European Union are pre-defined to 
prevent decisions on compensation to be crisis driven and to sustain cooperation for future risk 
reduction (Mumford, 2011). In case of vaccination as the control measure, one hundred per cent 
of the cost of supply of the vaccine and fifty per cent of the costs of administering are normally 
compensated for (European Council, 2008). The crowding-out effect that was previously described 
could be minimised by explaining better what the meaning is of providing subsidy and where the 
financial sources come from. The reasons for developing a community fund, as explained in the 
Council Decision 90/424/EEC (European Council, 2006), should be known by the farming 
community. The level of subsidy and the manner in which compensation and reimbursement is 
offered to farmers can have a signalling function, indicating the extent to which the government 
takes the issue seriously. 
Using motivational, social interaction or nudging mechanisms are seen as a fourth type of 
policy instrument. One such nudge is already implicitly described, which is the use of communication 
channels for information sharing that are perceived as credible and trustworthy. Another nudge 
relates to using descriptive norms (herd behaviour) as social pressures to induce behaviour. In the 
context of bluetongue vaccination, results of chapter 6 and 7 suggest that perceived social 
pressures to vaccinate to increase the uptake level become effective only when farmers have trust 
and confidence in the suggested approach to control the disease. Trust and confidence also relate 
to perceptions about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine.  
On the regulatory context of disease control approaches 
The regulatory context for the control of livestock diseases is closely linked to the economic 
and societal impact that these diseases can have (Wilkinson et al., 2011). According to a framework 
developed by the International risk governance council, bluetongue might fall in the so-called 
‘ambiguous’ risk category (Renn, 2005). This means that farmers and other stakeholders have 
different interests, goals and ideas about the severity of the risks associated with bluetongue 
(Roodenrijs et al., 2014). The focus in this thesis was on understanding farmers’ willingness to 
vaccinate against (the re-emergence of) bluetongue under different policy designs. Results were 
based on surveys from dairy farmers with a herd size of at least 40 dairy cows. Other relevant 
farmer stakeholders such as hobby holders keeping ruminants, commercial livestock farmers in 
sheep and goat sectors or veterinarians were not sampled.  
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Only collective vaccination could halt a disease epidemic, requiring a high uptake. In the first 
sample used in chapter 3, 4 and 5, about 25 per cent of the farmers were so-called ‘non-intenders’, 
about 35 per cent ‘undecided’ and about 40 per cent ‘intenders’. In the second sample used in 
chapter 6 and 7, the average vaccination uptake was estimated between 48 and 68 per cent, 
depending on the perceived adverse effects probability, the way government information was 
provided to farmers and the level of government subsidy. Whether to opt for a voluntary approach 
or a command-and-control approach of regulation and enforcement to livestock disease control is 
dependent on farmers’ willingness to act, which in turn is dependent on the approach chosen (May, 
2005a; May, 2005b). 
The methodology used in this thesis mainly studied how the design of policies can be 
improved given the heterogeneity in motives to invest in livestock disease control. As such, only the 
short-term effects related to the (cost-)effectiveness of different designs were studied. The long-
term effects of the control approach selected could be important as well as farmers in the qualitative 
research stage still referred back to a vaccination campaign in 1999 against infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis, in which a batch of vaccines was contaminated (Barkema et al., 2001; Elbers et al., 
2010). Throughout this thesis, using different samples and research methods, the importance of 
trust and confidence was highlighted. Voluntary approaches embedded in social capital, such as 
norms of reciprocity, reputation, and solidarity, have the potential to overcome collective action 
problems. 
8.4 Main scientific contributions 
This thesis started with the application of two normative models of decision making to the 
case of voluntary vaccination against the bluetongue disease. The expected utility theory from 
economics was used in chapter 2 and the reasoned action approach from social psychology was 
used in chapter 3 and 4. Both models of decision making are frequently used in the domain of 
economics of animal health. Three research themes for livestock disease control were subsequently 
worked out in the chapters 5 to 7 (see also section 8.2): how farmers cope with risk in the context 
of livestock diseases, on the usefulness of financial compensation as a policy instrument, and the 
role of trust and social norms. The main overall scientific contribution of this thesis to the domain 
of economics of animal health has been to connect several (social) psychological concepts with 
economic theories, mainly for the purpose to explain variation in farmer decision making and 
behaviour. More specific contributions are discussed in the forthcoming paragraphs. 
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First, in this thesis, recent advances in reasoned action theory (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010) 
have been applied for the first time in the domain of economics of animal health. Compared to 
preceding versions, i.e. the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of 
planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), the reasoned action approach (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010) pays 
attention to different dimensions that underlie the key social-psychological constructs that explain 
intention. For example, based on advancements in research about different types of norms, in 
chapter 3 injunctive norms were distinguished from descriptive norms instead of only measuring 
social norms. These theory advancements have come along with advancements in multivariate 
statistical techniques. A special case of structural equation modelling, called multiple indicators and 
multiple causes model (Jöreskog and Goldberger, 1975; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001; 
Diamantopoulos, 2006), was applied in chapter 4, and therewith introduced for the first time in the 
domain of economics of animal health to assess the most influential beliefs that indirectly explain 
intention. The potential mediating role of background variables, such as perceived risk and 
personality traits, is explicitly accounted for in the reasoned action approach framework. An 
application of using these background variables to explain heterogeneity in farmers’ beliefs was the 
subject of research in chapter 5. 
Second, this thesis contains the second discrete choice experiment in the domain of 
economics of animal health that specifically evaluated farmers’ preferences for vaccination scheme 
design attributes, after the study of Bennett and Balcombe (2012). The application of an integrated 
choice and latent variable model approach from marketing and transport economics in chapter 6 is 
novel to the agricultural and animal health economics literature. This model is based on generalised 
random utility theory (Walker, 2001; Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002; Ben-Akiva et al., 2012) and offers 
a general econometric framework to supplement economic theory with concepts or theories from 
social sciences. The idea of integrating social-psychological constructs into choice models to 
explain preference heterogeneity is not new (e.g. Onozaka et al., 2011; Grebitus et al., 2013; 
Greiner, 2015), but the integrated choice and latent variable model framework in these 
aforementioned studies was not considered. The more formal integration of a latent variable model 
with a choice model gives an improvement over conventional choice models that simply integrate 
social-psychological constructs as covariates, in terms of reducing measurement error and 
potential endogeneity bias (e.g. Ashok et al., 2002; Vij and Walker, 2016). 
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Third, this thesis contributed to the economic literature on the modelling of the interplay 
between farmers’ collective behaviour and disease epidemiology by presenting a bottom-up 
approach by means of an agent-based model in chapter 7. The utility model developed in chapter 
6 was connected with a social network structure and an epidemiological model. Existing studies 
based on mainly information economics approaches, principal-agent theory and game theory 
emphasize the importance of proper financial incentives to invest in voluntary livestock disease 
control (e.g. Hennessy et al., 2005; Gramig et al., 2009; Horan et al., 2015; Wang and Hennessy, 
2015). The results of chapter 7 highlight the importance of serving farmers’ information needs and 
of raising perceived trust and confidence in the disease control approach chosen by animal health 
authorities. 
8.5 Future research 
The study of the appropriateness of voluntary approaches in policy making is not bounded 
to livestock disease control but is found in many policy areas and mostly link to conservation and 
other environmental issues. A search on Scopus with the query ‘TITLE-ABS-KEY (voluntary AND 
(agricultur* OR farm*)) AND (polic*)’, resulted in 708 scientific publications. Figure 1 shows the 
number of publications over time and reveals that it is an growing study topic of interest. 
 
 
Figure 8-1: Number of publications by year from Scopus indicating the increase in research into voluntary 
approaches in policy making. 
There is ample empirical scientific evidence that farmers’ behaviour that involves private 
and public objectives, does not always follow the standard economic model, based on economic 
rationality. The type of research done in this thesis can be extended to many other decision 
problems that have societal relevance, and that involve potential conflicts between private and 
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collective interests. Policy design could improve from understanding first how farmers likely act to 
a government intervention. This information is of particular interest for policy makers who have to 
justify for their budget spending while their policies should be cost-effective in reaching the 
formulated goals. The specific contribution of economic theory with its notions of e.g. resource 
allocation, economic efficiency, and opportunity costs, over other social science disciplines such 
as sociology or psychology to policy making is its ability to quantify different policy outcomes and 
the consideration of uncertainty (Pannell, 2004). 
The main research themes that were identified and discussed in section 8.2 and 8.4 – how 
farmers cope with risk, the usefulness of financial compensation as a policy instrument, and the 
role of trust and social norms could be elaborated further in the light of recent findings and insights 
from the field of human judgement and decision making. A key concept that extends to all disciplines 
in this field is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Motivations in economic 
theory are just manifestations of underlying preferences; The extrinsic type of motivation is 
considered only in decision models that assume economic rationality via (mainly monetary) 
incentives coming from outside the decision maker. Future research could try to empirically test 
new theoretical economic viewpoints such as the idea of motivational crowding (Frey and Jegen, 
2001; Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012).  
One line of future research will be proceeding with the application of reasoned action theory 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). The latter does not impose restrictions on the type of motivation. It is 
a flexible theory in the sense that constructs or background variables (see chapter 5) which are 
hypothesized to be relevant for a decision problem are easily added to the key social-psychological 
constructs of attitude and social norms to explain behaviour (see e.g. Onwezen et al., 2013; 
Onwezen et al., 2014; van Dijk et al., 2015; van Dijk et al., 2016). In an excellent book chapter in 
which Icek Ajzen discusses the position of social psychology in the field of human judgment and 
decision making (1996), he shows that expected utility theory and reasoned action theory have 
similar ideas how people come to their decisions as both rely on the expectancy-value model 
(Feather, 1959; Feather, 1982). He argues that rational choice models are not the most accurate 
description of the way decisions are made, but rather an ideal or normative model based on 
statistical principles of probability and logic. Reasoned action theory deals with decision making in 
the more general context of predicting and explaining behaviour but is less sophisticated from an 
econometric perspective, as often simple rating (Likert) scales are used from which e.g. no welfare 
implications can be derived. This type of research could also be interesting for private actors in the 
agricultural sector, such as accountancy firms, banks or buyers, who have an economic relationship 
with farmers and want to improve consultancy or optimise collaboration in the supply chain.  
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A second line of future research will be to discover the usability of experimental methods in 
economics to understand and predict farmers’ behaviour. One such method, the discrete choice 
experiment which belongs to the family of stated preference methods, was applied in this thesis, in 
chapter 6. It makes use of surveys that are sent to a sample of farmers by mail, via the internet, or 
both. Discrete choice experiment methodology continues to improve on different aspects. The 
application in this thesis focused on explaining preference heterogeneity from a behavioural point 
of view using the integrated choice and latent variable model framework (e.g. Ben-Akiva et al., 
2012). 
Other experimental methods are framed field experiments (Harrison and List, 2004) or 
extra-laboratory experiments (Charness et al., 2013). One promising application of such 
experiments are so-called business simulation games (Holst et al., 2014; Buchholz et al., 2016; 
Moser and Mußhoff, 2016; Freudenreich and Mußhoff, 2017; Hermann et al., 2017). Within a 
decision-making environment that is made as realistically as possible, farmers in aforementioned 
studies were asked to make a series of production decisions under different policy designs (the 
treatment effect). Such research methods could be very well used to study farmer behaviour for all 
research themes that were identified and discussed in section 8.2 and 8.4 of this chapter.  
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8.6 Main conclusions of this thesis 
 Dutch dairy farmers who operate large-scale and intensive farms or keep heifers for export are 
likely to have private economic motives to vaccinate against bluetongue (Chapter 2, 4, 5 and 6). 
 Farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue is mostly driven by attitude, followed by 
perceived social pressures from injunctive and descriptive norms. This implies farmers can be 
motivated intrinsically, extrinsically, or both (Chapter 3).  
 Dutch dairy farmers have intrinsic motives to vaccinate against bluetongue. They do not want 
to be confronted with animal suffering but want to keep job satisfaction high from working with 
healthy animals (Chapter 4).  
 Dutch dairy farmers have social motives to vaccinate against bluetongue. They consider what 
important referents, such as the veterinarian or family members, think they should do and take 
into account the perceived behaviour of peers (Chapter 3 and 4). 
 Perceived risk, personality traits and past behaviour are important behavioural variables for 
explaining the heterogeneity in beliefs to vaccinate against bluetongue (Chapter 5). 
 The efficacy of financial, incentive based instruments to motivate to vaccinate against 
bluetongue is heterogeneous and not necessarily positive for each farmer. They are not 
effective if farmers already expect a positive net benefit from vaccination or if they crowd-out 
the motivation to comply with the vaccination policy (Chapter 2, 4, 6, 7). 
 The efficacy of informational policy instruments to motivate farmers to vaccinate against 
bluetongue is positively affected by farmers’ attitude towards vaccination and in case farmers 
perceive the communication channels used as credible and trustworthy (Chapter 3, 4, 6).  
 The efficacy of social interaction mechanisms in policy making, such as the perceived social 
pressure to vaccinate against bluetongue, is positively affected by farmers’ trust and confidence 
in the government approach to control the disease (Chapter 4, 6, 7).  
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Summary 
Animal health authorities in the European Union nowadays consider voluntary approaches 
based on a neoliberal model of cost and responsibility sharing as a tool for controlling livestock 
diseases. Policy makers aim for policies that are soft and optional, and use insights from behavioural 
economics and social psychology. Voluntary approaches are flexible in terms of legislation and can 
be effective at lower costs, provided that farmers are willing to participate. In 2008, the Dutch 
animal health authorities used a voluntary vaccination approach to control an emerging bluetongue 
epidemic that started end of 2006. Nearly 60,000 holdings with ruminants were already affected 
by the end of 2007 and experts indicated that transmission could only be stopped through mass 
vaccination. Farmers were motivated to participate by informational and financial, incentive-based 
policy instruments.  
Economic theory predicts that farmers underinvest in private disease control measures in 
the presence of externalities. These studies, however, assume farmers only consider the private 
economic motives and that they only can be extrinsically motivated via (monetary) incentives. If the 
willingness to invest in livestock disease control is also driven by intrinsic and social motives, this 
could imply that not only financial compensation, but a mix of policy instruments is needed to make 
voluntary approaches work. 
The overarching research objective of this thesis was to assess the key determinants of 
farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue and study the impact of different policy designs 
on the effectiveness of voluntary vaccination approaches to bluetongue disease control. 
A three-stage research approach was conducted. Two models of decision making, one from 
economics and one from social psychology, were first applied to the case study to obtain a solid 
understanding of important perceptions and motivations that farmers have to invest in livestock 
disease control. These motivations (sometimes incentives) and perceptions were then related to 
different attributes of a vaccination scheme to have a better understanding of how a higher uptake 
can be obtained. In the third stage, the effect of the interplay between farmers’ collective behaviour 
and disease epidemiology on disease rate and vaccination uptake was studied. 
Expected utility theory was used in combination with decision analysis and Monte Carlo 
simulation in chapter 2. The economic risk and monetary outcomes of the vaccination decision were 
considered, intrinsic or social motives ignored. The theoretical expectation from the analysis is that 
with high probabilities of herd exposure and disease effects at the start of the outbreak the farmer 
decides to vaccinate. Re-vaccination is uncertain during the course of the epidemic due to a lower 
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probability of herd exposure and enduring protection against infection from previous vaccination. 
Factors that make re-vaccination more likely to happen are risk-averse behaviour and farm 
management aimed at the export of heifers. The decision moment – before or during an epidemic 
– and the characteristics of the disease – endemic, epidemic or emerging – are important factors 
in perceptions of disease risk. 
Chapters 3 to 5 used data from a survey that was based on the reasoned action approach. 
Data were analysed with a variety of statistical, mostly multivariate, techniques. The relative 
importance of the social-psychological constructs in predicting the intention to participate in a 
hypothetical reactive vaccination scheme against bluetongue was assessed in chapter 3. It was 
found that intended vaccination behaviour was mainly explained by farmers’ attitude, but also by 
social pressures from injunctive and descriptive norms.  Perceived behavioural control was the least 
important predictor of intention. 
The most influential beliefs underlying the social-psychological constructs were assessed in 
chapter 4. Results suggested that instrumental beliefs (e.g. risk reduction) as well as experiential 
beliefs (e.g. animal welfare) were important drivers of the attitude towards vaccination against 
bluetongue. This indicates that in addition to monetary outcomes of the decision, at least a group 
of farmers also consider the non-monetary (or non-pecuniary) outcomes. The results further showed 
that the most influencing referents for the farmer are the veterinarian, his or her family members 
and colleague dairy farmers (peers). Two influencing control beliefs were associated with the 
provision of information and perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine safety, effectiveness and 
government approach to control the disease.  
The aim of chapter 5 was to explore factors that could explain heterogeneity in farmers’ 
attitudinal beliefs. In particular, perceived risk, measured by a relative risk attitude and risk 
perception, and the Big Five personality traits were associated with variability in these beliefs. 
Conscientiousness discriminated farmers into a group of ‘vaccination intenders’ and non-intenders 
although it remained somewhat unclear how it relates to the decision problem, as it can be a sense 
of duty, achievement striving or both. The perceived risk measures were related to the milk 
production intensity and also discriminated intenders from non-intenders. These differences in 
perceived risk indicated that farmers might not be commonly risk averse, however, it is important 
to account for the domain specificity of risk taking behaviour.  
 
 
199 
A survey-based discrete choice experiment was used in chapter 6 to study more deeply 
farmers’ choices for different voluntary bluetongue vaccination scheme designs. A generalised 
random utility model of farmers’ behaviour allowed for heterogeneity in motives to invest in 
bluetongue disease control. Results showed that farmers have private economic motives 
(incentives) to participate in a vaccination scheme, such as to insure the production risk from 
disease infection and to maintain the export of heifers. 
Interaction effects found between social-psychological constructs and specific designs of 
policy instruments highlighted the importance of perceived trust and confidence in the vaccine 
safety and effectiveness and in the disease control strategy chosen by animal health authorities. 
Attitude interacted positively with government communication (information) provided via 
veterinarians. Descriptive norm interacted positively with a lower perceived probability of adverse 
effects. This suggests that farmers are more likely to vaccinate if they perceive that others in their 
social network perform vaccination without experiencing adverse effects. Injunctive norm interacted 
negatively with a higher level of government subsidy. This suggested a crowding-out mechanism 
through which subsidization adversely affect farmer’s motivation to comply with the vaccination 
policy. 
The interplay between farmers’ collective behaviour and bluetongue disease epidemiology 
was studied in chapter 7 with an agent-based model. The utility model specification from chapter 6 
was used to describe the decision-making process of farmers. Other components that added to the 
dynamic nature of the model were a social network structure of the diffusion process of sharing 
information about vaccination status and a susceptible-latent-infectious-recovered model of disease 
spread. The effectiveness of different bluetongue vaccinations scheme designs was studied as 
measured by disease rate and vaccination uptake.  
Results of chapter 7 showed that vaccination schemes that focus more on motivating 
farmers via informational instruments were somewhat more effective than predicted from the 
comparative static analysis in chapter 6. Motivation via financial incentives resulted in a somewhat 
lower effectiveness than was predicted from that same model. This might be explained as an 
emergent effect that evolves under specific vaccination scheme designs from the interactions 
between farmers themselves and with the environment from which they observe the progress of 
the disease. These schemes focus more on serving the information needs of farmers and raising 
the perceived trust and confidence in the disease control approach rather than on incentivising with 
higher levels of subsidy. 
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Three themes for livestock disease control emerged from the synthesis of the results  in 
chapter 8, which were subsequently discussed in relation to the wider economic and (social) 
psychological literature. These themes coincide with shortcoming of the standard economic model 
of rational choice to describe and predict behaviour. The first theme was about understanding how 
farmers cope with risk in the context of livestock diseases. The second theme focused on the 
usefulness of financial compensation as a policy instrument. The third theme discussed the role of 
trust and social norms. After discussing the implications for policy making, main scientific 
contributions and suggestions for future research, the chapter concluded that: 
 Dutch dairy farmers who operate large-scale and intensive farms or keep heifers for export are 
likely to have private economic motives to vaccinate against bluetongue (Chapter 2, 4, 5 and 6). 
 Farmers’ willingness to vaccinate against bluetongue is mostly driven by attitude, followed by 
perceived social pressures from injunctive norms and descriptive norms. This implies farmers 
can be motivated intrinsically, extrinsically, or both (Chapter 3).  
 Dutch dairy farmers have intrinsic motives to vaccinate against bluetongue. They do not want 
to be confronted with animal suffering but want to keep job satisfaction high from working with 
healthy animals (Chapter 4).  
 Dutch dairy farmers have social motives to vaccinate against bluetongue. They consider what 
important referents, such as the veterinarian or family members, think they should do and take 
into account the perceived behaviour of peers (Chapter 3 and 4). 
 Perceived risk, personality traits and past behaviour are important behavioural variables for 
explaining the heterogeneity in beliefs to vaccinate against bluetongue (Chapter 5). 
 The efficacy of financial, incentive based instruments to motivate to vaccinate against 
bluetongue is heterogeneous and not necessarily positive for each farmer. They are not 
effective if farmers already expect a positive net benefit from vaccination or if they crowd-out 
the motivation to comply with the vaccination policy (Chapter 2, 4, 6, 7). 
 The efficacy of informational policy instruments to motivate farmers to vaccinate against 
bluetongue is positively affected by farmers’ attitude towards vaccination and in case farmers 
perceive the communication channels used as credible and trustworthy (Chapter 3, 4, 6).  
 The efficacy of social interaction mechanisms in policy making, such as the perceived social 
pressure to vaccinate against bluetongue, is positively affected by farmers’ trust and confidence 
in the government approach to control the disease (Chapter 4, 6, 7). 
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Samenvatting 
Diergezondheidsautoriteiten in de Europese Unie overwegen steeds meer een vrijwillige 
aanpak, gebaseerd op een neoliberaal model van het delen van kosten en verantwoordelijkheden, 
als instrument voor beheersing van dierziekten. Beleidsmakers streven naar beleid dat ‘soft’ en 
optioneel is, en gebruiken inzichten vanuit gedragseconomie en sociale psychologie. Een vrijwillige 
aanpak is flexibel qua wetgeving en kan kunnen effectief zijn tegen lagere kosten, op voorwaarde 
dat boeren bereid zijn om deel te nemen. In 2008 stelden de Nederlandse 
diergezondheidsautoriteiten een vrijwillig vaccinatieprogramma in om een emergente 
blauwtongepidemie te kunnen beheersen, die eind 2006 opgekomen was. Bijna 60.000 bedrijven 
met herkauwers waren al geïnfecteerd geraakt tegen het einde van 2007 en experts gaven aan dat 
de transmissie alleen beheerst kon worden door middel van massavaccinatie. Boeren werden 
gemotiveerd om deel te nemen met beleidsinstrumenten gericht op het verstrekken van informatie 
en financiële compensatie.  
Economische theorie voorspelt dat boeren onderinvesteren in maatregelen gericht op 
beheersing van dierziekten in de aanwezigheid van externaliteiten. Deze studies veronderstellen 
echter dat boeren alleen economische drijfveren hebben en dat ze alleen extrinsiek gemotiveerd 
kunnen worden door middel van monetaire prikkels. Indien de bereidheid om te investeren in 
dierziektebeheersing ook gedreven wordt door intrinsieke en sociale drijfveren, zou dat kunnen 
betekenen dat niet alleen financiële compensatie, maar een mix van beleidsinstrumenten nodig is 
om een vrijwillige aanpak te bewerkstelligen werkzaam te maken. 
Het overkoepelende onderzoeksdoel van dit proefschrift was het vaststellen van de 
belangrijkste determinanten van de bereidheid van boeren om te vaccineren tegen blauwtong en 
het bestuderen van de impact van verschillende beleidsontwerpen op de effectiviteit van vrijwillige 
vaccinatieprogramma’s gericht op de beheersing van blauwtong.  
De onderzoeksaanpak werd uitgevoerd in drie fasen. Allereerst werden twee modellen van 
besluitvorming, één uit de economie en één uit de sociale psychologie, toegepast op de casus voor 
het verkrijgen van een goed begrip van de belangrijkste percepties en motivaties die boeren hebben 
om te investeren in de dierziektebeheersing. Deze motivaties (soms prikkels) en percepties werden 
vervolgens gerelateerd  aan verschillende attributen van een vaccinatieprogramma om beter te 
begrijpen hoe een hogere opname kan worden verkregen. In de derde fase werd het effect van het 
samenspel tussen het (collectieve) gedrag van boeren en epidemiologie van ziekte op de mate van 
ziektegevallen en vaccinatiegraad bestudeerd. 
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De theorie van verwacht nut werd gebruikt in hoofdstuk 2 in combinatie met beslisanalyse 
en Monte-Carlosimulatie. Economisch risico en monetaire uitkomsten van vaccinatiebeslissingen 
werden overwogen, intrinsieke of sociale drijfveren buiten beschouwing gelaten. De theoretische 
verwachting uit de analyse is dat de boer in geval van hoge kansen op blootstelling van de kudde 
aan infectie en ziekte-effecten aan het begin van de uitbraak besluit te vaccineren. Opnieuw 
vaccineren is onzeker tijdens het verloop van de epidemie als gevolg van een lagere kans op 
blootstelling en blijvende bescherming tegen infectie van eerdere vaccinatie. Factoren die opnieuw 
vaccineren meer waarschijnlijk maken  zijn risico-avers gedrag en bedrijfsbeheer gericht op export 
van vaarzen. Het moment van besluiten – vóór of tijdens een epidemie – en de karakteristieken van 
de ziekte – endemisch, epidemisch of emergent – zijn belangrijke factoren in de perceptie van 
ziekterisico.  
De hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5 waren zijn gebaseerd op data van een enquête die werd 
ontworpen op basis van het beredeneerd gedragsmodel. Gegevens werden geanalyseerd met een 
verscheidenheid aan statistische, meestal multivariate, technieken. Het relatieve gewicht van de 
sociaal-psychologische constructen in het voorspellen van de intentie om deel te nemen aan een 
hypothetisch reactief vaccinatieprogramma tegen blauwtong werd vastgesteld in hoofdstuk 3. 
Gevonden werd dat voorgenomen vaccinatiegedrag voornamelijk verklaard woerdt door de attitude 
ten opzichte van vaccinatie van boeren, maar ook door sociale druk van injunctieve en descriptieve 
normen. Ervaren controle over het gedrag was de onbelangrijkste minst belangrijkste predictor van 
intentie.     
De invloedrijkste meest invloedrijke overtuigingen onderliggend aan de sociaal-
psychologische constructen werden vastgesteld in hoofdstuk 4. De uitkomsten suggereerden dat 
instrumentele overtuigingen (bijv. over risicoreductie) en ervaringsgerichte overtuigingen (bijv. over 
dierenwelzijn) de attitude ten opzichte van vaccinatie tegen blauwtong stururden. Dit geeft aan dat 
in aanvulling op de monetaire uitkomsten van beslissingen een deel van de boeren ook niet-
monetaire uitkomsten overweegt. , tenminste een groep van boeren ook de niet-monetaire 
uitkomsten overweegt. De uitkomsten lieten verder zien dat de meest invloedrijke referenten voor 
de boer de dierenarts, familieleden en collega-boeren zijn. Twee overtuigingen met betrekking tot 
ervaren controle waren geassocieerd met het verstrekken van informatie en het ervaren vertrouwen 
in de veiligheid van het vaccin, de effectiviteit en de overheidsaanpak van de beheersing van de 
ziekte.  
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Het doel van hoofdstuk 5 was het verkennen van factoren die de heterogeniteit in 
gedragsovertuigingen konden verklaren. Met name konden waargenomen risico, gemeten als een 
relatieve risicoattitude en ervaren risico, en de ‘Big Five’- persoonskenmerken worden geassocieerd 
met variabiliteit in de overtuigingen. Zorgvuldigheid onderscheidde boeren van elkaar in een groep 
van ‘voorgenomen vaccineerders’ en ‘niet-voorgenomen vaccineerders’, alhoewel het onduidelijk 
bleef hoe dit relateert aan het beslisprobleem, omdat het kan slaan op plichtsgevoel, 
prestatiestreven, of beide. De meetinstrumenten voor waargenomen risico meetinstrumenten waren 
gerelateerd aan de intensiteit van melkproductie en onderscheidden ‘voorgenomen vaccineerders’ 
van niet-voorgenomen’ vaccineerders. Deze verschillen in waargenomen risico suggereren dat 
boeren niet in het algemeen risicoavers zijn, het is echter van belang om hierbij rekening te houden 
met de domeinspecificiteit van risicogedrag. 
Een enquête-gebaseerd discreet keuze-experiment werd toegepast in hoofdstuk 6 voor het 
dieper bestuderen van de keuzes van boeren uit verschillende vrijwillige vaccinatieprogramma-
ontwerpen voor de beheersing van blauwtong. Een gegeneraliseerd willekeurig nutsmodel van het 
gedrag van boeren stond toe voor heterogeniteit in drijfveren om te investeren in 
dierziektebeheersing voor blauwtong. De uitkomsten lieten zien dat boeren economische drijfveren 
(prikkels) hebben om deel te nemen aan een vaccinatieprogramma, zoals het verzekeren van de 
productierisico’s afkomstig van dierziekte-infectie en het behouden van de mogelijkheid van export 
van vaarzen. 
Interactie-effecten tussen sociaal-psychologische constructen en specifieke ontwerpen van 
beleidsinstrumenten benadrukten het belang van ervaren vertrouwen in de veiligheid van het vaccin, 
de effectiviteit en de overheidsaanpak van de beheersing van de ziekte. Attitude interacteerde 
positief met informatie van de overheid verspreid via dierenartsen. Descriptieve norm interacteerde 
positief met een lager ervaren kans op bijwerkingen van het vaccin. Dit suggereert dat boeren meer 
geneigd zijn om te vaccineren wanneer zij merken dat anderen in hun sociale netwerk vaccineren 
zonder bijwerkingen te ervaren. Injunctieve norm interacteerde negatief met een hoger niveau van 
overheidssteun. Dit suggereert een verdringingmechanisme waardoor subsidiëring de motivatie van 
boeren om aan het vaccinatiebeleid te voldoen nadelig beïnvloedt. 
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Het samenspel tussen het (collectieve) gedrag van boeren en epidemiologie van ziekte werd 
bestudeerd in hoofdstuk 7 met een ‘agent-based’ (computationeel) model. De nutsmodelspecificatie 
uit hoofdstuk 6 werd gebruikt om het besluitvormingsproces van boeren te beschrijven. Andere 
componenten die werden toegevoegd voor het dynamische karakter van het model waren een 
sociale netwerkstructuur van het verspreidingsproces van het delen van informatie over de 
vaccinatiestatus en een ‘vatbaar-latent-infectieus-hersteld’-model van de ziekteverspreiding. De 
effectiviteit van verschillende vrijwillige vaccinatieprogramma-ontwerpen voor de beheersing van 
blauwtong werd bestudeerd aan de hand van de mate van ziektegevallen en vaccinatiegraad. 
Uit de resultaten van hoofdstuk 7 blijkt dat vaccinatieprogramma’s die meer gericht zijn op 
het motiveren van boeren via informatie--instrumenten enigszins meer effectief waren dan voorspeld 
op basis van de comparatief-statische analyse uit hoofdstuk 6. Het motiveren via financiële prikkels 
resulteerde in een enigszins lagere effectiviteit dan was voorspeld door datzelfde model. Dit kan 
worden uitgelegd als een emergent effect dat ontstaat onder specifieke vaccinatieprogramma-
ontwerpen, door de interacties tussen boeren onderling en met de omgeving van waaruit ze de 
voortgang van de ziekte waarnemen. Deze programma’s richten zich meer op het bedienen van de 
informatiebehoeften van boeren en het versterken van ervaren vertrouwen in de beheersingsaanpak 
in plaats van het stimuleren met hogere subsidieniveaus. 
Drie thema’s voor dierziektebeheersing kwamen voort uit de synthese van de resultaten in 
hoofdstuk 8, welke vervolgens besproken werden in relatie tot de bredere economische en sociaal-
psychologische literatuur. Deze thema’s vallen samen met tekortkomingen van het standaard-
economische model van rationele keuzes voor het beschrijven en voorspellen van gedrag. Het 
eerste thema ging over een beter begrip van hoe boeren omgaan met risico in de context van 
dierziekten. Het tweede thema richtte zich op de bruikbaarheid van financiële compensatie als 
beleidsinstrument. Het derde thema had betrekking op de rol van vertrouwen en sociale normen. 
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Na het bespreken van de implicaties voor beleid, de belangrijkste wetenschappelijke 
bijdragen en suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek, werd in dit hoofdstuk geconcludeerd dat: 
 Nederlandse melkveehouders die grootschalig en intensief boeren of vaarzen houden voor de 
export naar alle waarschijnlijkheid economische drijfveren hebben om te vaccineren tegen 
blauwtong (hoofdstukken 2, 4, 5 en 6). 
 De bereidheid van boeren om te vaccineren tegen blauwtong met name gedreven wordt door 
de attitude, gevolgd door ervaren sociale druk van injunctieve en descriptieve normen. Dit houdt 
in dat boeren intrinsiek, extrinsiek of op beide manieren kunnen worden gemotiveerd (hoofdstuk 
3). 
 Nederlandse melkveehouders hebben intrinsieke drijfveren om te vaccineren tegen blauwtong. 
Ze willen niet worden geconfronteerd met dierlijk lijden, maar arbeidsvreugde halen uit het 
werken met gezonde dieren (hoofdstuk 4). 
 Nederlandse melkveehouders hebben sociale drijfveren om te vaccineren tegen blauwtong. Ze 
overwegen wat belangrijke referenten zoals de dierenarts en familieleden, vinden wat zij moeten 
doen en houden rekening met het verwachte gedrag van collega-boeren (hoofdstuk 3 en 4).  
 Waargenomen risico, persoonskenmerken en gedrag in het verleden zijn belangrijke 
gedragsvariabelen voor het verklaren van heterogeniteit in gedragsovertuigingen om te 
vaccineren tegen blauwtong (hoofdstuk 5).  
 De doelmatigheid van financiële instrumenten voor het motiveren van boeren om te vaccineren 
tegen blauwtong is heterogeen en niet noodzakelijk positief voor elke boer. Ze zijn niet effectief 
als boeren al positieve nettobaten verwachten van vaccinatie of wanneer ze de bereidheid om 
te voldoen aan het vaccinatiebeleid verdringen. 
 De doelmatigheid van informatie-instrumenten voor het motiveren van boeren om te vaccineren 
tegen blauwtong wordt positief beïnvloed door de attitude van boeren ten opzichte van 
vaccineren en wanneer zij de communicatiekanalen als geloofwaardig en betrouwbaar ervaren. 
 De doelmatigheid van sociale interactiemechanismen in beleid, zoals de ervaren sociale druk 
om te vaccineren tegen blauwtong, wordt positief beïnvloed door het vertrouwen van boeren in 
de overheidsaanpak van de beheersing van de ziekte. 
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